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Apple Endorses Bill to Hobble Smaller Competitors

“Apple endorses California bill to oblige companies to report carbon footprint.” So reads the headline of a Reuters news story written by Isla Binnie and posted on September 8. Binnie writes: Wiener’s bill would require public and private companies with annual revenue in excess of $1 billion who do business in traditionally climate-conscious California to disclose independently verified data on their planet-warming emissions. Let’s see. Apple’s annual revenue in the fiscal year ending September 24, 2022 was $394.33 billion, which is just over 393 times more than $1 billion. Apple is so large that calculating its carbon footprint will be more expensive than the calculation for a $1 billion firm. But it’s unlikely to be 393 times more expensive. On this site, I have occasionally discussed what I call “economies of scale in compliance.” I showed in my 1976 Ph.D. dissertation, “The Economics of Safety Legislation in Underground Coal Mines,” that large unionized coal companies and the United Mine Workers lobbied for 1966 and 1969 legislation that wiped out thousands of small, non-union mines. Moreover an event study I reported in my dissertation found that the stock prices of the large mining companies rose after a key legislated hurdle was passed. The cost of calculating a carbon footprint could hobble a smaller competitor to Apple. Do I think that that’s Apple’s main motive in supporting the legislation? I don’t. My guess is that Apple’s management really believes in this legislation. But it helps that there could be a financial upside from less competition. HT2 Ross Levatter. (1 COMMENTS)

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Two Rules of Thumb Regarding Reformers

C. S. Lewis once observed something that rang very true for me. In his book God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, Lewis wrote: Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron’s cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience. This is certainly true in my own life. The difficulties inflicted upon me by bad actors who willfully wanted to make me worse off are a tiny fraction of the difficulties I have endured by people who were genuinely convinced they were being helpful and were acting with (what they judged as) my “best interests at heart.” I don’t think this experience is unique to me, of course. A surreal but not at all rare sight to see is when alleged “beneficiaries” seek to escape from those who view themselves as benefactors. I recently remembered a silly fictional example of this from a review of the game Resident Evil 5. For readers of this blog who aren’t into video games, Resident Evil is a series of horror games largely revolving around zombie outbreaks and bioweapons. When reviewing this game for his Zero Punctuation web series, game critic Yahtzee Croshaw had the following gripe about the AI programing that controlled your in-game partner: One time I was low on health, but not too low, and was about to use a small herb to keep myself going, when I saw my partner coming towards me brandishing a valuable large herb. And when you’re running away from your support character with more desperate terror than you feel for any of the actual monsters, something has definitely gone wrong somewhere.  That part of the review made me laugh out loud. I had also largely forgotten it until I read the following real-world example of the same phenomenon from the book Monitoring Sweatshops: Workers, Consumers, and the Global Apparel Industry by Jill Esbenshade. In this book, she describes her encounters with workers in Chinese sweatshops and she is surprised to find that she isn’t viewed as a benevolent helper the way she expected:  We find almost every violation in the book. The workers are pulling 90-hour weeks. The place has no fire extinguishers or fire exits, and is so jammed full of material that a small fire could explode into an inferno in a minute. There are no safety guards on the sewing machines, and the first-aid boxes hold only packages of instant noodles.  With the bosses out of earshot, I fully expect the workers to pour out their sorrows to me, to beg me to tell the consumers of America to help them out of their misery. I’m surprised at what I hear. “I’m happy to have this job,” is the essence of what several workers tell me. “At home, I’m a drain on my family’s resources. But now, I can send them money every month.”  I point out that they make only $100 a month; they remind me that this is about five times what they can make in their home province. I ask if they feel like they’re being exploited, having to work 90 hours a week. They laugh. “We all work piece rate here. More work, more money.”  The worst part of the day for them, it seemed, was seeing me arrive. “I don’t want to tell you anything because you’ll close my factory and ruin any chances I have at having a better life one day,” one tells me.  Rules of thumb are not perfectly accurate, but they are generally useful. And a good rule of thumb for would-be social reformers and helpers is this – if the person or people you think you are helping seem like they are desperate to get away from you, you should seriously consider the possibility that you’re not as helpful as you like to think. Other people are generally better than you are at knowing their own circumstances, preferences, and what would be in their own best interests. Tormenting someone “for their own good” is still torment – and I would never want to be the kind of person who can treat people that way with an unburdened conscience. And if you find yourself beset upon by the kind of person Lewis warned about, a good rule of thumb on how to handle them, in my opinion, comes from Robert Heinlein’s Notebooks of Lazarus Long: Freedom begins when you tell Mrs. Grundy to go fly a kite.     (1 COMMENTS)

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The Language of Dissent

When I first started reading back issues of Ayn Rand’s Objectivist Newsletter in late 1968, I found her book reviews particularly valuable. I learned about a lot of books she recommended, got almost all of them out of the University of Winnipeg library, and read, cover to cover, all the ones I took out. It was a tremendous learning experience for me, at age 18, who had in the past read only in spurts with large gaps in between, and mainly fiction. One book that made a particular impression on me, given that I knew virtually nothing about antitrust law, was The Language of Dissent by Lowell Mason. Mason had been a member of the Federal Trade Commission from 1945 to 1956. He was famous for his dissents from the majority decisions of the FTC. He compiled a number of them, along with explanations and context, for his book. I read through it while researching my forthcoming article on antitrust for Defining Ideas. Although I didn’t find anything that was on point with what I wanted to write about, the book still holds up. I did read one passage that was too long to quote in my article but that was telling. The case was Moog Industries, Inc. and Mason’s dissent was recorded on April 29, 1955. Moog was accused, under the Clayton Act, of offering different discounts to different buyers. This was not illegal per se. To be illegal, it had to lessen competition, tend to create a monopoly, or injure, destroy, or prevent competition. Mason dissented because the prosecution had not presented any evidence of injury to competition but instead had relied on the fact of disparate discounts to conclude that competition injured. Moog’s lawyers had decided to contact customers all over the country to get their views about whether they had been injured. As Mason put it: In the ensuing safari, every witness called positively denied he suffered any competitive injury from the challenged discounts or rebates–a position they all stoutly maintained in spite of the badgering the prosecutor gave them for ruining the Government’s case. Mason gives a digest of the testimony in the appendix. It’s worth quoting extensively. The first few excerpts show the prosecutor asking customers whether they were injured, with the customers saying they weren’t. The prosecutor then shifts and starts badgering one witness: Q: Do you know whether you suffered or not? A: No, I didn’t suffer. COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION: Just a minute. We aren’t so interested in getting your answer you are making as we are to find out whether or not you have the knowledge, yes or no, whether you know, and at that time I would like to make my objection. THE WITNESS: You want to know what, now? What is your question? COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION: I think Mr. Butterfield has a question pending. TRIAL EXAMINER: Mr Witness, the question is directed to your knowledge as to whether or not you know, not whether or not you did or did not, but whether or not you know whether you did or not. That calls for a yes or no answer. THE WITNESS: Whether I know I was injured, that is the question he asked me, was I injured. TRIAL EXAMINER: Do you know whether or not you were injured? You know or you don’t know. He will ask you a further question on that. THE WITNESS:  My answer still was no. COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION: I think the witness misunderstands the question. THE WITNESS: You asked me if I was injured. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: I ask if you know whether or not you were injured. THE WITNESS: Do I know whether or not I was injured? Q: Yes. A: The answer is I don’t think I was injured. I don’t see how I could be injured. I would say, whether I know whether I was injured or not? Q: Yes, do you know? A: I don’t know as far as either way. I am not injured in any way. I mean, the question was asked, am I injured. We have, all the fellows are competitors. Q: Who in your organization would know better than you whether you were injured or not? A: Whether I was injured, in what way are you asking? Your question is whether or not I was injured? Q: That is right. A: No, I am not injured. COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION: I still move that answer be stricken and we have a yes or no answer to the question. TRIAL EXAMINER: We will let the answer stand. Clearly, the prosecutor thinks there’s a big difference between the question “Do you know whether you were injured?” and “Were you injured?” There is a difference but if the witness answers that he wasn’t injured he is saying that he knows he wasn’t injured.     (0 COMMENTS)

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Anupam Bapu Jena on Random Acts of Medicine

Do marathons kill people who aren’t in the race? Does when you’re born make you more likely to get the flu? And what’s the difference between a good doctor and a bad one? These are some of the questions Anupam Bapu Jena of Harvard University and EconTalk host Russ Roberts take up as they discuss […] The post Anupam Bapu Jena on Random Acts of Medicine appeared first on Econlib.

