Author and economist Donald Shoup of UCLA talks about destructive parking policies with EconTalk host Russ Roberts. Shoup argues that most parking policies inflict unseen damage on the economy. He urges cities to charge for curbside parking and use the proceeds to improve the neighborhood beyond the curb. Stroup also explains the surprising harm done by requiring new buildings to provide a minimum level of off-street parking. (7 COMMENTS)
Author and economist Donald Shoup of UCLA talks about destructive parking policies with EconTalk host Russ Roberts. Shoup argues that most parking policies inflict unseen damage on the economy. He urges cities to charge for curbside parking and use the proceeds to improve the neighborhood beyond the curb. Stroup also explains the surprising harm done […] The post Donald Shoup on the Economics of Parking appeared first on Econlib.
Author and economist Donald Shoup of UCLA talks about destructive parking policies with EconTalk host Russ Roberts. Shoup argues that most parking policies inflict unseen damage on the economy. He urges cities to charge for curbside parking and use the proceeds to improve the neighborhood beyond the curb. Stroup also explains the surprising harm done […] The post Donald Shoup on the Economics of Parking appeared first on Econlib.
Author and economist Donald Shoup of UCLA talks about destructive parking policies with EconTalk host Russ Roberts. Shoup argues that most parking policies inflict unseen damage on the economy. He urges cities to charge for curbside parking and use the proceeds to improve the neighborhood beyond the curb. Stroup also explains the surprising harm done […] The post Donald Shoup on the Economics of Parking appeared first on Econlib.
Power, strategy, and imagination in 2034: A Novel of the Next World War 2034: A Novel of the Next World War, by Elliot Ackerman and Admiral James Stavridis, is a startling book. Not because of the general scenario it lays out—few students of politics and international affairs will be surprised by the suggestion that great power conflict between China and the United States is a realistic possibility in the years ahead—but because of the way in which the novel paints the story (really, the stories) of how a “cold” conflict could foreseeably advance to outright kinetic exchange. The crises and reciprocal escalations laid out in this book may be imagined, but as a quick glance at the biographies of the authors should reinforce, they are not at all divorced from the realm of history, logic, and strategic fact. Many of the seeds of the novel’s imaginary future conflict have already been sown in our real-life world of today. But it would be quite the mistake to interpret this work as a deterministic account of what the authors perceive to be the most likely path ahead, let alone the most desirable one. It is neither. It is rather an evocation of certain worst-case scenarios—what if our adversaries pull ahead of us in key areas of cyber and stealth technology? what if cooler heads do not always prevail within national security and defense establishments? —with the clear authorial intention of prompting serious people in positions of power and influence today to seriously rethink the road we are on with respect to China. Much of the setup of the novel is concerned with empire and overreach, how one era of international primacy gives way to another. We read of Athens and Persia, the Crown and the Raj. We read also of the world that is dawning, the world in which the subcontinent has risen to assume not just an equal, but an advanced station amongst the powers of the Earth. A longer and more complex version of this novel would likely have a similar story to tell about where we could expect certain “rising” African nations to be by the year 2034, or soon after. The upshot, though, is simple: We do not live in a world of US hegemony anymore, or if we do, we very soon probably will not. The unipolar moment is giving way to bipolarity once again, with Russia, Iran, Turkey, and a few other unaligned states doing what they can to maximize the realization of their own (largely regional) interests in and around the margins. This is not necessarily the end of world order as we know it, but it is something to be grasped. And my takeaway as a concerned and patriotic American is that grasp it we must. I am no friend of the ruling government in China, a repressive regime built on lies and the bodies of purged “enemies of the state.” (Often former officials whose usefulness to their superiors has expired.) I think that what the Chinese Communist Party has done to the Uyghur Muslim population deserves the designation of genocide, and I am humbly aware (largely in the sense of epistemic humility) that there are likely many other brutally oppressed groups, sects, and individuals within China who do not enjoy the same level of media and NGO attention as has lately fixed upon Xinjiang province. The “People’s Republic” of China is a closed, totalitarian society (certainly in the Arendtian sense, and more and more so in the Orwellian), and its government routinely commits unjust acts of intimidation, coercion, and rendition/disappearance/assassination against dissidents and perceived hostile forces, all in a so-far-successful effort to keep the ruling CCP elite in power, under the increasingly consolidated command of Xi Jinping. Control, order, and discipline are the operative terms when Chinese government officials speak of ends. Freedom and the space for pluralistic human flourishing do not