This is my archive

bar

Surface Freight Transportation Deregulation

History of Regulation With the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to oversee the railroad industry in 1887, the federal government began more than a century of regulating surface freight transportation. Railroad Regulation was strengthened several times in the early part of the twentieth century. Those changes stifled price competition between railroads by prohibiting rebating, discounting, and secret price cutting. The federal government nationalized the railroads during World War I, and by the end of the war had provided about $1.5 billion (1919 dollars) in subsidies to the ailing railroads. The major concern after the war was to make the railroads profitable. The Transportation Act of 1920 essentially cartelized the railroad industry and mandated that the Interstate Commerce Commission establish rates to provide a “fair rate of return.” The ICC was given complete authority over entry, abandonment, mergers, minimum rates, intrastate rates, and the issuing of new securities. Even during the prosperous 1920s, railroad earnings never reached what the act indicated might be a fair rate of return. New competition from the growing trucking industry presented a major problem for the railroads. With the advent of the Great Depression, earnings plummeted and, for the first time, became negative for the whole railroad industry. In an attempt to improve their profitability, leaders of the railroad industry, together with the ICC, urged Congress to regulate these competitors. The trucking industry also suffered during the Depression and began to favor allowing the ICC to restrict competition. With the major spokesmen for a number of large truckers arguing for controls to prevent “cutthroat competition,” Congress moved to control motor carriers and inland water carriers. The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 required new truckers to seek a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” from the ICC. Truckers already operating in 1935 could automatically get certificates, but only if they documented their prior service—and the ICC was extraordinarily restrictive in interpreting proof of service. New trucking companies found it extremely difficult to get certificates. In 1940, Congress extended ICC regulation to include inland water carriers, another competitor of the railroads. Thus, with pipeline regulation, which originated with the Hepburn Act of 1906, the ICC controlled all forms of surface freight transportation (air freight was controlled separately). From 1940 to 1980, new or expanded authority to transport goods was almost impossible to secure unless an application was completely unopposed. Even if no existing carriers were offering the proposed service, the ICC held that any already certified trucker who expressed a desire to carry the goods should be allowed to do so; new applicants were denied. The effect was to stifle competition from new carriers. By reducing competition the ICC created a hugely wasteful and inefficient industry. Routes and the products that could be carried over them were narrowly specified. Truckers with authority to carry a product, such as tiles, from one city to another often lacked authority to haul anything on the return trip. Regulation frequently required truckers to go miles out of their way. During the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, the ICC kept a stranglehold on railroads, preventing them from abandoning unprofitable lines and business. Regulations restricted rates and encouraged price collusion. As

/ Learn More

Telecommunications

Telecommunications matters economically for two reasons. First, it plays a role perhaps second only to brain power in the operation and rapidly expanding productivity of the modern “information-based” economy; indeed, it supplies a primary technical means for productively harnessing the information and knowledge spread among individual economic actors throughout the global economic order. Second, the evolution of telecommunications from a “natural monopoly” to a more competitively structured industry has raised many challenging economic issues, the analysis and resolution of which are important in their own right and relevant to other sectors of the economy as well. There’s No “There” Anymore … Only “Here” Information and communications technology plays an increasingly important role in the wealth of nations. Adam Smith’s theory of economic growth emphasized the “division of labor” (i.e., productive specialization), and he argued that growth through the division of labor was limited by “the extent of the market.” Thus, he favored extension of markets overseas and expansion of trade as practical methods of extending market boundaries, and thereby the scope available for further division of labor. Improvements in maritime navigation and the development of the steam engine and rail transport were important because they increased the size of economically relevant markets, thereby fostering greater productive specialization. Increases in market size also encourage economies of scale and scope and more intense competition among buyers and sellers. Just as improvements in transportation during the Industrial Revolution expanded the breadth of markets, so also recent improvements in the availability of information and the ability to communicate are expanding markets by making buyers and sellers aware of each other. High-quality transportation and communications sometimes make physical distance irrelevant: a buyer and seller may be thousands of miles apart but still figuratively “next door” (see spatial economics). At the turn of the twenty-first century, the U.S. economy experienced a jump in productivity growth, with productivity increases about 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points above the long-term trend. While the causes of this productivity surge are still debated, many economists believe it is due to the spread of increasingly economical and powerful information movement and management technologies throughout the economy. A Network of Networks The fundamental economic reform that has altered telecommunications is the introduction of competition into what had previously been a closed monopoly. In the United States, governments monopolized and regulated private telephone companies; in most other countries, governments owned and operated a monopoly telephone network. Privatization and deregulation (see Regulation) have produced substantial productivity increases, a proliferation of service offerings, and many service innovations. In the United Kingdom, for example, the British Post Office–run telephone company, prior to privatization, employed two to three times as many workers as were employed in the United States to maintain ten thousand access lines (a standard industry measure of productivity)—so there were huge gains to be reaped from privatization and deregulation simply by attaining productivity standards previously realized only by privately owned companies in the United States. Efficiency gains by U.S. telephone companies have also been quite substantial in the competitive era, although not as great as those experienced in many initially privatizing countries. Before this revolution away from monopoly, governments typically sought to promote widespread (“universal”) telephone service by keeping long-distance rates high—sometimes as much as 100 percent above cost in the United States and even more in some foreign countries—and using, or, in the case of private phone companies, requiring the phone companies to use, the revenues from long distance to subsidize line rentals. To put this into perspective, imagine that the government decided that everyone should have a fine automobile and subsidized a BMW purchase for every household—and then paid for this largesse by imposing an additional two-dollars-per-gallon gasoline tax. Everyone has a nice car under this program, but most cannot afford to drive it long distances; likewise, virtually everyone had a phone, but long-distance calls were a luxury item for most consumers. The artificially high-priced service, long distance, supplied an attractive target for competition, which is where the initial competitive forays in telecommunications occurred virtually everywhere. The subsidized service—local line rentals—offered a less attractive target, although wireless services provided a means to offer a competitive service without the need to duplicate the existing wireline carrier’s network of dedicated subscriber lines. U.S. regulators tried to have their cake and eat it too by attempting to promote competition for line rentals and related services at the same time they prevented the relevant service prices from rising to efficient levels. The result has been the proverbial