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The real problem is nominal (wages)

In 2021, some economists predicted that high inflation would be transitory. When inflation soared much higher in 2022, those claims looked foolish. Now that headline inflation has fallen to just over 3%, some are asking whether inflation was transitory after all.Macroeconomic data never “speaks for itself”. Data only has meaning in the context of a model. In order for transitory inflation to have a useful meaning, we need to consider how nominal and real variables interact. The average person probably views the concept of “transitory” in terms of a specific period of time—a few months, or perhaps a year. In my view, that’s not a useful way to define the term. Instead, it is more helpful to view transitory inflation as being associated with no change in the growth rate of nominal wages (allowing for composition effects.)For example, suppose there is a terrorist attack that shuts down the Saudi oil industry for a couple of months. Oil prices would rise and the Fed would probably allow some increase in the overall CPI. When Saudi oil comes back onto the market, oil prices would fall and the CPI would fall back to trend. Nominal wages would be largely unaffected.  This is roughly what people have in mind by the term ‘transitory’. In my view, the most useful definition of transitory is not the period over which the higher inflation persists, rather whether or not it bleeds through to wage inflation.  As long as nominal wage growth is stable, all excess inflation is likely to be transitory, whether lasting for 3 months or 3 years.  In contrast, if nominal wages start accelerating, then inflation will remain elevated unless a contractionary monetary policy brings wage growth back to normal.  Throughout history, that has usually required a period of elevated unemployment (although a “softish landing” is not inconceivable if the disinflation is gradual.) From this perspective, there is no specific time frame that makes inflation transitory.  Any significant amount of elevated wage inflation, no matter how short in duration, constitutes non-transitory inflation.  Of course the term “significant” is open to interpretation . Macro data is noisy, and a single month’s data might reflect random shocks, not an overheated labor market.  Nonetheless, the criterion here is not the duration of the labor market overheating; the existence of any significant excess nominal wage growth constitutes non-transitory inflation. During the period of Covid shutdowns, the BLS wage data was thrown off by “composition effects”.  Even if every single person got a completely normal wage boost during 2020 (say 3%), the average wage growth would have looked high because lower wage workers were disproportionately laid off.  In a case such as 2020, nominal GDP growth would be an alternative indicator of non-transitory inflation.  By late 2021, NGDP was rising above the pre-Covid trend line, and hence by that time inflation was no longer merely transitory. PS.  I’m seeing some optimism that the labor market is normalizing, with pundits pointing to things like lower quit rates and fewer unfilled jobs.  I hope these pundits are correct.  But keep in mind that the real problem is nominal.  We still need to bring nominal wage growth back down to 3%.  Various real labor market indicators will eventually normalize (at their “natural rate”) even if nominal wage growth stays permanently elevated.  That was Milton Friedman’s great insight in the late 1960s.  (Also Edmund Phelps.) (0 COMMENTS)

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Bank Failures in Fragile Banking Systems

