Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit

Comparison of those two Virtues

That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it

The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit

Recapitulation of the foregoing Chapters

Of the proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment

That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment

Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and the despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition

Of the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks

That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned