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Bill Allen RIP

Last week, Don Boudreaux over at CafeHayek did a nice appreciation of William R. Allen, co-author, with Armen Alchian, of the excellent University Economics textbook. Allen died last week, only a few months before his 97th birthday. Fortunately, Liberty Fund has published Universal Economics, edited by Jerry Jordan, an update of University Economics. I knew Bill Allen slightly while I was a graduate student at UCLA (from 1972 to 1975), and my not getting to know him better was my failing, not his. I sat in on one of his classes and I noticed how resentful he was of the UCLA administration. I think that made me wary of dealing with him. Not that I favored the administration, but I didn’t know what the big deal was. Bill Allen had a beautiful way with words. I highly recommend his thoughts about the economics profession and about UCLA’s distinctive brand on economics. Having read it, I now know what his big deal with the administration was. I’ve had enough experiences, and observed enough other people’s experiences, to know that when you take an unpopular stand on principle, you’ll find that people you expected to support you often don’t or, worse, even join the mob. Fortunately, my own experiences in that area have been relatively unscathing. But Bill Allen experienced it big-time, even to the point of having a bomb set up outside his office. He talks about it all, plus much else, in “A Life among the Econ, Particularly at UCLA,” Econ Journal Watch, September 2010. An excerpt  from the EJW article about his rocky experience as department chairman: Shortly later, in October, the Black Student Union uprising hit the department. Five BSU representatives visited me and demanded that I hire some black faculty, although they had no candidate in mind or intention of helping to find candidates with credentials other than the desired skin pigmentation. I made it forcefully explicit that the department would not recruit on the basis of race. The confrontation immediately spilled into the campus newspaper and the Los Angeles print and broadcast media. After a threatening telephone call at home, I bought a shotgun, and strung fine wire around the lawn to trip anyone storming the house. The Scovilles invited the Allens to move temporarily into the furnished apartment above their garage, but my stalwart wife, Fran, refused to be “run out of my home.” I was interviewed and discussed in various forums. The Academic Senate twice nearly censored me, and Chancellor Charles Young, who had succeeded Murphy, referred to me in supercilious manner in public. Soon after the war began, a bomb was placed at an entrance leading to the departmental offices, but it did not explode. I remarked in a television interview that the most conspicuous difference between my enemies and the Nazi hooligans of the 1930s was that the latter could make a usable bomb. Perhaps I came to appreciate in some small degree how Churchill felt in May 1940. I remember in class his referring to the idea that “you can take a horse to water but you can’t make him drink, whether that horse be an old one or a young one.” I later learned that this was his reference to Charles Young. (1 COMMENTS)

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Economics and Freedom: Not a Math Problem

What does it mean to think about politics realistically rather than romantically? What should economists really do? And is what they do (too) wrapped up in the materialistic pursuit of utility maximization? These  are just some of the questions that Nobel laureate James M. Buchanan tried to answer in his life’s work. In this episode, EconTalk host Russ Roberts welcomes back Don Boudreaux to discuss Buchanan’s legacy, and two articles of Buchanan’s in particular, “What Should Economists Do?” and “Natural and Artifactual Man,” both found in Volume 1 of Buchanan’s Collected Works. The conversation begins with an overview of Public Choice, largely the basis on which Buchanan was awarded the Nobel prize in 1986. But as Boudreaux is quick to point out, Buchanan’s intellectual legacy goes far beyond Public Choice. Let’s hear your reaction to the conversation between Roberts and Boudreaux. Use the prompts below to continue the conversation- here online or offline with others.     1- Why do Roberts and Boudreaux think the reaction to Buchanan’s Nobel was so unenthusiastic? When public choice is defined as, “Politicians are self-interested,” what’s missing?   2- What should economists do??? In what ways was Buchanan pushing back against the dominance of Welfare Economics at the time of this address? What’s wrong with the way we teach economics according to Buchanan’s view?   3- Boudreaux argues one reason why a lot of more hardcore libertarians don’t like Buchanan is because Buchanan always insisted on modeling politics as exchange.  Why might this be the case? How are markets and politics both examples of emergent orders?   4- What is “artifactual man,” according to Buchanan? How does this second article build on the first, according to Boudreaux?   5- Boudreaux cites one of his favorite quotes from Buchanan: ‘Man wants freedom to become the man he wants to become.’ What IS Buchanan’s case for freedom? Is this case convincing? Sufficient?     Bonus Question: Roberts and Boudreaux offer “twitter versions” of Nobels of  Buchanan and James Tobin. Can you come up with some others? Here’s the list of Economic Sciences Nobel prizes. Share yours on twitter, and tag us @Econlib and @EconTalker. (0 COMMENTS)

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Supply and aggregate supply are unrelated concepts

The AS/AD model that we teach our students is misnamed, as it has nothing to do with the supply and demand model used in microeconomics. To take one simple example, the vast majority of industry supply curves are almost perfectly elastic (horizontal) in the long run. The long run aggregate supply curve is almost perfectly inelastic (i.e. vertical.) These are just completely unrelated concepts. This can help us to evaluate some issues raised by Tyler Cowen: If you think “stimulus” is effective right now, presumably you think supply curves are pretty elastic and thus fairly horizontal. That is, some increase in price/offer will induce a lot more output. If you think we should hike the minimum wage right now, presumably you think supply curves are pretty inelastic and thus fairly vertical.  That is, some increase in price for the inputs will lead not to much of a drop in output and employment, maybe none at all.  The supply curve is fairly vertical. What matters for stimulus is the short run aggregate supply curve.  What matters for the minimum wage is the long run industry supply curve.  These two curves are especially unrelated. [There also the question of whether industry supply curves even exist. Minimum wage proponents usually deny it–claiming that industries are monopolistically competitive.  The evidence suggests that industry supply curves do exist.] I oppose both fiscal stimulus and minimum wage laws, but for reasons mostly unrelated to supply elasticities. If you favor a minimum wage hike because you think the demand for labor is inelastic, does that mean you don’t see “downward sticky wages” as a big problem?  After all, the demand for labor is inelastic, right? Minimum wage laws should be evaluated on the basis of their long run effects.  Proponents probably believe that a good chunk of the higher minimum wage will come out of the pockets of other workers (via higher prices.)  I’ll have to pay more for fast food.  And the empirical evidence supports that claim.  So minimum wage proponents would claim no inconsistency in their views on minimum wages and sticky wages.  But this is one problem with the argument for higher minimum wages.  If they raise prices then they probably also cost jobs.  (My own view is that the bigger problem with minimum wage laws is that they reduce non-wage compensation.) This is a good point: If you favor a minimum wage hike, do you criticize wage subsidies because inelastic demand for labor means most of the value of the wage subsidy will be captured by the employer? Or do you somehow want both policies at the same time, because they both involve “government helping people”? I support wage subsidies to low wage workers because I believe that minimum wage industries tend to be highly competitive, with zero long run economic profits.  And for exactly the same reason I oppose minimum wage laws.     (1 COMMENTS)

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The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism Book Club Commentary, Part 1