The sound of panic drums has been heard loud and wide around the financial world since the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, and the near collapse of Credit Suisse. The failure of a well-capitalized institution has been an enigma to some: how could a publicly recognized banking company suddenly go bankrupt and close its doors within 48 hours? To another lot, the collapse demonstrates the utter irrationality of markets. However, both of these views are misguided as a result of their biased theory of homogenous capital with no difference in quality, and their cognitive dissonance about the role that the exchange and asset functions of money play for its holders.   Money and the market The concept of “money” is a great reminder of the general state of ignorance of human beings. For example, the use of language is much older than our theoretical investigations into it, and much, much older than modern linguists investigating universal languages. For human beings, most actions precede correct comprehension of actions. Early humans used fire without necessarily having the need to understand its atomic, chemical nature. People’s awareness of money is similar to that of fire, except that we now understand fire better. This ignorance was shed to some extent with Carl Menger’s explanation of the emergence of money out of exchange. His core insight was that the emergence of the phenomenon, where a commodity comes into use as a general medium of exchange, is a natural culmination arising out differing salability of goods, and the freedom to accumulate and exchange that good. But understanding that money is a product of voluntary exchange and accumulation does not mean that we must then necessarily create and use political fiat currency as the sole medium of exchange; the simple possession of commodity money is enough to engage in exchange. The use of a commodity as a common medium of exchange probably arose with the first cities in ancient Mesopotamia, where a whole bunch of commodities traded against other non-money goods as common media of exchange in the market, as well as against each other at market-determined exchange rates. Mesopotamian monies are distinguished from ordinary commodities by being exchanged, sometimes for one another, but more often as payment for either tangible commodities or for less tangible goods, such as freedom from obligations of various sorts (taxes, loans with interest, etc.). Materials that functioned as money could be arranged then in ascending order of their value: barley, lead, copper or bronze, tin, silver, and gold. Of these, barley, lead, and copper or bronze functioned as cheaper monies; tin was mid-range, and silver and the much rarer gold were high-range monies. The existence of multiple monies circulating together in the market is a natural expression of economic calculation. Each of the various circulating monies had certain qualities which made them favorable for its holders, who in turn used them for particular forms of exchange. All of them together satisfied their respective holders more than any one of them could alone. The demand to hold each of the respective categories of money depended on the relative competence of monies in acting as a medium of exchange and a store of value. For example, gold was best for acting as a store of value or as a medium of exchange in high-value transactions, but wasn’t a good common medium of exchange due to its high relative value, which made holding it by everyone an impossibility. Silver and barley, however, were able to become the common medium with prices being quoted in both of them because barley gave direct utility as a primary food source and would thus be in high demand amongst commoners. Silver on the other hand, being a good store of value and having a lower relative value, served the needs of mass trade more successfully than other easily corroded metals such as tin and bronze. Monies that have been primarily used as a store of value have been selected due to their market-based ability to accumulate value as a store of purchasing power commanded by an individual, which tends to keep and grow in its relative value or purchasing power. This form of behavior has been documented as early as 1200 BC, but is much, much older. For example, an Egyptian woman cross-examined by a court scribe concerning gold found in her home explained: we got it by selling barley during the year of the hyenas when people went hungry. It illustrates the importance of a store of value that can hold its value even during times of great trouble, as a means of security for the masses. Pricing, or the act of economic calculation in an economy, is impossible without money, Prices reflect the relative valuation of goods via the demanded money. The money acts as the common yardstick that informs both parts of all prices, bid, and ask by buyer and seller. However, money is different from a physical yardstick in that its own value changes over time. When people are not in held bondage, they tend to trade away the bad yardsticks whose value either fluctuates violently or tends to lose its value quickly, for better yardsticks that are more stable and thus lend themselves towards a more rationally calculated economic order. As far back as the second millennium BC, Assyria, which was situated in northern Mesopotamia, provides ample evidence. The southern part of Mesopotamia, its center of influence, had adequate waters for barley cultivation, which in turn produced stable values for grain such as barley. Assyria, in the north, depended heavily on rainfall for its cultivation. This meant violently fluctuating values of grain, as opposed to its more stable value in the irrigation agriculture of Babylonia (southern Mesopotamia), which led to a situation where cheap metals such as lead, copper, and bronze circulated as the common medium of exchange in Assyria. Prices of goods have historically been posted in the common medium of exchange of the place. Wherever a seller, a buyer, and the broader market all valued, for example, silver, and were ready to hold it as a store of value, this allowed any other person to use it for purchases without any loss in its value. This allows the buyer to demand payments for his labor services in silver, and to carry silver with the expectation of it being accepted by others. The seller accepts the silver knowing that he can exchange it for other many other goods produced by others in the market. The modern arrangement of the monetary system through legislative means has prohibited the development of alternative measures of holding different kinds of money as legal tender in any practical way. The absence of any systemic changes in terms of the demand to hold fiat money by market participants, in spite of major gradual devaluations, is a testament to the coercive power of taxation. Money’s