There are ideal governments that some ideologues think will be born if they only dream about them hard enough; and there are actual governments, where politicians and bureaucrats respond to their ordinary incentives. Not every consumer wants to buy a luxury car at the cost of foregoing more of other things. We should should also expect poor consumers, ceteris paribus, to buy more bottom-of-the-line Kias and Hyundais. For idealistic lovers of government power, it might (and should) be puzzling why the government of New York City and of other municipal governments in America are suing the manufacturer of these cars because they are more often stolen (“New York Sues Hyundai and Kia over ‘Explosion’ of Car Thefts,” Financial Times, June 7, 2023). The move from New York City comes after “a $200mn consumer class action settlement last month,” which means that all members of the class will get a tiny amount of money on top of having benefited from a low purchase price. Thieves are attracted to these inexpensive cars’ less efficient anti-theft features (which, the company says, still comply with federal regulations). The victimized owners may end up paying more in insurance, but it’s their own business and risk—just as it is for those who prefer not to buy a more solid, safer, and more expensive Mercedes. A car with more features and gadgets is more expensive. Don’t government economists know that simple fact? Wouldn’t one think that do-gooder governments would spend their energy fighting car thieves rather than by penalising poor or thrifty crime victims and their suppliers? If only the federal government were as thrifty as buyers of inexpensive Kias and Hyundais! It is far from the only instance of make-believe Robin-Hood governments actually hurting the poor and denying them the freedom to make their own choices. It seems difficult for governments to accept that there exist poorer individuals who pay for exactly what they want given their circumstances. Any political theory incapable of explaining these realities is useless, if not mere propaganda. (0 COMMENTS)

There are ideal governments that some ideologues think will be born if they only dream about them hard enough; and there are actual governments, where politicians and bureaucrats respond to their ordinary incentives. Not every consumer wants to buy a luxury car at the cost of foregoing more of other things. We should would also expect poor consumers, ceteris paribus, to buy more bottom-of-the-line Kias and Hyundais. For idealistic lovers of government power, it might (and should) be puzzling why the government of New York City and of other municipal governments in America are suing the manufacturer of these cars because they are more often stolen (“New York Sues Hyundai and Kia over ‘Explosion’ of Car Thefts,” Financial Times, June 7, 2023). The move from New York City comes after “a $200mn consumer class action settlement last month,” which means that all members of the class will get a tiny amount of money on top of having benefited from a low purchase price. Thieves are attracted to these inexpensive cars’ less efficient anti-theft features (which, the company says, still comply with federal regulations). The victimized owners may end up paying more in insurance, but it’s their own business and risk—just as it is for those who prefer not to buy a more solid, safer, and more expensive Mercedes. A car with more features and gadgets is more expensive. Don’t government economists know that simple fact? Wouldn’t one think that do-gooder governments should spend their energy fighting car thieves rather than by penalising poor or thrifty crime victims and their suppliers? If only the federal government were as thrifty as buyers of inexpensive Kias and Hyundais! It is far from the only instance of make-believe Robin-Hood governments actually hurting the poor and denying them the freedom to make their own choices. It seems difficult for governments to accept that there exist poorer individuals who pay for exactly what they want given their circumstances. Any political theory incapable of explaining these realities is useless, if not mere propaganda. (2 COMMENTS)

Les Snead is in his twelfth year as General Manager of the Los Angeles Rams. Snead is the fifth-longest tenured GM in the NFL today. Snead and the Rams won Super Bowl LVI in 2022. In this episode of EconTalk, host Russ Roberts welcomes Les Snead to explore the role of the NFL GM. The two discuss how Snead operates in this risk-filled role—his take on the NFL draft, the adrenaline-filled experience of watching his Rams play, and the application of Sisyphus to the results-driven league are just a few highlights from the episode. I hope you enjoyed this episode as much as I did! Now, we’d like to hear your thoughts.     1- Snead describes how a key feature of his role is the installation of a successful, cohesive team unit. In addition to him, the team ownership, its executive leadership, and coaches are each key players in developing a team mission. How do you think various levels of power within an NFL organization react to each other’s different ideologies? What are examples you can think of where ownership became too involved in the on-field product?   