factor in. So, when we compare the moral legitimacy of each regime, its suite of ends and means, there is no question in my mind that the United States maintains the high ground, by a lot, now and into the future. This despite our many mistakes and shortcomings both at home (widespread exclusion of underclass groups from full enjoyment of American life, and a persistent inability—or is it an unwillingness? —to effectively help individuals from such groups rise to a firmer social and economic footing) and abroad (starting wars we don’t have plans to finish, killing civilians and making additional enemies in the process). But though we possess the more legitimate aims of advancing human freedom, championing republican democracy, and upholding a liberal, rules-based international order, we should not make the mistake of thinking that we can use our powers to project our ideals whenever and wherever we want. (See Iraq, Afghanistan.) There is a real world that we live in, a world that has not escaped History in the Fukuyaman sense. We must face its facts, and we must read the course of human events. The fact is, China has risen, and it has done so using a combination of state control, widespread surveillance, limited employment of market mechanisms, and revolutionary communist ideology (even if very few people in China and its government actually believe it full-stop, it still has its uses, particularly when enemies need to be identified and “dealt with,” whether in propaganda or by state security forces.) Reading the course we see that, through leapfrogging effects, copycat methods, and espionage campaigns, to say nothing of population size and imagined-historical self-conceptions, the Chinese military will soon be able to hold its own against our own, particularly near the Chinese mainland. And that brings us to the humbling heart of the book: Taiwan and the South China Sea. Wearing my idealist hat, I want to say—and have recently said—that Taiwan is a country, and will remain so, under the guarantee of US and allied force of arms. I’ve felt the same way about upholding “freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea. Upon reading 2034 and being forced to sit with just some of the consequences that could, or would, or will follow from maintaining that posture, I am less sure about this idealistic position. I am less sure because the novel actually enriched my understanding of the Chinese point of view, purely from a great-power nation-state perspective. Both contested zones are very close to the Chinese mainland. Taiwan is an embarrassment to the CCP (as it should be [i]) and the South China Sea is a proving ground for force projection and the display of “national greatness.” Much as it pains the idealist in me to say this, I think we need to devise a framework in which we let these areas go, while mitigating the most harmful effects of doing so. I suggest from the armchair that we could do this by issuing visas and establishing pathways to citizenship in the US and allied nations for all residents of Taiwan who do not wish to be assimilated into the PRC, under a policy of “covered retreat.” I suspect that many of the island’s 23.6 million residents would want to participate. I have few concerns about the liberal and open nations of the world (to include Canada, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, the U.K., and the countries of Europe, as well as, hopefully, allies in Central and South America and Africa) being able to do this. Sure, there would be some administrative, economic, and even social and cultural challenges to account for, but at its best this consortium of nation states—operating on good will within the liberal order of treaties, alliances, and international organizations—could overcome them. Similarly, in the South China Sea (as to be distinguished from the Philippine Sea and the western Pacific Ocean), the United States should probably move toward a less aggressive policy of patrolling and projecting force into the region. I encourage my fellow Americans to look at a map of the area. It’s not our backyard—it’s theirs. I don’t want to incentivize the regular presence of Chinese military vessels in the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, off the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, or in the neighborhood of Hawaii and other overseas territories. We can ward off such unwelcome visits by ceasing our own provocations—the authors of 2034 seem to agree that this is what they are—on the doorstep of the Chinese mainland. No militaristic great power will tolerate them forever. Some will challenge the posture of “Far East Asian” renunciation that I here advocate, perhaps even going so far as to call it “appeasement.” Such persons might think me naïve for suggesting that the PRC/CCP will stop at Taiwan and the Spratly Islands and similar currently contested territories. But I am not suggesting that. Perhaps after the fall of Taiwan (qua territory) and the conquest of the South China Sea the PRC will continue on a path of territorial conquest, menacing Vietnam or the Philippines. Or Brunei, Indonesia, or Malaysia. It’s possible, and were it to happen the U.S. would again have to do what it could to either ameliorate the evil around the edges (more visas and resettlement assistance programs, building international consensus against further Chinese aggression, etc.) or, in the case of egregious aggression, to mount a direct response. We’d be in the best position to take the lead in organizing such a response if we weren’t engaged beforehand in controversial force-projection exercises ourselves, which the CCP will invariably point to on the world stage as they try to justify their own actually aggressive actions. (See their record of finger-pointing and deflective antics at the UN and the recent Alaskan summit.) Give them nothing, and their actions will be naked. The flipside of renouncing our pretensions to police the coastal seas of East Asia must then be establishing a clear but more credible zone of containment around China, and a protective zone around United States territories and those of our regional allies (Japan, Australia, South Korea, etc.). Taiwan I view as strategically indefensible under the U.S. umbrella, unfortunately, short of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (keep in mind that a threat must be credible to be effective), which I cannot countenance after a cost-benefit analysis when “covered retreat” remains an option [ii] (though I remain open to counterarguments). This is not appeasement, but prudential deference to the realities of a rising great power that will assert its regional interests (territorial interests, in their view) in line with its historical imagined self-conception. Some well-intentioned democrats have suggested making mainland democratization a prerequisite for ceding Taiwan or giving up navigation claims to the South China Sea, but I am less sanguine about the prospects for the democratization of the PRC anytime soon. Ethno-nationalist authoritarians maintain a firm, technologically-enhanced grip on Chinese society, and I see few signs of successful domestic opposition. (See this recent interview with pro-democracy activist, scholar, and former political prisoner Jianli Yang.) Human tragedies may well ensue if China maximizes its aggression under the new arrangement I propose, but the United States cannot remedy all human tragedies. All we can do is draw a set of more realistic red lines, the crossing of which we will actually be willing and able to do something about. But reading 2034 has made it crystal clear to me what we must not do, insofar as we can help it, and that is go to war with China. Not now, not in the future. As Francis Fukuyama recently wrote, “If there is one single objective for American foreign policy to aim at in Asia, it is to prevent a U.S.-Chinese military conflict from ever occurring.” Certainly we must do our best not go to war over something like an avoidable incident in a far-flung sea (a direct attack on the United States or an ally would be a different matter); an incident (perhaps even an accident) which leads to a challenge, which leads to a response, which leads to an escalation—that is how we climb the force ladder to nuclear hell. Yet as 2034 hauntingly demonstrates, such a ladder is not hard to start climbing. And even harder to stop. We must act like the “bigger” nation that we are. We must consolidate and pare down what we assess to be in our “vital national security interest,” while fortifying our abilities to defend those actual vital interests that do remain. As we do so, we must not lose sight of what matters most: the preservation of our own open, free, liberal, and pluralist society, as well as our own constitutional order, against all enemies, foreign and domestic. As I try to imagine my way into our uncertain future, the space between now and 2034, I see serious problems as well as immense promise. Some of the problems I have already elaborated upon. But the promise is American renewal, the kind of re-energization of society, culture, government, economy, and politics that would make the authorship of books like 2034 less necessary, less urgent. I hold out hope that being reminded of our limitations abroad might inspire us to do more where we can do more, which is at home. As Dr. Yang says at the end of his American Purpose interview, “A student of mine back in China recently told me that Trump and the poor performance of American democracy has made Xi Jinping great again. If the United States is to project its soft power, it must lead by example. The most important thing Americans can do is to make American democracy great again—call it ‘MADGA.’” The path of problems, and the path of promise. An oversimplification, to be sure. But still I wonder, which will we choose? Shanon FitzGerald is Assistant Web Editor at Liberty Fund. You can find him on Twitter @shanonjfitz. Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of Liberty Fund, Inc. Nevertheless, Econlib is proud to publish this article and others like it—representing a range of perspectives—because US-China relations will be one of the major economic and geopolitical issues of the years ahead. [i] Taiwan gives the lie to the CCP claim that “Western” democracy is not suited to the unique historical and social conditions of mainland China. Prior to 1949 Taiwan was unified with mainland China, and today Taiwan is democratic. The barrier to Chinese democratization is the CCP itself, not any purported social fact about the PRC population. [ii] Under this scenario, multinational conventional forces (backed by multinational ICBM arsenals) would need to be positioned in the area to prevent PRC aggression during the period of Taiwanese depopulation and relocation. Of course, much physical and cultural capital would have to be left behind, and while this is tragic, I think it decidedly less so than the plausible alternative: the subjugation of the entire Taiwanese population under tyrannical CCP rule. See the recent history of Hong Kong. In the final analysis, souls matter more than soil. (0 COMMENTS)
I wrote the final exam in Jeff Hummel’s Masters course in Monetary Theory and Policy last month and got the results about 10 or 12 days ago. I got an A+. (Yay!) Now you might say that I should have gotten an A+, given that I have a Ph.D. in economics and given that one of the readings on the syllabus was by me. (By the way, embarrassingly, the only short-answer question out of 46 questions that I got wrong was on an article that Jeff and I had co-authored. Division of labor explains that. Jeff came up with the data, which was what the question was on, and wrote the first draft, and I rewrote.) But I had to do the work. Don Boudreaux asked me after the midterm, on which I got close to a perfect score, what percent I would have got if I hadn’t taken the course or done any of the readings. I estimated that it would have been between 50 and 60%, which, in a Masters class, is essentially a failing grade. I asked myself that question for the final. The answer is 40 to 50% because the material in the last half of the course was less familiar to me than the material in the first half. I learned a ton: the resource cost of a gold standard, the weird and implausible Diamond-Dybvig model, the Bailey curve on seigniorage, bond illusion, the fiscal theory of the price level, the Taylor rule (I knew that but I couldn’t have told you the actual numbers–now I can), Hayek’s prediction of the kind of money that would evolve if there were no government intervention (and why I think, with Larry White, that Hayek was wrong), the Currency School, the Free Banking School, the real bills doctrine, Murray Rothbard’s pretty weak case for 100% reserve requirements in banking, the exact definition of fiat money (HINT: it does not mean money that has no intrinsic value), the interesting history (in a reading by Hummel) showing that bank panics, widespread bank failures, and recessions must be distinguished between, the formula for the money multiplier, and how Jeff’s favorite President, Martin van Buren, avoided having the federal government have a bank account, to name a few. Along with that, he gave an outstanding lecture on the Great Depression. I already knew most of what he talked about here, but most means about 70%. I learned the other 30%, including the fact that the feds put a 2-cent tax on checks at exactly the wrong time because the tax encouraged people to convert checking accounts to currency, reducing the money multiplier and shrinking the money supply. Also his explanation of capital theory using Tom Hanks’s character in Castaway is really good. Just cuts to the chase and avoids a lot of extraneous stuff. If Jeff teaches the class again next January by Zoom, and I’m encouraging him to do so, I recommend that you get in touch with him if you have a fairly strong economics background and are willing to stay up until 9:15 p.m. Pacific time, on a Tuesday evening. (0 COMMENTS)
As far as I know, neither political party has ever advocated “death panels”, that is, panels of experts that would deny Medicare coverage to FDA-approved treatments that don’t pass a cost/benefit test. But maybe they should. Biogen’s new drug to treat Alzheimer’s was recently evaluated by the FDA. Here is Rachel Sachs in Health Affairs: In March 2019, both trials were stopped halfway through, when “a planned interim analysis met prespecified futility criteria.” But Biogen went further into the data, analyzing the results and arguing that the high-dose patient population in the second trial had in fact experienced a statistically significant clinical benefit when measured against the placebo (a 22 percent reduction of clinical decline as measured on a chosen clinical scale), albeit a benefit absent from the high-dose population in the other trial or the low-dose population in either trial. On this basis, Biogen submitted an application to the agency for approval in July 2020. In November 2020, the FDA convened a meeting of the pertinent advisory committee to review the evidence surrounding aducanumab. The advisory committee was highly skeptical of the post-hoc rationale used to provide evidence of the drug’s effectiveness, particularly when viewed against the backdrop of decades of failures of drugs which similarly targeted amyloid plaques. I am no expert here, but in general I am extremely suspicious of claims of “statistical significance” that rely on post-hoc rationalizations. The committee was also unimpressed: The FDA’s own advisory committee voted overwhelmingly that the drug’s clinical trials did not demonstrate evidence of effectiveness (with ten members opposed, none in favor, and one abstention). Nonetheless, the FDA recently approved the new drug, which will have a $56,000 list price. Given that more than 6 million Americans suffer from Alzheimer’s (a number that is rising rapidly), this decision will have major consequences for health care costs: The FDA’s approval of Aduhelm is likely to have health policy ramifications far beyond the FDA itself, though. As noted above, the potential financial implications for our health care system are staggering. Medicare Part B spends approximately $37 billion annually on prescription drugs program-wide, and Part D spends approximately $90 billion annually. Given the large patient population and high price tag, it is not difficult to imagine aducanumab alone commanding somewhere between those totals every year—for a drug with extremely limited evidence of clinical efficacy. I believe that all American