purchasing power depends on paper money being legal tender and being accepted by the government for the payment of taxes and duties. By giving its paper money legal privileges, the government subsidizes its demand by increasing its use in exchanges, therefore preventing it from becoming economically uncompetitive versus other monies such as gold, silver, bitcoin or certificates for them. This however is not odd, but another example of the harmful effects on consumers, and the beneficial effects on politically connected producers, namely banks, in the modern monetary system. When a government subsidizes domestic enterprises by tariffs, the public might be better off using cheaper foreign goods, but are forced to use possibly sub-standard and costly domestic products. The analogous costly nature of fiat monies is less acknowledged than that of tariffs before the failure of the fiat currency, but is ever present, particularly in its spectacular ability to reduce the ability of its holders to accumulate value. The decline in the purchasing power of the US dollar since 1913, when the dollar certificate which represented certain amounts of gold was reduced to only certificates made out of paper, is another illustration of the same.   Effects of monopoly on the money issue The perverse effects of having a single fiat money are only acknowledged once hyperinflation has set in, when the value of a currency falls much quicker than it changes hands. The most informed and connected market participants are the first ones to substitute the widely fluctuating domestic currency with a more stable currency, like the US dollar. Later, governments acknowledge the failure of its money, and the entire country’s monetary regime is changed. This was evident in the dollarization of currencies in countries such as Ecuador, El Salvador, and Zimbabwe. Fiat money systems with single paper money, as is the case with most nation-states today, can be contrasted with systems of paper money where other commodities such as gold and silver also function as legal tender and thus have the same playing field as the fiat money, which improves the long-run stability of the latter. The sudden downfall of fiat monetary systems as the monetary crisis of hyperinflation takes place is due to the absence of the development of a natural adjustment process in markets, where the overissue of one money is signaled as its devaluation in other monies. These devaluations can serve as signals to entrepreneurs, investors, and consumers to adjust their own money holdings. The absence of other monies serves as the root cause in creating and propagating fragile banking systems. This is similar to a market structure where the foundational primary industries such as iron, coal, etc. were to be nationalized, while producers of steel and coal products were left in private hands. It is the private production of iron, coal, and market-determined prices that allows for efficiency and creativity in long-term planning by multiple steel companies and other producers of iron products. The combination of governments restricting money to a single legal tender, and a central bank acting as the sole issuer of base money creates inefficiency and fragility throughout the banking system. The creation of a more anti-fragile system requires essential learning from the failures of individual banks. The supply of any given commodity or service which comes on the market is a function of its demand, of the purpose it serves for its demanders. Learning from failures is related to the need for survival in the marketplace, The market where the government is not actively subsidizing producers is not a place that is sympathetic to long-term, drawn-out failures; this can hardly be a disputable statement. The market becomes anti-fragile through successive failures and rooting out of firms, with the successful firms inheriting informational learning about what to do and what not to do in the market environment. Successful firms become efficient not because they can perfectly plan everything from the beginning but through learning not to make the same mistakes while surviving. This for practical purposes means firms investing in what makes them successful, and abstaining from the devotion of any resources toward identified failures. The “too big to fail” doctrine stops the filtering process by building up and creating more defects by saving failed banks and keeping the value of failed securities such as mortgage-backed securities afloat, making the entire system more fragile, leading only to bigger failures. The correction of these macroeconomic failures, however, is not to be found in macroeconomic but rather in microeconomic solutions. The reason often advanced for the legitimacy of governments power in private matters is its protection of the private property function, This claim is similar in some aspects to  government’s demand of a monopoly in violence over a geographical space in order to limit violence in private matters. So the central bank demands a monopoly of the issuance of money in order to stabilize the value of ordinary people’s money holdings. However, in light of the extraordinary amount of both theoretical and empirical evidence of the failure of central banks in maintaining a stable value of their money, the cheapest, easiest, and most just solution would be to accord to gold and silver the status of legal tender in tax payment. This is a modest solution in light of the successive inflationary episodes that impact the less well-off more seriously due to their binding budget constraints. The impact of suddenly higher prices has a disproportionate effect on people with less money stock than on people with more. It also has a larger impact on their ability to accumulate money than those who receive successive inflationary bouts of money. The effect of a sudden increase in prices on an individual during the last two years who had kept his money balance in liquid savings as bank deposits is more problematic than if he had kept it in the form of digital gold or silver bitcoin which could be quickly converted to dollars. This is because the gold, bitcoin and silver would have provided a premium for holding it, which is washed away quickly in fiat money balances during a general rise in the price level. Restoring the ability to pay taxes in gold and silver for everyone would put gold and silver at a more competitive level with the dollar, would stabilize our currencies, and raise the standard of living of the poorest among us.     Vibhu Vikramaidtya is a scholar with research interests in capital theory, monetary theory, and business cycles writing about events in the economy from a legal and economic standpoint. His other works can be found at the Austrian Economics Center, the Libertarian Institute, and beinglibetarian.com.  (0 COMMENTS)

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Political Economy in Half a Lesson

An objection to libertarianism and classical liberalism is that total individual autonomy does not exist: even on the market, I cannot do anything I want. So what’s all the fuss about individual liberty? This is an important question about liberal political economy. The short answer is that in a regime of equal individual liberty, you are constrained by the equal liberty of all other sovereign individuals, while in a regime of non-liberty, you are constrained by the will of some individuals (or by stifling tribal customs). To obtain this result, one needs first to recognize scarcity: resources, if only time, are limited and not everybody can have or do everything he wants. The simplest microeconomic model, which you will find in any good microeconomics textbook, embodies these ideas. In order to maximize your utility (that is, improve your situation), you choose among all bundles of goods and services on the basis of both your preferences (tastes) and your budget constraint. Your budget constraint is composed of two things: the relative prices of all goods (and services) and your income; you can’t have everything. Your income is determined by how useful your productive capacities, yourself or your capital, are to others. Whatever his ultimate purpose (except negating your equal liberty), anybody may bid for what you directly or indirectly produce. Prices themselves are determined by everybody bidding on the goods he is pursuing. A free market is a continuous and silent auction, an important idea to understand. The analysis is basically the same for all, or nearly all, kinds of social interaction. In order to obtain what you consider to be your preferred situation, you constantly choose among available social interactions on the basis of your preferences and what is possible for you to do. What is possible for you to do—your “feasible set”—is determined by what you must sacrifice to pursue some means of happiness instead of some others, and by your abilities and capacities (which are likely partly innate, partly acquired, pace Adam Smith). You can’t do everything. Your feasible set is determined by your contribution to the happiness of others, the latter’s cooperation, and of course by the person you are. The relative terms at which you can pursue social opportunities are determined by the social consequences of what all others do with the same liberty as you have to pursue their individual happiness. These choices or decisions about your life as an adult can be made either by somebody for you (imposed on you), which, at least at a certain level, is called despotism or tyranny, or by yourself, which is called individual liberty. Among the objections to this economic way of looking at the social world, one claims that the simple model described above does not work: it is impossible or “inefficient” for all individuals to have their individual liberty limited only by the equal liberty of all others. The response to this objection is that the possibility and efficiency of an autoregulated economic and social order has been a major 18th-century discovery, notably by Adam Smith. James Buchanan, the 1986 laureate of the Nobel Prize in economics, similarly explained that “we can all be free” (his emphasis). Economics demonstrates that the economy and society generally work better without commands from a coercive authority. What the “generally” exactly covers is a controversial matter, but it is difficult to rationally discuss it without some knowledge of economics. “Market failures” exist, of course, but they are generally much less constraining than the failures of government coercion. An illustration a contrario was given by the Russian official who, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, asked British economist Paul Seabright: “Who is in charge of the supply of bread to the population of London?” A bread czar is not necessary. Historically and theoretically, there is more bread without one. Other objections are more ethical, which means that they more explicitly require a value judgment. Instead of plunging into that rabbit hole, let me quote Anthony de Jasay, which raises the right questions (from “Before Resorting to Politics,” in de Jasay’s Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order [Routledge, 1997], p. 152): If consequentialism is circular, depending in all cases involving harm or interpersonal comparisons on a value judgement about its own validity, the standard argument  for letting the state to do all the good we can find for it to do, and accordingly allowing politics to have unrestricted scope, falls to the ground. Its collapse releases and activates and activates the basic presumption against coercion, a presumption that can be derived either from an axiom about the practice of choice, or from a social convention of “live and let live,” of letting each do what it will if doing so involves, roughly speaking, no harm to others. Accepting, and acting on, this presumption also presupposes a value judgement, but it is one that demands far less of our moral credulity than any consequentialist alternative I can think of. This would take us much farther. There are many other objections and further explanations, but I could only promise, at most, half a lesson. (0 COMMENTS)

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Rent Stabilization IS Rent Control

The following letter was published in today’s Carmel Pine Cone. The Monterey city government is walking its citizens into a horrible mess. When I attended the May 30 meeting in which we discussed its proposed compulsory rent registry, I talked briefly to Mayor Tyller Williamson. I told him that economists are almost unanimous in their view that rent controls cause shortages of housing, cause landlords to cut down on maintenance, and discourage new construction. He replied that he doesn’t advocate rent control but, instead, favors what he called “rent stabilization.” It’s a distinction without a difference. Rent stabilization is simply a form of rent control because it’s a government limit on rents. The compulsory rent registry that the Monterey city council is about to vote for will be the first step to rent control. I don’t know if the mayor will regret it but a lot of people in Monterey will. David R. Henderson Research Fellow Hoover Institution Here’s the 7 hour meeting at which the rental registry was discussed and voted for. One of the city council members, Alan Haffa, with whom I had carried on a civil email discussion early in the week, voted for the registry after admitting a lot of the problems. Notice what he says at about the 5:22:43 point: Those of you who are professionals know what the prices are, you know what rents are, but your clients, your tenants may not. So you have the information but they don’t. I wrote him this morning and asked him how the tenants manage to fill out their monthly rent check without knowing the rents. He has not got back to me. The pic above shows the effects of long-term rent control in the South Bronx. It began as a temporary measure during World War II. (0 COMMENTS)

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Should we root for poverty?

I’m a big fan of Matt Yglesias, but I found this off hand remark to be both inaccurate and in poor taste: Analysts now think China’s GDP may not overtake America’s after all, good news for the world, albeit slightly bad news for “One Billion Americans” book sales.  The only meaningful way of comparing countries is on a PPP basis.  And on that basis, China’s total GDP is larger than that of the US.  The media only uses current exchange rate GDP measures when they wish to belittle China.  Nowhere in the media will you find stories reporting the “Japanese Great Depression of 2012-22”, even though in US dollar terms Japan’s GDP has plummeted in recent years.  The media instinctively knows that a dollar measure of Japan’s GDP is meaningless.  If you don’t believe me, I’d suggest visiting Beijing and staying in a 4-star modern hotel, for $48/night.  Or ride the Beijing subway, which is light years better than the NYC subway, and costs about 50 cents for a ride.  Even real estate is cheap in China, if priced in rental equivalent terms (as we do when constructing our GDP data in the US.) But let’s say I’m wrong and market exchange rates are the correct way to make comparisons.  In that case, China’s GDP/person would be roughly 1/6th the level in the US.  In other words, China would be a very poor country.  Then Yglesias would essentially be saying, “Good news, the 1.4 billion Chinese people are likely to stay very poor.” The US government is now actively trying to sabotage the Chinese economy.  We gloat every time they fail, and wring our hands when they achieve a limited success, such as producing their own smart phone chips.  And then our media wonders why the Chinese consumers are moving away from Apple iPhones for “nationalistic” reasons.  I guess nationalism is a disease that only affects the Chinese, not us Americans: But the biggest potential threat to Apple may be something more nebulous: a resurgence in Chinese nationalism that spurs everyday consumers to shun the iPhone and other foreign-branded devices. Governments that do great harm to other countries can always find an ethical fig leaf to justify their actions.  I suppose one could argue that a richer China is a threat to world peace.  But where are the academic studies that suggest that economic growth increases warfare?  Doesn’t the correlation usually go in the opposite direction?  Don’t rich people have more to lose from nuclear war?  Social science research has recently received a great deal of criticism, and rightly so.  The replication crisis suggests that very little published research is of any value.  But let’s say I’m wrong.  Is there any reliable research supporting nationalism?  Tyler Cowen recently asked AI doomsters to show him the mathematical model that demonstrates the existential risk resulting from of future gains in AI. I’m asking someone to show me the model that demonstrates how nationalistic policies aimed at hurting the welfare of a nation of 1.4 billion people and causing bitter resentment in that country is likely to make the world a better place.  Heck, I’d even be happy if someone could show me a model where gloating over economic distress that we caused in China will make the world a safer place. If you could push a button and make China much poorer, causing unimaginable harm to 1.4 billion people, would you have enough confidence in the social science model in your head to push that button?  Should we be rooting for mass poverty? (1 COMMENTS)

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Argentina’s Liberalization

Argentina has yet to elect a new president, but based on the leading candidates, economic liberalization is inevitable.  On August 11, when a national primary election was held, the pro-government coalition led by current Minister of Economy Sergio Massa received a meager 27% of the total vote, behind two opposition leaders: Javier Milei (30%) and Patricia Bullrich (28%). Heading into the general election in October, both Milei and Bullrich promise strong liberalizing reforms for Argentina’s repressed economy. Though their proposals might look opposed at first glance, what separates Milei’s and Bullrich’s approaches is a question of how fast this liberalization should take place. Milei’s approach resembles shock therapy, while Bullrich’s is more moderate. Their economic teams, which are full of former officials from previous administrations, reflect this view. Milei is supported by Austrian-school economists, Bullrich by the classical liberal mainstream. Javier Milei, a libertarian, self-described ‘anarcho-capitalist,’ and an outsider who only started his political career in 2021, has a radical platform to restructure Argentina’s economy. He plans to adopt the American dollar, do away with the Argentine peso, and close Argentina’s Central Bank –– which he blames for the country’s catastrophic inflation history. He has also called for tax cuts, sweeping public spending reductions, the privatization of some state-owned companies, and the elimination of over half of the country’s ministries. That’s a lot of big changes to propose.  Former Minister of Security Patricia Bullrich agrees that the country needs to liberalize, but takes a more restrained approach. Instead of dollarizing the economy, she says Argentina should allow pesos and dollars to compete, which implies getting rid of currency controls by the Central Bank but not its elimination. Like Milei, she is a proponent of tax cuts, but only insofar as they are compatible with a balanced budget. Though privatizations are absent from her platform, she stresses the need to improve the operations and profitability of state-owned companies. The debate between Milei and Bullrich –– on how to end Argentina’s seemingly permanent fiscal crises –– resembles that of 2015, when then-candidate Mauricio Macri debated whether he should take a ‘gradualist’ or a ‘shocking’ course of action. In the end, President Macri’s administration decided on the gradualist approach, which resulted in a notorious failure that neither Milei and Bullrich want to repeat. Indeed, nobody wants another liberalizing attempt in Argentina to end in an IMF bailout, particularly as the consequences of failure grow more acute. In a closed, heavily regulated economy with over 40% the population living under the poverty line, an ever-increasing debt and 120% annual inflation, liberalization cannot be avoided. Undoubtedly, the costs of liberalization will be high. Lifting barriers to trade could threaten businesses which have grown accustomed to protectionism. Reducing government handouts would hurt the poor. Modernizing labor legislation and privatizing state companies would almost certainly result in laying off unproductive workers. Any major reform––even a necessary one––produces undesirable outcomes. But reforming Argentina’s economy is worth these downsides. And despite the known differences in their approaches, there is much agreement between the two main contenders to Argentina’s presidency. Since becoming the front-runner, Milei has begun lowering expectations for immediate change, saying that dollarization, for example, could take years. He says the conditions for implementing reform include a balanced budget and significant changes in tax legislation. Bullrich, in turn, is becoming more hawkish. She hopes to attract voters who are considering Milei but doubt his ability to implement reform, given his lack of experience in office and that his coalition will not hold a majority in Congress after the election. She says that only her administration could actually implement change in Argentina. Thus, Milei and Bullrich have different platforms but are increasingly converging. One thing is certain: Liberalization is coming to Argentina. The only question is how fast.   Marcos Falcone is the Project Manager of Fundación Libertad and a regular contributor to Forbes Argentina. His writing has also appeared in The Washington Post, National Review, and Reason, among others. He is based in Buenos Aires, Argentina. (0 COMMENTS)

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