/ Learn More

Stock Market

The price of a share of stock, like that of any other financial asset, equals the present value of the sum of the expected dividends or other cash payments to the shareholders, where future payments are discounted by the interest rate and risks involved. Most of the cash payments to stockholders arise from dividends, which are paid out of earnings and other distributions resulting from the sale or liquidation of assets. The cash payments available to a shareholder are uncertain and subject to the earnings of the firm. This uncertainty contrasts sharply with cash payments to bondholders, the value of which is fixed by contractual obligation and is paid in a timely manner unless the firm encounters severe financial stress, such as bankruptcy. As a result, the price of stocks normally fluctuates more than the price of bonds. Over time, most firms pay rising dividends. Dividends increase for two reasons. First, because firms rarely pay out all their earnings as dividends, the difference, called retained earnings, is available to the firm to invest or buy back its shares. This, in turn, often produces greater future earnings and, hence, higher prospective dividends. Second, a firm’s earnings will rise as the price of its output rises with inflation, as demand for its products grows, and as the firm operates more efficiently. Firms with steadily rising dividends are sought after by investors, who often pay premium prices to own such firms. Cash payments to shareholders also result from the sale of some of the firm’s assets, outright liquidation, or a buyout. A firm may sell some of its operations, using the revenues from the sale to provide a lump-sum distribution to stockholders. When a firm sells all its operations and assets, this total liquidation results in a cash distribution after obligations to creditors are satisfied. Finally, if another firm or individual purchases the firm, existing shareholders are often eligible to receive cash distributions. Stock Markets In the United States, most stocks are traded either on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE, or “Big Board”) or on NASDAQ, an electronic market that grew out of the “over-the-counter” market in 1970. The NYSE, founded in 1792, trades most of the large U.S. stocks through a series of

/ Learn More

Sports

Major league sports, as every reader of the sports pages knows, is a major league business. As a result, economics has a lot to say about how players, teams, and leagues will act under different circumstances. But would you believe that economics can be used to predict which teams will win and which will lose? It can. How good a professional sports team is depends, of course, on the quality of its players. Because teams compete for better players by offering higher salaries, the quality of a team depends largely on how strong it is financially. The financially stronger teams will, on average, be the better teams. And they will also, on average, be the ones in bigger cities, because more revenues can be made in bigger cities. In baseball, equivalent win records in New York, Los Angeles, or Chicago yield three times the revenue as in Kansas City, Milwaukee, or Pittsburgh. That is why professional sports teams in cities with large populations tend to have records above .500, while teams in cities with small populations tend to have records below .500. Exceptions to the rule that financially stronger teams are better are some small-market teams, such as Oakland and Montreal, that, for certain periods of time, develop high-quality players in their farm-team system. These “diamonds in the rough” are better than the market. Such a strategy can produce relatively competitive teams in a small market while keeping player salaries relatively low. Of course, the exception proves the rule. Once these players win substantial salary increases through arbitration or become free agents, big-market teams often hire them away. It is easy to see why large-market teams do better in the era of free agents, when a star player can move to whichever team will pay him the most. But, as I will explain below, this differential between large- and small-city teams also existed when teams “owned” player contracts and players were not free to accept a higher offer. One factor that matters for team revenues and for competitive balance is the league’s rule for dividing the gate receipts. In basketball and hockey, the home team gets all of the gate receipts and the visitor gets nothing. The gate division is 85:15 in baseball and 60:40 in football. When the home team gets to keep more of the gate receipts, the teams in bigger cities get more of the benefit from their inherent financial advantage. When the split is more equal, the financial advantage of being in a bigger market is less. Partly for this reason, financial disparity is least in the National Football Leaque (NFL). But in all sports, revenues from national television contracts have grown as a percentage of total revenues, and TV revenues are divided equally among the clubs. As a result, the differences in the financial strength of teams have narrowed. Big-city domination, though not completely eliminated, has diminished. By their very nature, sports leagues are cartels that exclude competition from other companies. You cannot start a baseball team and hope to play the Yankees unless you can get Major League Baseball (the cartel) to grant you a franchise. The antitrust laws prohibit cartels, but professional sports is the only private business in the United States that is largely exempt from those laws. Ever since a 1922 court decision (Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League et al.), baseball has been totally exempt. No other sport enjoys such a blanket exemption from antitrust, but all professional team sports have a labor exemption and, since the Sports Television Act of 1961, a broadcast exemption. All of the leagues have collusive agreements that govern the selection, contractual arrangements, and distribution of players among the teams. Collectively, these agreements grant a degree of monopsony power (monopoly power over the right to buy something—in this case, player services) to owners. The owners exploit this power by paying the players less than their incremental contribution to revenue. Athletes enter most professional team sports through a drafting procedure. The common feature of the drafts is that they grant one team exclusive bargaining rights with each prospective player. Once drafted, the athlete negotiates with that team alone, and others cannot offer higher salaries to get him. In some instances, signing bonuses for draft choices are very high. Such instances are relatively rare and depend on the quality of the player and the labor-market structure of the sport. In baseball, where drafted players usually are assigned to the minor leagues, face relatively long careers on average, are not constrained by a salary cap, and are paid their salaries for the length of their contracts—which can be for several years—large signing bonuses for amateurs are rare. In football, where players face a salary cap, careers are short—less than three years, on average—and salary is not guaranteed if the player fails to make the team or is injured during the season, signing bonuses can be high for impact players. The rules affecting the amateur draft have been weakened somewhat over the years, but competitive bidding for beginning players remains impeded. Once the player has come to terms with the drafting team, he must sign a uniform player’s contract that allows him to sell his services only to the team holding the contract. Although player contracts vary from sport to sport, all contain some basic prohibitions against player-initiated moves to other teams. That is, owners are free to “trade” (sell) players to other teams, but players are not totally free to offer their services to competing teams. Owners claim that restrictions on player movement are necessary to maintain competitive balance and prevent financial powerhouses such as the old Yankees from buying up all the best talent and completely dominating the sport. That, owners say, would make the sport duller for fans and hurt everyone. Economists have always been skeptical about the owners’ motives—and about the evidence. There never was any disagreement over the fact that star players would wind up on big-city teams. But economists believe that this would happen regardless of whether or not leagues restrict moves initiated by players. If players were free to move between teams, then, assuming they were indifferent about location, they would play for the team that pays the most. The team that pays the most is the one that expects the largest increment in revenue from that player’s performance. Since an increment in the win-loss record yields more revenue in, say, New York than in Kansas City, the best players go to New York rather than to Kansas City. That point, which is made by those who justify restrictions on mobility, is correct. But limiting the ability of players to initiate moves should not have any effect on where players end up playing. When players are not free to move, does a small-city team that acquired a star player in the draft keep him? For a small-city franchise, the team holding the player’s contract expects him to contribute, say, one million dollars in incremental revenue to the club. In a large city, that same player’s talents might contribute three million dollars. Because the player is worth more to the big-city team in either case (and the big-city team will pay more for him), the small-city franchise has an incentive to sell the player’s contract to the big-city team, and thereby make more money than it could by keeping him. Thus, players should wind up allocated by highest incremental revenue, with or without restrictions on player-initiated movement. The evidence supports that conclusion. Since the advent of free agency, which made it easier for players to jump from one team to another, the total movement of players (trades, sales, minor league transfers) has been about the same as it was before. So, although restrictions on player-initiated movement should not affect the allocation of player talent within a league, they substantially affect the division of income between owners and players. Under free agency, the players earn what they contribute to incremental revenue; under league restrictions on player-initiated transfers, the owners keep more of the revenues. The dramatic rise in player salaries since the mid-1970s, notably in baseball and basketball, is largely the result of the relaxation of restrictions on player-initiated transfers. The most important antitrust issue in sports today relates to the formation of new leagues. The collusive arrangement in the allocation of broadcast rights between the television networks and the existing leagues constitutes a formidable barrier to entry for a new league. In particular, football programming is very valuable because football games attract large audiences. Large audiences mean high advertising revenues and, therefore, large network television revenues to the NFL. By allocating games to several networks instead of just one, the NFL has become a partner with the networks in the broadcast enterprise. Further, the contract stipulates that the networks cannot broadcast another professional football league’s games within forty-eight hours of an NFL game. This relegates any competing league’s games to midweek, which is hardly attractive to the networks. Television, by building fan recognition and loyalty, builds attendance and gate receipts. Thus, a competing league may not be able to exist without access to television. The NFL has an exclusive, multiyear contract with the networks that is a barrier to entry for a competing league. Only when the network-NFL contract expires is there the possibility of a point of entry. But for that to happen, the networks would have to consider a new league’s games suitable substitutes for NFL games. Because teams in new leagues are inferior to established teams (the established teams already have the best stars), the networks have little incentive to make such a substitution. Partly because of the broadcast exemption to antitrust law, and partly because of the judicious expansion of the leagues in all of the professional team sports, fans are unlikely to see competing sports leagues arise. Some seventy-three million fans attended major league baseball games in 2004, and fan interest remains high in other professional team sports. The explosion of new sport facilities since 1990 has contributed to increased attendance. These expensive facilities, usually financed by taxpayers, are leased to the teams at relatively low prices. These implicit annual subsidies to teams are about ten million dollars or so per team, and a new facility adds twenty million or more to a team’s revenue. These added revenues and subsidies add to a franchise’s value. Economists have found that the benefits from the government subsidies, such as increased employment, expanded consumer leisure spending, economic development, or other economic effects, are a fraction of the subsidies. Proponents of public spending on sports facilities claim that income generated in the community is ten dollars for every one dollar spent by the team’s fans. Economists are skeptical that the impact is more than twice that of club revenues. Many other public projects rank well above sport facilities in generating benefits for a given subsidy. But politicians and bureaucrats are in a poor bargaining position relative to the monopoly leagues. These leagues keep one or more sites open and threaten to relocate or deny expansion to the locality that will not build a new facility. Politicians want to provide popular projects that their constituents favor, and a sports team is considered part of the local culture and quality of life. Often, special bond elections are held to approve public spending for sport facilities. Such elections seldom draw voter turnouts of more than 10 percent. Relatively more fans turn out to vote than the general public. Moreover, these facilities often are financed by increased taxes on tourists. But one must also turn to psychological and sociological explanations for the popular support of sports monopolies. One important area of economic activity that this article leaves out is that of amateur sports. The economic importance of amateur sports, measured by the value of time and other resources spent by participants and fans, is comparable in order of magnitude to the importance of professional sports. About the Author Gerald W. Scully is emeritus professor of economics at the University of Texas at Dallas. Further Reading   Lewis, Michael. Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game. New York: Norton, 2003. Noll, Roger G., and Andrew Zimbalist, eds. Sports, Jobs and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. Quirk, James, and Rodney D. Fort. Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. Scully, Gerald W. The Market Structure of Sports. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.   (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Standards of Living and Modern Economic Growth