Here are my reactions to your thoughts on Part 1 of the Orwell book club. David Henderson: Here’s another glaring statement that shows Orwell at his economically illiterate worst: As for the problem of overproduction, which has been latent in our society since the development of machine technique Orwell buys into the idea of overproduction. He doesn’t understand that our wants are unlimited. That may be also why, as you noted, he doesn’t worry about incentives. In his view, we had too much even in 1948. I basically agree, but I don’t think Orwell would have denied that wants are unlimited.  The “problem of overproduction” wasn’t literally that business produced too much stuff, but that business produced more stuff than it could profitably sell.  This in turn is supposed to lead either to unemployment or cartels – two evils much in evidence during the 1930s (even though both of us know that government bears most of the blame).  Still, to convincingly answer this objection, you need to either show that (a) free markets can handle the problem by cutting input costs, or (b) government can handle the problem via the keyhole solution of printing more money.   Obvious once you think about it, but hard to articulate. Neera Badhwar: I wonder what you think about the following passages about war: “The search for new weapons continues unceasingly, and is one of the very few remaining activities in which the inventive or speculative type of mind can find any outlet. In Oceania at the present day, Science, in the old sense, has almost ceased to exist. In Newspeak there is no word for ‘Science’. The empirical method of thought, on which all the scientific achievements of the past were founded, is opposed to the most fundamental principles of Ingsoc” (p. 5). “When war is continuous there is no such thing as military necessity. Technical progress can cease and the most palpable facts can be denied or disregarded. As we have seen, researches that could be called scientific are still carried out for the purposes of war, but they are essentially a kind of daydreaming, and their failure to show results is not important. Efficiency, even military efficiency, is no longer needed.” The second passage seems to contradict the first. Does it really?  The first paragraph says that military research is virtually the only research left, and the second passage says that even that research is none-too-fruitful.  These seem like compatible claims. But even if they can be reconciled, I wonder what Orwell had in mind when he wrote them. In 1939, Soviet scientists tried to replicate the fission experiments done by German scientists, and started trying to develop nuclear weapons in 1943. The Party didn’t consider this work like a kind of daydream! Perhaps it wasn’t generally known what was going on in the SU. In Orwell’s schema, World War II and his imagined World War III in the 1950s are the last deadly serious drives for global domination.  Only afterwards does the world fall into the three-way stalemate he describes.  I think that’s what he has in mind. KevinDC: However, on the point where the fictional author seems to dismiss the importance of incentives regarding differential pay, Orwell does seem to have thought something like this. Or, a weaker version of it at least. In his essay The Lion and the Unicorn, Orwell wrote: It is no use at this stage of the world’s history to suggest that all human beings should have exactly equal incomes. It has been shown over and over again that without some kind of money reward there is no incentive to undertake certain jobs. On the other hand the money reward need not be very large. In practice it is impossible that earnings should be limited quite as rigidly as I have suggested. There will always be anomalies and evasions. But there is no reason why ten to one should not be the maximum normal variation. Many thanks for sharing this passage.  News to me. Of course, he never provides any actual argument for why “the money reward need not be very large” or any evidence for his claim that “there is no reason why ten to one should not be the maximum normal variation,” either in this essay or in any of his other writing on the topics. He just asserts it. People prone to anti-market bias have a tendency to commit the fallacy of argument from personal incredulity when it comes to market outcomes they don’t like. “I can’t see any reason for it to be this way” is treated as if it entailed “there is no reason for it to be this way.” In defense of Orwell, labor supply elasticity does seem fairly low.  Indeed, for many people labor supply is plausibly backward-bending over some ranges.  But he probably neglects the tournament incentives at play; many people start businesses because they’re inspired by the possibility that they might become billionaires.  I can’t prove that rising inequality since 1980 has made the U.S. the startup center of the world, but it’s plausible. Henri Hein: The invention of print, however, made it easier to manipulate public opinion This does not seem right. Print also allows wider sharing of ideas, including ones inimical to authority. You’re both right.  The printing press makes the “manipulation of public opinion” easier for everyone.  Under free speech, the end result of the cacophony is unclear.  With a government control over the media, however, the end result is to support the status quo. Weir: What Orwell says in one sentence about “the conscious aim of perpetuating unfreedom” he contradicts in his next sentence about lip service. The first sentence is Orwell the polemicist. The second sentence is Orwell the novelist. I don’t see the contradiction.  You can consciously aim for unfreedom while paying lip service to freedom, no? The novelist knows that the banner of equality is just too useful to drop. Pretending to fight for justice is about as basic as pretending to be younger and more attractive. Birds do it. Why isn’t this fully consistent with Orwell’s description? Is Nike conscious of its pandering? Is Citibank? No more than the peacock is conscious of natural selection. If you’re not conscious, how is it “pretending”?  I’ve met people in marketing, and they seem quite conscious of what they’re doing.  They don’t consider their behavior bad, but they know what they’re saying isn’t literally true. The polemicist would say that American Airlines and Coca Cola and BMW and CVS and all the corporate sponsors of violence and looting and arson are consciously, deliberately, making life worse for people living in those cities where the murder rate doubled in 2020. As if Gatorade and Conde Nast wanted to bankrupt a lot of immigrant-owned businesses and black-owned businesses, and make it harder for people to get jobs in a hundred communities across America. The ambitious pragmatists at Proctor and Gamble and Bank of America and AT&T aren’t dishonest. They believe their slogans. In their own minds they’re enlightened and progressive. They aren’t aware of having caused harm. I think Orwell has the better description.  On one level, they believe what they’re saying.  On another level, however, they know they’re tiptoeing around uncomfortable truths. (0 COMMENTS)

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Why Is the Vaccine Distribution So Difficult?