should be free to use Aduhelm (aka aducanumab) as long as taxpayers don’t have to pay for it. The more difficult question is whether it makes sense for taxpayers to pay vast sums of money to subsidize drugs that government experts view as having little or no benefit (relative to cost.) I’m skeptical of that idea, although I’m willing to listen to arguments for the other side. PS. Three members of the FDA advisory panel have now resigned in protest: A third member of a key Food and Drug Administration advisory panel has resigned over the agency’s controversial decision to approve Biogen’s new Alzheimer’s drug, Aduhelm, CNBC has learned. Dr. Aaron Kesselheim, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School, said the agency’s decision on Biogen “was probably the worst drug approval decision in recent U.S. history,” according to his resignation letter obtained by CNBC. PPS. I recently appeared on the Bob Murphy Show. (0 COMMENTS)
Libel law is back in the news what with some public rethinking (more like wailing and gnashing of teeth) about New York Times v. Sullivan. Should public figures be more or less protected from being libeled is one issue that has arisen. Another is exactly who is and who is not a public figure? Then there is the question of whether or not “actual malice” should be a requirement for libel. And where does the First Amendment fit in to all of this? Justice Clarence Thomas and Senior Judge Laurence Silberman are thinking out loud about restructuring Sullivan. These questions do not go deep enough. Instead of seeking “balance,” and fine-tuning this legal precedent, we should dig deeper. Of more basic moment is the question of whether libelous speech ought to be unlawful in the first place. At the outset, this seems like a silly question. Slander ruins people’s reputations. The victims of this practice can lose their jobs, friends, marriages, the respect of the general community. Surely, there should be at least some protection for them? Yes, but not a legal one. Why not a course of action in court? Is not libel akin to theft? Only in this case, what is being stolen is more important than ordinary goods like shoes or coats, or even automobiles or boats in many cases. We are accustomed to referring to people’s reputations as if they were owned. My reputation, your reputation, Jim’s reputation. This is more than a little bit misleading in that people don’t actually possess the reputations that refer to themselves. Rather, Jim’s reputation consists of the thoughts (and predilections to act in certain ways) of other people, not of what he thinks about himself. His reputation, paradoxically, consists solely and of nothing but the thoughts about him on the part of his neighbors, family members, bosses, fellow workers, sports team members, bowling league colleagues, etc. Since he cannot own these possessions of other people, their thoughts about him, he cannot, somewhat surprisingly, own his own reputation. Thus, libel laws of whatever variety, type or degree, are unjust; they protect people from losing what isn’t really theirs in the first place. Here is a paradox. Reputations would actually be safer, in most cases, without laws against slander and libel. For nowadays if a reputation is besmirched, especially by the mainstream media which reaches millions, people are likely to believe the smear, at least partially. “Where there’s smoke there must be at least a little fire,” might be the common reaction. These attacks occur relatively infrequently, and thus also tend to stand out. But without such legislation, the slurs and insults would come thick and fast. There would be so many, they would lose their relative power to reduce people’s standing in the community. No longer would mere allegations suffice. Now some sort of proof or evidence would be required before one’s character would suffer. So let us not fine tune around the edges of libel law, making marginal changes and adjustments as to who is and is not a “public figure.” Don’t we all have the same identical rights, no matter how public our persona? Instead, let us repeal this spate of legislation root and branch, and overturn judicial findings supporting this mischievous unjustified legal tradition. Walter E. Block is Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair and Professor of Economics at Loyola University New Orleans (0 COMMENTS)
Most government interventions consist in forbidding adult individuals (or their voluntary associations) to freely engage in acts of exchange: securities laws, antitrust laws, minimum-wage laws, maximum prices (like in “price gouging” laws, for example), laws and regulations mandating or banning discrimination, legal privileges for trade unions, tariffs and import controls, and so forth. Some believe that all these interventions are required, and required in growing number. Many people including some economists ignore or forget the benefits of voluntary exchange. In The Wealth of Nations (1786), Adam Smith illustrated the centrality of exchange in economic relations (and, in fact, in all social relations) when he wrote about a certain propensity in human nature … the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. … Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this: Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. This is a positive statement, which describes a distinctive way in which human individuals often behave: they engage in acts of voluntary exchange when it is in their mutual interest to do so. Smith also showed that a society based on