2- In addressing Roberts’ question about his in-season duties, Snead points to his focus on the draft- the “April thesis” he calls it. Snead has two incredible draft picks on his resume that have dominated the NFL for a long time in Aaron Donald and more recently, Cooper Kupp, but he has also traded first-round picks for players in the prime of their careers like Jalen Ramsey, Brandin Cooks, and most recently, Matthew Stafford. Roberts presses on Snead’s decision to trade for Stafford, and whether the trade was worth it if Stafford’s health and play continue to decline. Snead says yes. Do you agree? Are there examples you can think of where your favorite team failed at balancing the win-now or draft for the future strategies?   3- Throughout the episode, Roberts and Snead discuss the draft: projectability of players, value of picks, and the ignorance of those outside of the NFL (commentators and fans) who try to forecast picks and grade a team’s collective drafts. Snead alludes to both the strength of quantitative measurements available along with the need for GMs to make the best picks based on a combination of  natural talent and the intangibles which make up the players’ football skill. What do you think is (or should be) the dominant strategy today for drafting players? How do teams balance drafting a player to fill a need in their team versus drafting the best players available? Who in this year’s draft do you think brought a GM the elation that Les Snead felt when he drafted future hall of famer Aaron Donald?   4- Roberts and Snead discuss Giannis Antetokounmpo’s quote dismissing the ‘failure’ of the Milwaukee Bucks season in the NBA after they fell to the Miami Heat in the first round of the playoffs. Snead appreciated Giannis’ quote, but he and Roberts also speak to the agony of defeat when the standard you reach for is always a championship. Snead comments on the Rams’ loss to the Patriots in Super Bowl LIII as one that brought pain. But the pain did not wear off; he still feels relentless regret that the Rams could not come out on top in 2018. Do you agree with Giannis’ quote about failure? Are there events in your professional life that you think could compare to the agony of a Super Bowl defeat, or is that feeling unique to sports?   5- Snead applies the Myth of Sisyphus who must face the task of rolling a monstrous boulder up a mountain—restarting each day—for the rest of eternity. NFL games are extremely consequential compared to other sports, given how short the season is. The sport is also incredibly violent, and Roberts and Snead allude to the camaraderie and respect felt between the fraternity of NFL players. What is so compelling and rewarding for fans and players who have such intense passion for football? How does Snead relate to the Sisyphus myth? What could society at large learn from football about humanity, humility, and respect?   Brennan Beausir is a student at Wabash College studying Philosophy, Politics, and Economics and is a 2023 Summer Scholar at Liberty Fund. (0 COMMENTS)

Consider, for example, one potential effect of global warming: rising ocean levels. For the past three decades, writes physicist and former Caltech provost Steven E. Koonin in his 2021 book, Unsettled, sea levels have risen by 0.12 inches per year. If sea levels continued to rise at that rate, then, by the year 2100, they would be about ten inches higher than now. That is not a large problem, and we have a lot of time to adjust. Moreover, even in the Netherlands where, a thousand years ago, the vast majority of people were poor by modern standards, people had the resources to build dikes to keep the ocean out. Since then, technology has no doubt improved and, as noted above, standards of living are a huge multiple of what they were a few centuries ago. That means that it should be even easier and more affordable to build dams in, say, Miami, and other low-lying areas. Another way to adapt is to change where we grow food. Economist David Friedman recently quoted the EPA’s statement that “Overall, climate change could make it more difficult to grow crops, raise animals, and catch fish in the same ways and same places as we have done in the past.” That, he noted, is not the end of the story because although global warming will make currently cultivated land somewhat less productive, it will make land that is closer to the poles more productive. Friedman also points out that people will adjust crops, change the amount of irrigation, and adjust in several other ways. His whole detailed analysis is worth reading, but if you don’t have time, here’s his summary statement about what’s wrong with the EPA’s approach: These 3 paragraphs are from my article “Destructive Energy Policies,” Defining Ideas, June 8, 2023. Later in the piece I get into the details about how destructive energy policies are in the United States and, particularly, where I live: California. Read the whole thing, which is a little longer than my usual Defining Ideas article. (0 COMMENTS)

David Beckworth directed me to this tweet: If the Fed had a single mandate to target inflation, then there would be an argument for switching from a point target like 2% to a band such as 1.5% to 2.5%.  But the Fed has a dual mandate, under which an inflation band would be completely pointless.  The Fed already allows inflation to fluctuate above and below 2% as required to achieve the high employment side of their mandate. Calling something “pointless” might be viewed as mild criticism, but I have other concerns.  I fear that something like this might be the sole outcome of the next Fed review of its operating procedure, which is scheduled for 2025.  In that case, an inflation band would shift from pointless to deplorable. The past two years have clearly demonstrated that the Fed is off track, and it’s not hard to see where the problem lies.  Fed policy since 2021 has been far too expansionary.  The biggest problem seems to have been the Fed’s “flexible average inflation target”, which despite its name does not call for flexible average inflation targeting.  The best outcome for the Fed upcoming policy review would be to actually adopt flexible average inflation targeting.  Under this regime, the Fed would make up for inflation overshoots with lower than 2% inflation going forward, and inflation undershoots with above 2% inflation going forward.  Over longer periods, the Fed would keep the average inflation rate close to 2%.  Obviously, the Fed isn’t doing that today.  The policy must be symmetrical. As for the “flexible” part of the policy, the Fed would allow transitory deviations from 2% inflation due to supply shocks.  The best way of implementing flexible average inflation targeting would be to set a target path for the level of NGDP at a rate of 2% plus the Fed’s estimate of long run RGDP growth.  Those trend growth estimates might be updated every 5 or 10 years.   I’d actually prefer a simple NGDP level target, but as long as Congress gives the Fed a mandate for stable prices, they cannot entirely ignore inflation.  Fortunately, the two options are pretty similar in practice, as long run growth trends change very slowly over time. (0 COMMENTS)

A few years ago, when Obama was president, I read that new federal dishwasher standards were coming. So even though we didn’t really need a new dishwasher, ours was fairly old and so I bought a new one before the new standards would be implemented. My reason? The standards required future dishwashers to use less water, meaning that the dishes would take longer to clean and probably would be dirtier. When Trump was president, he lightened the rules a little. But now President Biden’s Department of Energy has repealed the Trump liberalization and is imposing new standards that will require less water and less energy. How much energy will the dishwasher rules save. Christian Britschgi of Reason writes: The department [of energy] estimates that consumers will save $3 billion over the next 30 years, or $100 million per year, on their utility bills thanks to the rougher rules. That’s a pretty small per capita savings when spread across the 89 million dishwasher-owning households. Yes, that is small. It amounts to $1.12 per year. And your dishes will likely take longer to wash and be dirtier. So if you were thinking of replacing your dishwasher, now would be a good time. (1 COMMENTS)

a The great Adam Smith was born sometime in early June 1723. I’m not going to spend time figuring out which day because it doesn’t really matter. To commemorate Smith’s birthday, Reason magazine asked various people to give their favorite quotes from Smith and comment on them. I like a lot of the choices. Among my favorites are the ones noted by Dan Hannan, Russ Roberts, and Don Boudreaux. Here are four of my other favorites: Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man or of another animal, it has no other means of persuasion but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours by a thousand attractions to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civilised society he stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. The folly of empire: To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers may at first sight appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by shopkeepers. Such statesmen, and such statesmen only, are capable of fancying that they will find some advantage in employing the blood and treasure of their fellow-citizens to found and maintain such an empire. Say to a shopkeeper, Buy me a good estate, and I shall always buy my clothes at your shop, even though I should pay somewhat dearer than what I can have them for at other shops; and you will not find him very forward to embrace your proposal. The second sentence in the quote above is one of my all-time favorite pithy Smith statements. It reads as if it could have been written last week. Smith’s early cost/benefit analysis of empire: The maintenance of this monopoly has hitherto been the principal, or more properly perhaps the sole end and purpose of the dominion which Great Britain assumes over her colonies. In the exclusive trade, it is supposed, consists the great advantage of provinces, which have never yet afforded either revenue or military force for the support of the civil government, or the defence of the mother country. The monopoly is the principal badge of their dependency, and it is the sole fruit