Imagine if food were allocated and distributed by the government. Wouldn’t this prevent hunger and famines, which have certainly killed more people than epidemics in the history of mankind? Most students of economics should have a ready answer. The opposite approach—that government allocation is more efficient than the anarchy of the market—is illustrated by the story of the Russian official who, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, asked British economist Paul Seabright, “Who is in charge of the supply of bread to the population of London?” (recalled by Philip Coggan in his recent book More). There is somebody in charge of the supply of Covid-19 vaccines in the United States, and that is precisely the problem. (That both the federal government and states government are involved is not the basic problem; on the contrary, decentralization prevents the centralization of error and improves the Soviet-inspired distribution system, if only by permitting experimentation.) A Wall Street Journal story sounded the alarm (again) on the dramatic inefficiency of the current distribution system (Elizabeth Findell, Jared S. Hopkins, and Dan Frosh, “Covid-19 Vaccines Are Getting Stuck at the Last Step,” January 17, 2021): In South Texas, a man slept in his car for two nights straight so he wouldn’t lose his place in a line of hundreds of people at a mass-vaccination event. In Western Kentucky, residents registered for vaccination slots online, only to find when they arrived that their doses had been taken by walk-ins. In New Mexico, state officials scrambled to hire more people to staff a vaccination hotline after it was overwhelmed with callers. … “It’s crazy that people have to call around to see what different providers have the vaccine, rather than having a central place,” [Texas state REp. Vikky Goodwin Goodwin] said. “People are thinking that we had months and months to prepare for this.” Isn’t it tragic that such things happen and the same failed government interventions are proposed (like by Ms. Goodwin above) after nearly three centuries of modern economic analysis? When prices don’t clear the market, people wait in line and those at the end of the queue don’t even know if they will get anything when their turn comes. In this respect, the United States is not worse than other regulated countries but it is often not better either. We should not exaggerate the Sovietization of the American economy. Looking at the throve entrepreneurship deployed by American private businesses during the pandemic suggests that the economy is more resilient than many would have thought. Yet, the trend of the past few decades is unmistakable. Sometimes, it even looks like military Sovietization, from the retired army officer running Operation Warp Speed to president Biden considering deploying the National Guard to set up Covid-19 vaccination clinics. Even if government intervention is judged necessary in a pandemic, less Sovietized and more efficient ways would be more productive. The federal government could buy enough Covid-19 vaccines from the manufacturers by bidding up prices to obtain enough for the whole population—that is, by bidding high enough to divert enough economic resources to manufacturing and shipping these vaccines. It could then offer the vaccines for free to interested health providers and pay the shipping by Fedex and UPS. Even better,  the government (at the federal or state levels) could offer vouchers to anybody who wants the vaccine and let Amazon (or any retailer) buy the vaccines and sell them in exchange for the vouchers or for ordinary cash from those who are willing to pay. With tens of thousands of intermediaries with incentives to deliver the vaccines because it pays to do so, the distribution would proceed like for food or computer equipment. The trick is to allow the market to clear as fast as possible. Even the government’s preferred clientèles would be better served by a liberalization of entrepreneurship and a large measure of economic freedom. It would go less smoothly in states, such as New York State, that have set up their own Soviet-style allocation of vaccines, but individuals could at least cross state lines to buy a vaccine if they want. And competition would, to a certain extent, push state governments not to hamper private distribution. If ordinary economic markets are not allowed to clear, expect the political market to clear with the help of patronage, random access, and waste. We have seen much of that since the beginning of the pandemic. It would not be surprising if, as recently reported, a large number of vaccines are trashed because not enough government-prioritized recipients are available at any given time or place. (See also Scott Sumner, “Regulation and Vaccines: It’s Much Worse Than You Think,” Econlog, January 17, 2021, who correctly defends a free market in vaccines.) (0 COMMENTS)

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A Shocking USPS Admission

USPS: We Don’t Care; We Don’t Have To Last Monday, January 11, I mailed off my estimated tax payments to California’s state government (an agency called the Franchise Tax Board) and the federal government (IRS). Both, but especially the check to the IRS, were for large amounts. At about 10 a.m., I put them in a mail box close to my office in downtown Monterey. The sticker on the box says that pick up is at 12 noon. At about 2:20 p.m. I received a call from a man at a nearby men’s club. He explained that he had received my letter to the Franchise Tax Board in that day’s mail. He had used my return address to track down my phone number. I thanked him profusely, rushed over to the club, and picked up the letter. My concern, of course, was about what happened to the check to the IRS. Was it badly misplaced also? And if it was, would the person who received it be as responsible and as resourceful as this nice man? I walked from there to the downtown post office. When it was my turn, the woman I talked to said she would get the postmaster. I waited about 10 minutes until he came to the front. I started to explain the situation. My first surprise was that he told me that the mail from that box hadn’t been picked up yet. I was surprised because I was showing him the letter that I had put in that box. How did he think I got it? When I finally got him to listen and understand, I told him my bigger concern: was the IRS check similarly misplaced? He answered that he didn’t know and couldn’t know at this point. Then he told me a shocking number. He said that the postal service loses about 2 percent of the mail. Even though I had my mask on, I think he saw my eyes widen. “Two percent?” I said, “that’s terrible.” “No, it’s not,” he answered. “We have billions of pieces per day.” (I think he overestimated by at least an order of magnitude, but that doesn’t matter for these purposes.) “Two percent is a large number,” I answered. “FedEx doesn’t lose 2 percent of its shipments.” “You can’t mail something with FedEx,” he said. “Yes, you can,” I replied, “You can put a letter in a FedEx envelope.” “Then use FedEx,” he answered. “Meanwhile,” I said, “I’ve got this problem that I did use USPS and I want to make sure my check to the IRS will be delivered.” “We can’t cross that bridge until we come to it,” he said. I didn’t understand what that meant in this context, so I asked, “What’s that bridge look like? How would you know we’ve come to it?” “We would know when the IRS contacts you and says they didn’t get the check.” “I’m pretty sure they don’t get in touch when that happens,” I replied. “I won’t know until April when I file my taxes and they tell me I owe a big amount rather than sending me my usual small refund. They would also charge me interest and a penalty.” “So that’s how we would know,” he said. (I’ve since realized that if I don’t see that the check has cleared by, say, January 22, then it was lost. It’s not clear what I would do. Would I call the IRS? Good luck with that. Would I put a stop payment on the check and send another one? I’m nervous about putting a stop payment on a check to the IRS.) One of the interesting things about the interaction, which shouldn’t have been surprising, is how little this guy seemed to care and how blasé he was about a 2% loss in mail. As I say, though, incentives matter. And the USPS’s incentive to deliver all the mail is very low. (3 COMMENTS)

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Gary Shiffman on the Economics of Violence

***** TAKE THE 2020 ECONTALK SURVEY: https://tinyurl.com/y6tzqvg6. VOTE FOR YOUR FAVORITE EPISODES OF THE YEAR! ***** Economist and author Gary Shiffman of Georgetown University talks about his book, The Economics of Violence, with EconTalk host Russ Roberts. Shiffman argues that we should view terrorism, insurgency, and crime as being less about ideology and more about […] The post Gary Shiffman on the Economics of Violence appeared first on Econlib.

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Total Government à la Fisher Is Not Ideal

A major issue at the confluence of economics, political science, and political philosophy is, What is morally or economically better, the state (formal and centralized coercive authority), anarchy, or something in between? Ignorance of this question, which parallels the alternative between collective choices and individual choices, mars most political debates. In 1941, progressive economist Irving Fisher said before the Yale Socialist Club (quoted in Mark Thorton, The Economics of Prohibition [University of Utah Press, 1991], p. 17): I believe [William Graham Sumner] was one of the greatest professor we ever had at Yale, but I have drawn far away from his point of view, that of the old laissez faire doctrine. I remember he said in his classroom: “Gentlemen, the time is coming when there will be two great classes, Socialists, and Anarchists. The Anarchists want the government to be nothing, and the Socialists want government to be everything. There can be no greater contrast. Well, the time will come when there will be only these two great parties, the Anarchists representing the laissez faire doctrine and the Socialists representing the extreme view on the other side, and when that time comes I am an Anarchist.” That amused his class very much, for he was as far from a revolutionary as you could expect. Fisher immediately added: But I would like to say that if that time comes when there are two great parties, Anarchists and Socialists, then I am a Socialist The question is of course which regime would be better for all or most people—in terms of their own preferences, a liberal economist would add. This question reduces to what kind of absolute state and what kind of anarchy would obtain and how each system would actually work, which are largely economic questions. Hobbesian anarchy (“the war of all against all”) and totalitarian government have little in their favor. Between good anarchy and “good” totalitarianism, Sumner was obviously right. We may wonder where between the two ideal extremes lies the best practical state. This raises the question of whether any mixed regime is dynamically stable and, if not, towards which extreme and how close it will tend to lead society. One can (try to) evaluate any such intermediate position on Fisherian or Sumnerian criteria, that is, according to whether it gets closer to absolute government or to anarchy. The classical liberal tradition favors a position “between anarchy and Leviathan,” to use the subtitle of a book by James Buchanan, but certainly closer to anarchy than to absolute government. One of the anarchist theorists who believe that all intermediate positions lead to absolute government was Anthony de Jasay, a must-read author for anybody interested in these issues, which have a bearing on practical politics (trigger warning: some economics is necessary). (0 COMMENTS)

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The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism Book Club, Part 1