free exchange is the secret to general prosperity. All animals including humans, however, also use force (murder and theft) as an alternative to exchange. This suggests a normative (that is, moral) idea: free exchange should be the founding principle of social interaction. One common objection is that the individual does not really know what is good for himself and should, in his own interest, have his choices, or some of them, coercively limited or dictated by political rulers. The problems with this objection are many, as the public-choice school of economics has confirmed. There is nothing to prove that such an authoritarian ruler, whether representing a minority or a majority, can know better than each individual what is good for him given his own circumstances. Even if the ruler could know, his altruistic incentives would be generally lacking. And even an altruistic despot (or despotic assembly) would be unable to act for the good of each and every individual, for different individuals have different preferences and values. Another objection is that market exchange fails because of “externalities” and other market imperfections. The proponents of this approach don’t seem to realize that government intervention is generally subject to even more failures than exchange on free markets. (See a short review of the problem in my Econlog post “Externalities: Handle with Care.”) James Buchanan, one of the main founders of the public-choice school of economics, expresses the principle of free exchange in a way that puts in sharp focus the revolutionary character of the normative approach suggested by economics: If I observe someone with apples and somebody else with oranges, I don’t want to try to say a particular allocation of oranges and apples in a final position is better than in the other allocation. If I observe them trading without defrauding each other, whatever emerges, emerges, and that is the way I define what is efficient. That this quote comes from a conversation between Buchanan and Richard Musgrave, a major theorist of mainstream public finance, shows the extent of the mini-revolution that the former introduced into the already revolutionary science of economics (James M. Buchanan and Richard A. Musgrave, Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State [MIT Press, 1999]). In the same book, Buchanan argues: As for global or social utility or social welfare, I am not willing to impose any sort of maximand. … Whatever emerges from individual choices emerges, and it is not a question of imposing a kind of global maximization process. … My concern and my primary motivation here in a normative sense is preventing the exploitation of man by man, or woman by woman, through the political process. That is what is driving my whole approach. Buchanan dreamed of, and theorized about, a state that would be based on “politics as exchange,” trying to mimic in politics free exchange between free individuals on free markets. To which extent his ambitious and sophisticated demonstration was successful remains an open question. Speaking about the 20th century, which continues in the 21st with a vengeance, Buchanan added: This terrible century has done much more than bear witness to the tragic failures of collectivist controls over personal lives. (0 COMMENTS)
What is the outlook for black Americans today- is the black experience glass half full or half empty? Is racial discrimination the root of all problems in Black America? In this episode, EconTalk host Russ Roberts welcomes the Wall Street Journal‘s Jason Riley, who argues the current situation has been distorted by activists with conflicting interests. Says Riley, “I’m not someone who believes that racism has been vanquished from America. The question is: does racism explain the outcomes we see today…?” Now we’d like to turn the conversation over to you. After listening to the episode, consider the prompts below and share your replies. We’d love to see them here online, but we’re equally pleased if we can help you start a conversation with someone offline. 1- The conversation begins with a discussion of police violence. Riley argues that the media preoccupied with breaking down police encounters by race, but not criminality by race. Which is the bigger problem- policing or black criminality? To what extent do you agree this presents a distorted view to the public? What are some of the unintended consequences Riley says results from this media (and social media) attention? 2- Riley notes that during the period between the Civil War and the Civil Rights movement, black lives improved greatly and in a great many ways. What does he suggest we should learn from that? How does this relate to what Riley call the problem of black elites? How does Riley use the case of immigration as a comparison to black Americans today? 3. For what reasons does Riley argue that the Drug War has become a victim of revisionist history? To what extent do you agree with his statement that, “if your goal is to a). reduce mass incarceration, or b). reduce the racial disparities among our incarcerated population, among the prison population, going after the drug war is barking up the wrong tree.” 4- Riley sadly suggests he thinks racism is a part of human nature. Is that true? As he and Roberts speculate at the end of the conversation, would everything really be hunky-dory if the US eliminated racism? 5- The episode ends with a brief discussion of Riley’s new biography of Thomas Sowell. What do Riley and Roberts see as Sowell’s legacy? (0 COMMENTS)