which has hitherto been gathered from that dependency. Whatever expence Great Britain has hitherto laid out in maintaining this dependency has really been laid out in order to support this monopoly. The expence of the ordinary peace establishment of the colonies amounted, before the commencement of the present disturbances, to the pay of twenty regiments of foot; to the expence of the artillery, stores, and extraordinary provisions with which it was necessary to supply them; and to the expence of a very considerable naval force which was constantly kept up, in order to guard, from the smuggling vessels of other nations, the immense coast of North America, and that of our West Indian islands. The whole expence of this peace establishment was a charge upon the revenue of Great Britain, and was, at the same time, the smallest part of what the dominion of the colonies has cost the mother country. If we would know the amount of the whole, we must add to the annual expence of this peace establishment the interest of the sums which, in consequence of her considering her colonies as provinces subject to her dominion, Great Britain has upon different occasions laid out upon their defence. We must add to it, in particular, the whole expence of the late war, and a great part of that of the war which preceded it. The late war was altogether a colony quarrel, and the whole expence of it, in whatever part of the world it may have been laid out, whether in Germany or the East Indies, ought justly to be stated to the account of the colonies. It amounted to more than ninety millions sterling, including not only the new debt which was contracted, but the two shillings in the pound additional land tax, and the sums which were every year borrowed from the sinking fund. The Spanish war, which began in 1739, was principally a colony quarrel. Its principal object was to prevent the search of the colony ships which carried on a contraband trade with the Spanish Main. This whole expence is, in reality, a bounty which has been given in order to support a monopoly. The pretended purpose of it was to encourage the manufactures, and to increase the commerce of Great Britain. But its real effect has been to raise the rate of mercantile profit, and to enable our merchants to turn into a branch of trade, of which the returns are more slow and distant than those of the greater part of other trades, a greater proportion of their capital than they otherwise would have done; two events which, if a bounty could have prevented, it might perhaps have been very well worth while to give such a bounty. Under the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies. Smith’s prediction of the outcome of the revolutionary war and the future of the United States: Unless this or some other method is fallen upon, and there seems to be none more obvious than this, of preserving the importance and of gratifying the ambition of the leading men of America, it is not very probable that they will ever voluntarily submit to us; and we ought to consider that the blood which must be shed in forcing them to do so is, every drop of it, blood either of those who are, or of those whom we wish to have for our fellow-citizens. They are very weak who flatter themselves that, in the state to which things have come, our colonies will be easily conquered by force alone. The persons who now govern the resolutions of what they call their continental congress, feel in themselves at this moment a degree of importance which, perhaps, the greatest subjects in Europe scarce feel. From shopkeepers, tradesmen, and attornies, they are become statesmen and legislators, and are employed in contriving a new form of government for an extensive empire, which, they flatter themselves, will become, and which, indeed, seems very likely to become, one of the greatest and most formidable that ever was in the world. But hey, what did he know?   (0 COMMENTS)

Robert Hetzel has written an outstanding new book entitled The Federal Reserve: A New History.  I reviewed the book for Central Banking.  Here’s an excerpt: During 2008, the Fed overreacted to (transitory) rising energy prices, and policy became too contractionary during the early stages of the Great Recession. Just as during the Great Depression of the 1930s, policymakers misdiagnosed the core problem as the financial system, whereas the actual problem was an overly tight monetary policy. This incorrect diagnosis of the problem led to a number of interventions into the banking system, which failed to boost the economy in late 2008. Even worse, fear of inflation led the Fed to enact some misguided contractionary policies, such as its decision in October 2008 to sharply raise the interest rate paid on bank reserves. The goal was to prevent its liquidity injections from going out and stimulating the broader economy. The economy only began to recover in 2009, when the Fed switched from banking rescue operations to monetary stimulus. The Covid crisis saw the Fed make the exact opposite error, an overly stimulative policy that relied on the now discredited 1960s idea of a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. In 2020, not many economists correctly diagnosed the dovish policy errors being made by the Fed. Even fewer correctly spotted the overly hawkish policy during 2008. Robert Hetzel is one of a vanishingly small number of economists who were correct on both occasions. Perhaps it’s time we started paying more attention to his views. Hetzel’s book should become the new standard for those who wish to understand how monetary policy has shaped the economy over the past 110 years.  Read the whole thing. (0 COMMENTS)

If you’ve been paying any attention to EconTalk over the last few months, you know that Artificial Intelligence (AI) is very much on host Russ Roberts’ mind. This episode may end up being the most frightening of them all, as Russ welcomes Eliezer Yudkowsky, a Research Fellow at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, and an AI, er…skeptic. Skeptic of course does not begin to encapsulate Yudkowsky’s position; Yudkowsky argues that AI will kill everyone on earth. Is his position too extreme, or are you just as concerned? Let’s hear what you have to say. And feel free to reference any of our Artificial Intelligence episodes as well! As always, we love to hear from you.     1- Both Roberts and Yudkowsky agree that the current level of AI is not dangerous. Roberts recalls an analogy from this 2014 episode with Nick Bostrom, “In general, you wouldn’t want to invite something smarter than you into the campfire.” Why does he bring this up, and how does it help explain the distance between Roberts and Yudkowsky’s viewpoints? Perhaps put another way, to what extent can algorithms have goals, as Yudkowsky suggests?   2- Can AI really become smarter than us? Roberts challenges his guest, “What does it mean to be smarter than I am? That’s actually somewhat complicated, at least it seems to me; i.e., does ‘it’ really know things are out there, or is this just an illusion it presents?” What does Yudkowsky mean when he talks about an invisible mind that AI might come to possess?   3- To what extent is AI analogous to the to the market process, particularly with regard to unintended consequences? Yudkowsky challenges Roberts, ” Put yourself in the shoes of the AI, like an economist putting themselves into the shoes of something that’s about to have a tax imposed on it. What do you do if you’re around humans who can potentially unplug you?” Roberts counters with another question, “How does it [AI] get outside the box? How did it end up wanting to do that, and how did it succeed?” How would you respond to these questions? Whose answer better convinced you- Roberts’ or Yudkowsky’s?   4- Several times Yudkowsky mentions man’s moon landing, asserting that one would not be able to explain that achievement from an evolutionary perspective. To what extent do you agree? Roberts again challenges huis guest asking whether this viewpoint requires a belief that the human mind is no different than a computer? Again- whose answer were you more convinced by?   5- Roberts recalls his conversation with neuroscientist Erik Hoel in which the threat of mutually assured destruction had been able to “regulate” nuclear proliferation. Is there any way we can retrain AI that’s similarly meaningful? Can it be done without govt/ the use of threat of lethal force? To what extent do you agree with Yudkowsky that if the government comes in and wrecks the whole thing, that’s better than the thing that was otherwise going to happen? (0 COMMENTS)

Hyperbole has its rhetorical or pedagogical advantages, but it must not overcome reality. I am not casting the first stone at Financial Times columnist Edward Luce, but I do want to criticize a recent column of his (“Beware Elon Musk’s Warped Libertarianism,” May 24, 2023). On what basis does Mr. Luce claim that Elon Musk is a libertarian? I have never seen anything written by Mr. Musk that would show his support for this political philosophy. Andrea Mays, who teaches economics at California State University in Long Beach, has “no idea how thoroughly he has considered [libertarian principles],” and she has “never come across any of his writings on the subject” (personal correspondence). Surely, she adds, he could hire someone to write op-eds for him if he wished to explain his personal philosophy. I haven’t completely given up on Musk but, as John Maynard Keynes wrote, “in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age.” Consider the following quotes from Luce’s column, followed by my comments: Billionnaire libertarians … have the money to do whatever they want. This is hyperbole, of course. Nobody has the money to do whatever he wants. The first lesson of economics is that resources are scarce compared to human desires, which are quasi-infinite. This limitation also applies to Mr. Musk—although obviously not as much as to you and me, but envy is not the greatest virtue. American libertarians should rarely be taken at face value. There is some truth in that, as for any group of partisans, but the “rarely” is exagerated. Among defenders of minority ideas, who feel like Martians in their society, you are bound to find eccentric figures. I confess that, in another life, I myself co-translated a book from one of them (I am not speaking of my translation work on James Buchanan’s The Limits of