Judged by the huge strides that people all over the world have made in overcoming poverty and want, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that little of economic consequence happened before the last three centuries. Before that, most of the world not only took poverty for granted,

/ Learn More

Sportometrics

Until recently, economists who analyzed sports focused on such things as the antitrust exemption, the alleged cartel behavior of sports leagues, and the player draft (see sports). Sportometrics is different. It is the application of economic theories to the behavior of athletes to explain what they do and to see if what they do can help to explain the behavior of people in other professions and settings. Instead of being about the “economics of sports,” sportometrics introduces the idea of “sports as economics.” In other words, sportometricians view sports as an economic environment in which athletes behave according to incentives and constraints. Economists have, for example, shown how incentives and costs can explain how much effort runners exert in a footrace (see Higgins and Tollison 1990; Maloney and McCormick 2000). Using data from sprint events of the modern Olympics from 1896 to 1980, Richard Higgins and Robert Tollison (1990) found that running times were faster when there were fewer contestants in a race. This makes sense. With fewer runners, each runner’s chance of winning is greater, and, therefore, each runner’s expected gain from putting out additional effort is greater. This cannot be attributed to decreased congestion: because each runner is given a lane, congestion does not diminish when the number of contestants falls. Higgins and Tollison also found that the harder an Olympic record is to break, the less effort contestants will expend to break it. Can any fan ever forget Carl Lewis’s

/ Learn More

Spatial Economics

Producers and buyers are dispersed in space, and overcoming the distances between them can be costly. Much commercial activity is concerned with “space bridging,” and much entrepreneurship is aimed at making good use of locational opportunities and cutting the costs of transport and communication. Spatial economics is the study of how space (distance) affects economic behavior. The Costs of “Space Bridging” Have Fallen Throughout history, transport costs have hampered specialization, and improvements in transport and communications have been among the main driving forces of economic progress. In medieval Europe and China, most ordinary people never moved farther than twenty miles from their birthplaces, and before the advent of book printing, most people knew very little about what happened beyond those narrow horizons. Firms that depended on heavy inputs, such as steel makers, used to locate near the source of major inputs—coal mines, in particular. By contrast, firms that interacted intensively and frequently with customers tended to locate near the demand. Thus, gasoline stations are still found near busy intersections. In recent decades, technical and organizational progress has caused the costs of transport to fall steadily and communication costs to plummet. Between 1950 and 2000, the price of bulk sea freight and port handling dropped, on average, by 0.9 percent annually, of long-distance passenger air transport by 2.6 percent annually, and of trans-Atlantic phone calls by an astounding 8 percent annually. The inflation-adjusted price of a long-distance phone call from New York to London is now less than 1 percent of what it was in 1950. Fax machines, portable video cameras, satellite TV, computers, and cell phones have all cut communication costs greatly. More recently, the Internet has made global communication so cheap and user friendly that words and images can be distributed by almost anyone globally, without delay and at near-zero cost. These technologies have opened new, easily accessible channels of communicating, so that entirely new forms of the division of labor between different locations have become feasible. This reduction in transport costs has revolutionized decisions about where goods and services are produced. The relative costs of employing immobile production factors, such as land and labor, have become relatively more important in influencing the spatial arrangement of industries, irrespective of national borders. Yet, most businesses still take account of transport and communication costs (and the risks of disruptions) between the locations from which their inputs are supplied and the locations where they find their market demand. Globalization In the wake of these changes, globalization has become a tough political issue. Lower transport and communication costs have thrown many firms and their workers into global competition. Now, with concerns about competitors in faraway places entering the local market, locals must control costs more tightly, remain innovative, and sell at lower prices than before. Manufacturers have long known that foreign producers can make inroads into local markets and that their own market is increasingly the world, rather than simply the national market. Thus, there are now steel plants in China, Japan, and South Korea, far from iron and coal mines but near ports; the falling cost of shipping has made it possible to transport coal and iron ore to seaside locations, from where steel is sold around the world. What matters more for capital-intensive industries is whether the capital owners enjoy secure property rights where they invest. Consequently, locations now have to compete by providing good property-rights protection and other such trust-inspiring institutions. Because the Internet now makes it possible to provide many services over long distances and even globally, service providers—in accounting, finance, and managerial supervision, for example—have also become more mobile. Thus numerous low-skill service jobs have begun to migrate from high-wage locations to low-cost locations overseas. Established service providers are now often coming under competitive pressure from new, low-cost competitors in distant places, such as call centers and software developers in Ireland or India. By the same token, engineers in New York offices are now supervising construction work in Brazil in real time, and academics in California are delivering lectures and tutorials via computer terminals throughout East Asia, adding high-skill job opportunities in America. The Thünen Model The work of nineteenth-century German economist Johann Heinrich von Thünen explains the economic effects of falling space-bridging costs. Thünen became the father of spatial economics when he laid out the basic logic of how producers distribute themselves in space. He explained that the owners of mobile production factors, such as capital and technical knowledge, have to be paid the same return whether their assets are employed in the center of activity or on the periphery, at a distance from the central marketplaces. Otherwise they engage in “locational arbitrage”—that is, move from places where they are paid less to places where they are paid more. The story for owners of immobile production factors such as land and labor is different. If they are in remote locations, then, to stay in business, they must absorb the entire transport-cost disadvantage. Landowners and workers in the center of markets, on the other hand, can earn a premium. In short, the prices of immobile land and labor vary inversely with the distance from the central marketplaces. This “Thünen principle” can be demonstrated at various levels of locational analysis: A. In a city or region, real estate rents drop as one moves

/ Learn More

Socialism

Socialism—defined as a centrally planned economy in which the government controls all means of production—was the tragic failure of the twentieth century. Born of a commitment to remedy the economic and moral defects of capitalism, it has far surpassed capitalism in both economic malfunction and moral cruelty. Yet the idea and the ideal of socialism linger on. Whether socialism in some form will eventually return as a major organizing force in human affairs is unknown, but no one can accurately appraise its prospects who has not taken into account the dramatic story of its rise and fall. The Birth of Socialist Planning It is often thought that the idea of socialism derives from the work of Karl Marx. In fact, Marx wrote only a few pages about socialism, as either a moral or a practical blueprint for society. The true architect of a socialist order was Lenin, who first faced the practical difficulties of organizing an economic system without the driving incentives of profit seeking or the self-generating constraints of competition. Lenin began from the long-standing delusion that economic organization would become less complex once the profit drive and the market mechanism had been dispensed with—“as self-evident,” he wrote, as “the extraordinarily simple operations of watching, recording, and issuing receipts, within the reach of anybody who can read and write and knows the first four rules of arithmetic.” In fact, economic life pursued under these first four rules rapidly became so disorganized that within four years of the 1917 revolution, Soviet production had fallen to 14 percent of its prerevolutionary level. By 1921 Lenin was forced to institute the New Economic Policy (NEP), a partial return to the market incentives of capitalism. This brief mixture of socialism and capitalism came to an end in 1927 after Stalin instituted the process of forced collectivization that was to mobilize Russian resources for its leap into industrial power. The system that evolved under Stalin and his successors took the form of a pyramid of command. At its apex was Gosplan, the highest state planning agency, which established such general directives for the economy as the target rate of growth and the allocation of effort between military and civilian outputs, between heavy and light industry, and among various regions. Gosplan transmitted the general directives to successive ministries of industrial and regional planning, whose technical advisers broke down the overall national plan into directives assigned to particular factories, industrial power centers, collective farms, and so on. These thousands of individual subplans were finally scrutinized by the factory managers and engineers who would eventually have to implement them. Thereafter, the blueprint for production reascended the pyramid, together with the suggestions, emendations, and pleas of those who had seen it. Ultimately, a completed plan would be reached by negotiation, voted on by the Supreme Soviet, and passed into law. Thus, the final plan resembled an immense order book, specifying the nuts and bolts, steel girders, grain outputs, tractors, cotton, cardboard, and coal that, in their entirety, constituted the national output. In theory such an order book should enable planners to reconstitute a working economy each year—provided, of course, that the nuts fitted the bolts; the girders were of the right dimensions; the grain output was properly stored; the tractors were operable; and the cotton, cardboard, and coal were of the kinds needed for their manifold uses. But there was a vast and widening gap between theory and practice. Problems Emerge The gap did not appear immediately. In retrospect, we can see that the task facing Lenin and Stalin in the early years was not so much economic as quasi military—mobilizing a peasantry into a workforce to build roads and rail lines, dams and electric grids, steel complexes and tractor factories. This was a formidable assignment, but far less formidable than what would confront socialism fifty years later, when the task was not so much to create enormous undertakings as to create relatively self-contained ones, and to fit all the outputs into a dovetailing whole. Through the 1960s the Soviet economy continued to report strong overall growth—roughly twice that of the United States—but observers began to spot signs of impending trouble. One was the difficulty of specifying outputs in terms that would maximize the well-being of everyone in the economy, not merely the bonuses earned by individual factory managers for “overfulfilling” their assigned objectives. The problem was that the plan specified outputs in physical terms. One consequence was that managers maximized yardages or tonnages of output, not its quality. A famous cartoon in the satirical magazine Krokodil showed a factory manager proudly displaying his record output, a single gigantic nail suspended from a crane. As the economic flow became increasingly clogged and clotted, production took the form of “stormings” at the end of each quarter or year, when every resource was pressed into use to meet preassigned targets. The same rigid system soon produced expediters, or tolkachi, to arrange shipments to harassed managers who needed unplanned—and therefore unobtainable—inputs to achieve their production goals. Worse, lacking the right to buy their own supplies or to hire or fire their own workers, factories set up fabricating shops, then commissaries, and finally their own worker housing to maintain control over their own small bailiwicks. It is not surprising that this increasingly Byzantine system began to create serious dysfunctions beneath the overall statistics of growth. During the 1960s the Soviet Union became the first industrial country in history to suffer a prolonged peacetime fall in average life expectancy, a symptom of its disastrous misallocation of resources. Military research facilities could get whatever they needed, but hospitals were low on the priority list. By the 1970s the figures clearly indicated a slowing of overall production. By the 1980s the Soviet Union officially acknowledged a near end to growth that was, in reality, an unofficial decline. In 1987 the first official law embodying perestroika—restructuring—was put into effect. President Mikhail Gorbachev announced his intention to revamp the economy from top to bottom by introducing the market, reestablishing private ownership, and opening the system to free economic interchange with the West. Seventy years of socialist rise had come to an end. Socialist Planning in Western Eyes Understanding of the difficulties of central planning was slow to emerge. In the mid-1930s, while the Russian industrialization drive was at full tilt, few raised their voices about its problems. Among those few were ludwig von mises, an articulate and exceedingly argumentative free-market economist, and friedrich hayek, of much more contemplative temperament, later to be awarded a Nobel Prize for his work in monetary theory. Together, Mises and Hayek launched an attack on the feasibility of socialism that seemed at the time unconvincing in its argument as to the functional problems of a planned economy. Mises in particular contended that a socialist system was impossible because there was no way for the planners to acquire the information (see Information and Prices)—“produce this, not that”—needed for a coherent economy. This information, Hayek emphasized, emerged spontaneously in a market system from the rise and fall of prices. A planning system was bound to fail precisely because it lacked such a signaling mechanism. The Mises-Hayek argument met its most formidable counterargument in two brilliant articles by Oskar Lange, a young economist who would become Poland’s first ambassador to the United States after World War II. Lange set out to show that the planners would, in fact, have precisely the same information as that which guided a market economy. The information would be revealed as inventories of goods rose and fell, signaling either that supply was greater than demand or demand was greater than supply. Thus, as planners watched inventory levels, they were also learning which of their administered (i.e., state-dictated) prices were too high and which too low. It only remained, therefore, to adjust prices so that supply and demand balanced, exactly as in the marketplace. Lange’s answer was so simple and clear that many believed the Mises-Hayek argument had been demolished. In fact, we now know that their argument was all too prescient. Ironically, though, Mises and Hayek were right for a reason they did not foresee as clearly as Lange himself. “The real danger of socialism,” Lange wrote, in italics, “is that of a bureaucratization of economic life.” But he took away the force of the remark by adding, without italics, “Unfortunately, we do not see how the same or even greater danger can be averted under monopolistic capitalism” (Lange and Taylor 1938, pp. 109–110). The effects of the “bureaucratization of economic life” are dramatically related in The Turning Point, a scathing attack on the realities of socialist economic planning by two Soviet economists, Nikolai Smelev and Vladimir Popov, that gives examples of the planning process in actual operation. In 1982, to stimulate the production of gloves from moleskins, the Soviet government raised the price it was willing to pay for moleskins from twenty to fifty kopecks per pelt. Smelev and Popov noted: State purchases increased, and now all the distribution centers are filled with these pelts. Industry is unable to use them all, and they often rot in warehouses before they can be processed. The Ministry of Light Industry has already requested Goskomtsen [the State Committee on Prices] twice to lower prices, but “the question has not been decided” yet. This is not surprising. Its members are too busy to decide. They have no time: besides setting prices on these pelts, they have to keep track of another 24 million prices. And how can they possibly know how much to lower the price today, so they won’t have to raise it tomorrow? This story speaks volumes about the problem of a centrally planned system. The crucial missing element is not so much “information,” as Mises and Hayek argued, as it is the motivation to act on information. After all, the inventories of moleskins did tell the planners that their production was at first too low and then too high. What was missing was the willingness—better yet, the necessity—to respond to the signals of changing inventories. A capitalist firm responds to changing prices because failure to do so will cause it to lose money. A socialist ministry ignores changing inventories because bureaucrats learn that doing something is more likely to get them in trouble than doing nothing, unless doing nothing results in absolute disaster. In the late 1980s, absolute economic disaster arrived in the Soviet Union and its Eastern former satellites, and those countries are still trying to construct some form of economic structure that will no longer display the deadly inertia and indifference that have come to be the hallmarks of socialism. It is too early to predict whether these efforts will succeed. The main obstacle to real perestroika is the impossibility of creating a working market system without a firm basis of private ownership, and it is clear that the creation of such a basis encounters the opposition of the former state bureaucracy and the hostility of ordinary people who have long been trained to be suspicious of the pursuit of wealth. In the face of such uncertainties, all predictions are foolhardy save one: no quick or easy transition from socialism to some form of nonsocialism is possible. Transformations of such magnitude are historic convulsions, not mere changes in policy. Their completion must be measured in decades or generations, not years. Heilbroner on Who Predicted Socialism’s Demise But what spokesman of the present generation has anticipated the demise of socialism or the “triumph of capitalism”? Not a single writer in the Marxian tradition! Are there any in the left centrist group? None I can think of, including myself. As for the center itself—the Samuelsons, Solows, Glazers, Lipsets, Bells, and so on—I believe that many have expected capitalism to experience serious and mounting, if not fatal, problems and have anticipated some form of socialism to be the organizing force of the twenty-first century. … Here is the part hard to swallow. It has been the Friedmans, Hayeks, von Miseses, e tutti quanti who have maintained that capitalism would flourish and that socialism would develop incurable ailments. Mises called socialism “impossible” because it has no means of establishing a rational pricing system; Hayek added additional reasons of a sociological kind (“the worst rise on top”). All three have regarded capitalism as the “natural” system of free men; all have maintained that left to its own devices capitalism would achieve material growth more successfully than any other system. From Robert Heilbroner. “The World After Communism.”Dissent (Fall 1990): 429–430. About the Author Robert Heilbroner, a socialist for most of his adult life, was the Norman Thomas Professor of Economics (emeritus) at the New School for Social Research and author of the best-seller The Worldly Philosophers. He died in 2005. The editor of this volume, David R. Henderson, edited this article slightly, but only to adjust it for developments in the formerly socialist countries, not to change any of its other substantive content. Further Reading   Hayek, Friedrich A. “Socialist Economic Calculation: The Present State of the Debate.” In Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order. 1942. Reprint. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972. Heilbroner, Robert. “After Communism.” New Yorker, September 10, 1990. Heilbroner, Robert. “The Triumph of Capitalism.” New Yorker, January 23, 1989. Lange, Oskar, and Fred Taylor. On the Economic Theory of Socialism. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938. Mises, Ludwig von. “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth.” In Friedrich A. Hayek, ed., Collectivist Economic Planning. London: Routledge and Sons, 1935. Smelev, Nikolai, and Vladimir Popov. The Turning Point. New York: Doubleday, 1989.   (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Social Security

Social Security, or, to be precise, Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI), is the U.S. government program that pays benefits to workers after retirement, to spouses and children of deceased workers, and to workers who become disabled before they retire. In 2003, the program had 47 million recipients, of whom 32.6 million were retired workers and their dependent family members, 6.8 million were survivors of deceased workers, and 7.6 million were disabled former workers and their dependent family members. Social Security is financed through a payroll deduction (FICA) tax that is more than adequate now, but soon will be less than the amount needed to pay benefits. The first social security program originated in Germany in 1889 under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. By 1935, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed the U.S. Social Security law, thirty-four European nations operated some form of old-age retirement plan based on transfers from workers to retirees. The U.S. Social Security system remained a retirement and survivor benefit program until 1957, when Congress began changing it significantly. The only previous changes had been increases in benefits and in taxes. In 1957, Congress broadened the program to include disability Insurance benefits for severely disabled workers. In 1972, Congress approved automatic cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) and in 1977 changed the benefit formula to provide a constant percentage of work income. Then, in 1983, in response to a funding crisis, Congress raised the payroll tax rate to its current level, increased the retirement age, and started to tax benefits. In spite of and, in some cases because of, these changes, the system faces serious challenges in the future. In 1945, the United States had more than forty workers per retiree, so a minimal tax on workers could support all retirees. However, the system that began with few receiving benefits had to mature, and this maturation process meant that more and more individuals would become eligible for benefits. Thus, this idyllic world could not last. The combination of increased life expectancy from sixty-one years for those born in 1935 to seventy-six for those born in 2004, increased benefits, and falling birthrates has reduced the number of workers per retiree to three. By 2030, only two workers will be available to support each retiree. U.S. Social Security comprises two distinct programs, each covering a separate population and each with its own method of financing. Old Age and Survivor Insurance (OASI) provides two types of benefits: retirement benefits for retired workers and benefits to the spouses and children of deceased workers. Disability Insurance (DI) provides benefits for disabled workers and their dependents on the same basis as retirement benefits are determined. Social Security retirement benefits are based on average indexed monthly earnings for the thirty-five highest earnings years prior to retirement. The benefit formula is set up to favor lower-income workers. For example, in 2004, someone with average monthly earnings of $624 received a benefit that replaced 90 percent of earnings. Someone whose average monthly earnings were $3,760 received a benefit that replaced 42 percent of earnings, while someone with monthly earnings at the then-taxable maximum of $7,325 received a benefit that replaced only 28 percent of earnings. Early retirement—retirement between age sixty-two and the full-benefit age—results in a deduction from full benefits based on the actuarial assumption that early retirees will collect benefits for a longer period of

/ Learn More

Savings and Loan Crisis

Years later, the extraordinary cost of the 1980s S&L crisis still astounds many taxpayers, depositors, and policymakers. The cost of bailing out the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which insured the deposits in failed S&Ls, may eventually exceed $160 billion. At the end of 2004, the direct cost of the S&L crisis to taxpayers was $124 billion, according to financial statements published by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the successor to the FSLIC. Additionally, healthy S&Ls as well as commercial banks have been taxed approximately another $30 billion to pay for S&L cleanup costs. Finally, the federal courts are still resolving the so-called goodwill cases stemming from regulatorily inspired mergers of failing S&Ls into healthy S&Ls in the early 1980s (discussed below). Resolving these cases will probably cost taxpayers another $5–$10 billion. The bankruptcy of the FSLIC did not occur overnight; the FSLIC was a disaster waiting to happen for many years. Numerous public policies, some dating back to the 1930s, created the disaster. Some policies were well intended but misguided. Others had lost whatever historical justification they might once have had. Yet others were desperate attempts to postpone addressing a rapidly worsening situation. All of these policies, however, greatly compounded the S&L problem and made its eventual resolution more difficult and much more expensive. When disaster finally hit the S&L industry in 1980, the federal government managed it very badly. Fifteen public policies that contributed to the S&L debacle are summarized below. Public Policy Causes with Roots Before 1980 Federal deposit insurance, which was extended to S&Ls in 1934, was the root cause of the S&L crisis. Deposit insurance was actuarially unsound from its inception, primarily because all S&Ls were charged the same Insurance premium rate regardless of how safe or risky they were. That is, deposit insurance provided by the federal government tolerated the unsound financial structure of S&Ls for decades. No sound insurance program would have done that. Congress tried to rectify this problem in 1991 when it directed the FDIC to begin charging risk-sensitive deposit-insurance premiums. However, because those who should pay the most would scream the loudest to Congress, the FDIC’s premium structure still does not charge the riskiest banks and S&Ls enough. Much of the time, the “drunk drivers” of the S&L and banking world pay no more for

/ Learn More