This is the first installment of my book club on Orwell’s book-within-a-book, entitled The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism by fictional dissident Emmanuel Goldstein.  I’m going to treat Orwell as the author of the book, even though he probably didn’t agree with all of the general claims, and almost surely didn’t mean to predict the rise of his precise geopolitical scenario.  Today I’ll start with Chapter 1, “Ignorance Is Strength.”  Please put all your thoughts and questions in the comments, and I’ll respond in a big post later this week. Now let’s get started. At first glance, Chapter 1 is just rehashed Marxism: Throughout recorded time, and probably since the end of the Neolithic Age, there have been three kinds of people in the world, the High, the Middle, and the Low. They have been subdivided in many ways, they have borne countless different names, and their relative numbers, as well as their attitude towards one another, have varied from age to age: but the essential structure of society has never altered. Even after enormous upheavals and seemingly irrevocable changes, the same pattern has always reasserted itself, just as a gyroscope will always return to equilibrium, however far it is pushed one way or the other. The aims of these groups are entirely irreconcilable. On closer look, however, TPOC improves on Marxism by focusing on political power rather than relationship to the means of production.  Furthermore, it has the wisdom to recognize that revolutions are fundamentally about replacing one elite with another rather than replacing elite rule with “rule by the people,” whatever that might mean. Still, TPOC retains the silly Marxist dogma of “irreconcilable conflict.”  Whenever two groups fight, both sides burn up resources.  At minimum, then, both sides would be better off if they simply foresaw the ultimate outcome, skipped the actual conflict, implemented the ultimate outcome, and saved the resources.  If this doesn’t happen, the reason isn’t that the conflict is “irreconcilable,” but that the participants refuse to reconcile.  The possible reasons for their refusal are endless: overconfidence, stubbornness, ethical constraints, imperfect information about the other sides’ resources, and so on.  Nevertheless, if you want to understand any conflict, you have to energetically sift through these possibilities.  Calling a conflict “irreconcilable” ensures that you’ll never understand what’s really going on. The aim of the High is to remain where they are. The aim of the Middle is to change places with the High. Orwell’s basically right about the aim of “the High,” though of course the High often dream of being Higher.  But he grossly misunderstands “the Middle.”  Their most common ambition by far is to join the High without changing the structure of society. The most Orwell can rightly say is that in some societies a tiny minority of the Middle dreams of “changing places with the High” – and that once in a long while, they succeed.  Even that, however, is misleading, because such malcontents are often already part of the High; they’re just so power-hungry that they’d rather tear down the whole system than share power. The aim of the Low, when they have an aim — for it is an abiding characteristic of the Low that they are too much crushed by drudgery to be more than intermittently conscious of anything outside their daily lives — is to abolish all distinctions and create a society in which all men shall be equal. Since Orwell wrote, the leisure time of the Low has immensely increased.  Yet all public opinion research confirms that the masses remain deeply politically apathetic.  So instead of saying that they are “crushed by drudgery,” the accurate description is that pragmatic conformism is most human beings’ natural state. In any case, when roused from this natural state, the Low are at least as inclined to religious fundamentalism and xenophobia as they are to egalitarianism.  While the rhetoric of human equality has broad appeal in some societies, hardly any of the Low take such talk literally.  Just try using the rhetoric of the American or French Revolutions to sell open borders to ordinary Americans or Frenchmen and see how far you get. Thus throughout history a struggle which is the same in its main outlines recurs over and over again. For long periods the High seem to be securely in power, but sooner or later there always comes a moment when they lose either their belief in themselves or their capacity to govern efficiently, or both. They are then overthrown by the Middle, who enlist the Low on their side by pretending to them that they are fighting for liberty and justice. As soon as they have reached their objective, the Middle thrust the Low back into their old position of servitude, and themselves become the High. Presently a new Middle group splits off from one of the other groups, or from both of them, and the struggle begins over again. Using these categories, apparently, the American elite in 1775 was actually part of “the Middle” of the British Empire.  And so was Parliament during the Glorious Revolution, Islamic fundamentalists in Iran under the Shah, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt under Mubarrak, and the leadership of Solidarity in 1980s Poland.  Unless Orwell turns his story into a tautology, these classifications seem quite odd. Of the three groups, only the Low are never even temporarily successful in achieving their aims. It would be an exaggeration to say that throughout history there has been no progress of a material kind. Even today, in a period of decline, the average human being is physically better off than he was a few centuries ago.  But no advance in wealth, no softening of manners, no reform or revolution has ever brought human equality a millimetre nearer. From the point of view of the Low, no historic change has ever meant much more than a change in the name of their masters. Unless, of course, one of the aims of the Low is to simply to enjoy a prosperous and healthy life!  