This pamphlet is a part of The Pamphlet Debate on the American Question in Great Britain, 1764-1776: A Digital Collection, edited by Jack P. Greene.

This pamphlet is a part of The Pamphlet Debate on the American Question in Great Britain, 1764-1776: A Digital Collection, edited by Jack P. Greene.

This pamphlet is a part of The Pamphlet Debate on the American Question in Great Britain, 1764-1776: A Digital Collection, edited by Jack P. Greene.

Fisher Ames was a leading New England Federalist and sublime critic of Jacobin Democracy and the French Revolution. During the presidency of George Washington, he was the leader of his party in the House of Representatives. Ames was active in public life from 1787 through 1807 and was instrumental in one drafting of the First Amendment to the Constitution.

This essay denies any claim to unlimited supremacy. Such a view asserts an infallibility that belongs only to God, “not Parliaments.” The writer then extends the point to insist that colonies may go so far as to separate, when they have “come of age.” Thus, “in consequence of an unanimity, nay a majority of voices,” they may “throw off all subjection to the… parent state.” Both Wesley and Johnson are excoriated for dipping their pens “deep in prerogative poison, and aristocratic infection.”

Siding with Richard Price’s earlier work in favor of colonial rights but dismayed that it did not get the attention it deserved, the writer of this essay set out to counter the attack on “the laws and constitution” by those “endeavoring to persuade the consciences of the subjects, that they are bound to obey commands, unconstitutional and illegal.” Americans, the essay went on, did no wrong, but were “an increasing people, daily improving in arts and science…and wealth.” This “was their crime.”

This essay presents an extensive critique of virtual representation, arguing that a representative had to at least live among those being taxed. To assert otherwise was to accept that they could impose laws “without ever being exposed to suffer any inconvenience in common with the people they represent.” The very idea, the author argued, “does such violence to common sense, and is, I think so contrary to the spirit of our constitution, that nothing could make it deserve serious consideration.”

This essay makes the case for Parliament’s authority as a body comprising the “representatives and guardians of all British commoners, wheresoever dispersed.” While conceding that a “better mode of election” might be hoped for, until then, “we must abide by present regulations,” because “To bring the spirit of the constitution against the general established law,” is to overset “all order and government.” And as “healthy” places, unlike the West Indies, American colonies can bear the expense.

This piece depicts a fictional exchange between a representative of imperial administration, Aristocraticus, and a defender of America, Philodemus, making the case for colonial self-government. The example of Ireland plays a prominent role as proving the lack of any necessity for a single, unitary imposition of authority. And to the extent that Englishmen residing in England are not themselves represented in Parliament, this shows only that “the representation is defective, unjust.”

This text refutes Parliament’s total supremacy as new policy. Taking the perspective of an English resident, the author disavows all authority to taxing colonials without consent. Ireland is seen as “a case more exactly similar to that of America,” where Parliament’s power is “always asserted,” but “for purposes of a revenue, never.” George II, a “Whig king,” who respected charters, is noted for requesting the colonies be reimbursed, belying claims that America did not provide for its defense.