Liberty). But libertarian thought remains necessary to understand our world, even from its American theorists! It is as rare to find an impoverished libertarian as it is to find a wealthy socialist. This is a statement is simply baseless and must contradict the experience of most people who know, personally or in writing, more than one libertarian and one socialist. Luce mentions George Soros, who is a mild socialist. Incidentally, I agree when the Financial Times columnist condemns “Soros demonization,” like when Musk tweeted that this fellow billionaire “hates humanity.” Rich socialists are very numerous, even if you consider only the first percentile of total income, which starts below $500,000 in the US. Luce could have mentioned many woke habitués of the World Forum in Davos. Bernie Sanders is less rich, but probably qualifies. Hugo Chavez (of “21st-century socialism” fame) and his family did better, like Friedrich Engels. One can also find candidates for the rich-socialist label among the rulers or high-level apparatchiks of past communist countries or socialist banana republics of our days. In our countries, socialists are fortunately constrained on what they can suck from the state, but Mr. Luce must have heard of what in France is called la gauche caviar (“the caviar left”). Young idealistic libertarians are often poor. Many of Andrea’s students must be. I certainly wish that all libertarians were wealthy. Wealth is not a sin by itself. To simplify a bit, it depends on whether a rich person has made his money through voluntary transactions and interactions, or whether he has stolen it. [The American libertarians’] libertarianism rarely stretches beyond their personal freedoms, especially the liberty not to be taxed. Other people’s freedom is their own lookout. There are certainly some libertarians who have not reflected on all the implications of their beliefs. But again, I don’t think Mr. Luce’s sample is representative. Libertarians, who may be conceived as the radical wing of classical liberalism, have this rather rare virtue of defending a formal liberty that, by construction, can only belong equally to all individuals—contrary to the sort of “freedom” requiring that some be harmed by the state in other to favor others. One reason why libertarians are often seen as eccentrics is, indeed, that they defend the freedom of prostitutes or drug consumers, the right of self-defense for ordinary people (ordinary people, ma chère!), as well as the freedom of great entrepreneurs and famous journalists. The only constraint is the respect of everybody’s equal liberty: as John Stuart Mill wrote (in his 1859 On Liberty), “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.” The continuity between classical liberalism and libertarianism is an interesting topic. Anarchist economist Anthony de Jasay describes himself as a liberal. I give other examples in my EconLog post “The Continuum Between Liberalism and Anarchism.” Needless to say that this current of thought covers a wide spectrum of ideas and analytical approaches, which contrasts with the poverty of American “liberalism,” an adulterated liberalism that the Financial Times seems close to. But let’s continue with the quotes from Mr. Luce: [Musk’s] philosophical confusion … applies to many in his cohort, such as Peter Thiel, Ken Griffin and Charles Koch. Perhaps Peter Thiel and Ken Griffin are in Musk’s cohort, I don’t know. Some years ago, Mr. Thiel made noises that sounded libertarian: see my Regulation review of his 2014 book From Zero to One (pp. 54-56 in the linked file). He has now stopped. Only Charles Koch seems to me to be clearly a classical liberal. I would argue that the philosophical confusion is, anyway, at least as much on the side of the Financial Times columnist. Some of Musk’s fellow billionaires support Donald Trump, who is the most un-libertarian figure in US politics. … Not much of this seems to bother the libertarians. Like myself, nearly all libertarians, I think, would agree that Trump is a very authoritarian, i.e. un-libertarian, figure. Some eccentric libertarians have other opinions; a few hope, or hoped, that Trump would lead to a crash of the statist system and open the field for anarchic nirvana. Yet, there are a number of other candidates for “the most un-libertarian figure in US politics,” in both the Republican and Democratic parties. As for the second sentence in the quote above, there must not be many libertarians who are not bothered. So I don’t know whom Mr. Luce refer to as “the libertarians.” Does he see the world in terms of woke identity groups? Musk’s Tesla, for example, received $465mn of taxpayers’ stimulus money in 2009. I heard about that, and I would agree that it is worse than socialists purchasing iPhones or sending their children to private schools. We must concede this criticism, but it adds to Luce’s burden of showing that Musk is a libertarian. Musk’s love of free speech vanishes when it comes to China. I also find that troubling, as I think virtually all classical liberals and libertarians do. One thing that seems clear anyway is that Mr. Luce has not demonstrated that he understands what libertarianism or classical liberalism is. (2 COMMENTS)