Since Orwell never renounced socialism, I suspect that he couldn’t fully accept the obvious fact that most people care far more about personal well-being than societal equality. Also worth mentioning: The history of decolonization shows that the Low can at least temporarily get excited by “a change in the names of their masters.”  Indeed, there is far more evidence that ordinary human beings care about the nationality of their masters than the ideal of “equality.” By the late nineteenth century the recurrence of this pattern had become obvious to many observers. There then rose schools of thinkers who interpreted history as a cyclical process and claimed to show that inequality was the unalterable law of human life. This doctrine, of course, had always had its adherents, but in the manner in which it was now put forward there was a significant change. In the past the need for a hierarchical form of society had been the doctrine specifically of the High. It had been preached by kings and aristocrats and by the priests, lawyers, and the like who were parasitical upon them, and it had generally been softened by promises of compensation in an imaginary world beyond the grave. The Middle, so long as it was struggling for power, had always made use of such terms as freedom, justice, and fraternity. What about religious fundamentalism, with the Protestant Reformation being the most obvious historical example? Now, however, the concept of human brotherhood began to be assailed by people who were not yet in positions of command, but merely hoped to be so before long. In the past the Middle had made revolutions under the banner of equality, and then had established a fresh tyranny as soon as the old one was overthrown. The new Middle groups in effect proclaimed their tyranny beforehand. Socialism, a theory which appeared in the early nineteenth century and was the last link in a chain of thought stretching back to the slave rebellions of antiquity, was still deeply infected by the Utopianism of past ages. But in each variant of Socialism that appeared from about 1900 onwards the aim of establishing liberty and equality was more and more openly abandoned. Alternate story: Throughout history, dissident movements have usually been authoritarian at best.  But beginning in 1700 or so, novel dissident movements promising liberty and equality arose in the Anglosphere, and this classical liberal rhetoric gradually spread to the rest of Europe and the broader world.  In practice, this movement had very mixed results; see the French Revolution and the quarter century of carnage it inspired.  As the 19th-century progressed, however, classical liberalism began to deliver results consistent with its high-minded rhetoric.  During this time, however, rival dissident movements of socialism and nationalism began to take shape, and twisted the rhetoric of liberty and equality to authoritarian ends.  “Liberty” became the “liberty of each nationality to be ruled by members of their own nationality” and “equality” became “state ownership and state regulation.”  Socialism, like nationalism, was “born bad” – authoritarian from day one, though happy to borrow appealing classical liberal rhetoric. The new movements which appeared in the middle years of the century, Ingsoc in Oceania, Neo-Bolshevism in Eurasia, Death-Worship, as it is commonly called, in Eastasia, had the conscious aim of perpetuating unfreedom and inequality. These new movements, of course, grew out of the old ones and tended to keep their names and pay lip-service to their ideology. Lip service is one of the great under-used concepts in social science.  One wonders, though, what lip service to “Death-Worship” might be! But the purpose of all of them was to arrest progress and freeze history at a chosen moment. The familiar pendulum swing was to happen once more, and then stop. As usual, the High were to be turned out by the Middle, who would then become the High; but this time, by conscious strategy, the High would be able to maintain their position permanently. In Orwell’s time, Marxism-Leninism in particular seemed to have mastered the science of “arresting progress and freezing history at a chosen moment.”  Once the revolutionary Bolshevik generation passed away, however, their successors were markedly less fanatical and ruthless.  After one further generation, the totalitarian system crumbled to dust.  This isn’t an iron law, but I do predict that both the Chinese and Iranian leaderships will markedly moderate over the next forty years even if they don’t lose their monopoly on power.  The main issue is that selecting for fanaticism and ruthlessness in peacetime is like pulling teeth.  Why?  Because ambitious pragmatists will eagerly and skillfully feign fanaticism and ruthlessness to get ahead – and in every known human population, ambitious pragmatists outnumber ruthless fanatics by a factor of at least 10:1. But the principal, underlying cause was that, as early as the beginning of the twentieth century, human equality had become technically possible. It was still true that men were not equal in their native talents and that functions had to be specialized in ways that favoured some individuals against others; but there was no longer any real need for class distinctions or for large differences of wealth. In earlier ages, class distinctions had been not only inevitable but desirable. Inequality was the price of civilization. With the development of machine production, however, the case was altered. Even if it was still necessary for human beings to do different kinds of work, it was no longer necessary for them to live at different social or economic levels. “No longer necessary”?!  How about to provide incentives to work, acquire useful skills, and innovate?  And incentives aside, you might want to allow inequality because preventing inequality requires a draconian police state.  Come now, Orwell! Therefore, from the point of view of the new groups who were on the point of seizing power, human equality was no longer an ideal to be striven after, but a danger to be averted. In more primitive ages, when a just and peaceful society was in fact not possible, it had been fairly easy to believe it. The idea of an earthly paradise in which men should live together in a state of brotherhood, without laws and without brute labour, had haunted the human imagination for thousands of years. And this vision had had a certain hold even on the groups who actually profited by each historical change. The heirs of the French, English, and American revolutions had partly believed in their own phrases about the rights of man, freedom of speech, equality before the law, and the like, and have even allowed their conduct to be influenced by them to some extent. Orwell conspicuously omits the heirs of Russian revolution from his enumeration of the partially sincere.  Well-done. But by the fourth decade of the twentieth century all the main currents of political thought were authoritarian. The earthly paradise had been discredited at exactly the moment when it became realizable. Every new political theory, by whatever name it called itself, led back to hierarchy and regimentation. And in the general hardening of outlook that set in round about 1930, practices which had been long abandoned, in some cases for hundreds of years — imprisonment without trial, the use of war prisoners as slaves, public executions, torture to extract confessions, the use of hostages, and the deportation of whole populations — not only became common again, but were tolerated and even defended by people who considered themselves enlightened and progressive. Remember: For Orwell writing in 1948, this is history, not futurology. It was only after a decade of national wars, civil wars, revolutions, and counter-revolutions in all parts of the world that Ingsoc and its rivals emerged as fully worked-out political theories. But they had been foreshadowed by the various systems, generally called totalitarian, which had appeared earlier in the century, and the main outlines of the world which would emerge from the prevailing chaos had long been obvious. What kind of people would control this world had been equally obvious. The new aristocracy was made up for the most part of bureaucrats, scientists, technicians, trade-union organizers, publicity experts, sociologists, teachers, journalists, and professional politicians. Verily.  And who did the new aristocracy supplant?  Nobles and clergy in some countries.  But businesspeople and the rich in all countries – the elite that is as masterful at delivering prosperity as it is incompetent at pandering to Social Desirability Bias. These people, whose origins lay in the salaried middle class and the upper grades of the working class, had been shaped and brought together by the barren world of monopoly industry and centralized government. As compared with their opposite numbers in past ages, they were less avaricious, less tempted by luxury, hungrier for pure power, and, above all, more conscious of what they were doing and more intent on crushing opposition. Yes!  Power-hunger is the great neglected motive of social science.  And the big power grab of the 20th-century was when professions high in rhetorical dominance got the upper hand over professions high in material dominance. This last difference was cardinal. By comparison with that existing today, all the tyrannies of the past were half-hearted and inefficient. The ruling groups were always infected to some extent by liberal ideas, and were content to leave loose ends everywhere, to regard only the overt act and to be uninterested in what their subjects were thinking. Even the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages was tolerant by modern standards. Again, I remind you: For Orwell writing in 1948, this is history, not futurology. Part of the reason for this was that in the past no government had the power to keep its citizens under constant surveillance. The invention of print, however, made it easier to manipulate public opinion, and the film and the radio carried the process further. With the development of television, and the technical advance which made it possible to receive and transmit simultaneously on the same instrument, private life came to an end. Every citizen, or at least every citizen important enough to be worth watching, could be kept for twenty-four hours a day under the eyes of the police and in the sound of official propaganda, with all other channels of communication closed. The possibility of enforcing not only complete obedience to the will of the State, but complete uniformity of opinion on all subjects, now existed for the first time. At this point, modern readers may feel chills run up their spines.  Imagine Stalinism enforced with modern computing power!  Modern China is moving in this direction, but for now Xi’s China remains far freer than Mao’s China. Even so, the potential for totalitarian oppression has probably reached a new height, and continues to grow.  Facial recognition plus ubiquitous cameras plus AI approximates constant surveillance.  Back in 1994, Peter Huber wrote a book called Orwell’s Revenge arguing that new technology helped liberate the Eastern Bloc.   Huber made some good points, but the long-run link between tech and freedom is at best unclear, as I discuss in my essay on “The Totalitarian Threat.”   (0 COMMENTS)

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Without Government, Who Would Stop Us from Feeding Poor People?

In September, a group of residents in Fort Worth, Texas, decided to do something to combat growing hunger in their city. They placed a refrigerator on a city street and stocked it with food that anyone in need could take and eat. For free. Months later, though, their efforts are in jeopardy due to an unwelcome combination of outdated laws and overzealous regulators. So begins a story from Baylen Linnekin, “Fort Worth Regulators Target Community Fridges Providing Free Food for People in Need,” Reason, January 16, 2020. Fort Worth regulators have found an obscure law that allows them to prevent people from feeding their fellow humans. (0 COMMENTS)

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