All ideologies reach a point where they are perceived to have failed. What can we learn from that fact? I’d argue that there are almost no lessons to be learned. Capitalism was widely seen to have failed in the early 1930s. Authoritarian nationalism was widely seen to have failed in 1945. Liberalism was widely seen to have failed in the 1970s. Communism was widely seen to have failed in 1989. Neoliberalism was seen to have failed in the 2010s. Prediction: Islamic fundamentalism will be seen to have failed in the 2020s. Just to be clear, I’m a neoliberal.  So I don’t believe either capitalism or neoliberalism actually failed, while I do believe that authoritarian nationalism, (1960s) liberalism, communism and Islamic fundamentalism actually did fail. But that’s not the point of this blog post. What I think doesn’t matter. So what does it actually mean when a modern intellectual says something like, “neoliberalism has failed”. What exactly does that mean? When people say an ideology like neoliberalism has failed, their thought process is as follows: 1. We have been in the neoliberalism era for a few decades. 2. Problems have cropped up. 3. Ergo, neoliberalism has failed. That’s it? Surely there must be more to it than that? After all, problems always crop up over time. That’s inevitable. If that were the criterion for failure then every single ideology would eventually fail, except those that have never been tried. It must be more complicated than that! Nope, it’s that simple. Every single ideology will be seen to have failed after some period of time. There are no exceptions. One can imagine alternative universes where not all ideologies fail. Thus you could imagine a world where ideologies are judged on a cross sectional basis, not a time series basis. People might compare highly neoliberal places like Switzerland, Denmark and Singapore to less neoliberal places like Greece, Italy and the Philippines, and then those countries could be compared to highly illiberal places like North Korea, Venezuela and Cuba. In that universe, not all ideologies would seem to fail over time. But that’s not the universe we live in. In our universe, intellectuals use time series evidence to judge ideologies. In this universe, all ideologies are eventually perceived to have failed, because it’s inevitable that problems will eventually crop up. So if you are young then don’t get too attached to your pet ideology. If it’s ever enacted, you will eventually see it get discredited. (3 COMMENTS)

  Yesterday, I reviewed the first half of Tyler Cowen’s critique of the Great Barrington Declaration. This is the last half. As before, quotes from him are highlighted and my responses are not. Here are the key words of the Great Barrington Declaration on herd immunity: The most compassionate approach that balances the risks and benefits of reaching herd immunity, is to allow those who are at minimal risk of death to live their lives normally to build up immunity to the virus through natural infection, while better protecting those who are at highest risk. We call this Focused Protection. And then: What exactly does the word “allow” mean in this context? Again the passivity is evident, as if humans should just line up in the proper order of virus exposure and submit to nature’s will. How about instead we channel our inner Ayn Rand and stress the role of human agency? Something like: “Herd immunity will come from a combination of exposure to the virus through natural infection and the widespread use of vaccines. Here are some ways to maximize the role of vaccines in that process.” It means, as the document says, “allow those who are at minimal risk of death to live their lives normally.” I’m not sure why Cowen has trouble understanding. Allowing people to live their lives has nothing to do with passivity. It certainly is consistent with the idea of human agency, even if you don’t go all Ayn Rand on it. When people are allowed to do something, that doesn’t mean they have to do it. There’s necessarily human agency. He’s right about how herd immunity will come about. But then he says, “Here are some ways to maximize the role of vaccines in that process.” The problem here is, as former Obama economist Austan Goolsbee pointed out in a related context, that this is like the old economics joke where the punch line is “assume a can opener.” We don’t yet have a vaccine, so right now maximizing the role of vaccines gets you to a maximum of zero. In practical terms, the most problematic paragraph in the declaration is this one: Those who are not vulnerable should immediately be allowed to resume life as normal. Simple hygiene measures, such as hand washing and staying home when sick should be practiced by everyone to reduce the herd immunity threshold. Schools and universities should be open for in-person teaching. Extracurricular activities, such as sports, should be resumed. Young low-risk adults should work normally, rather than from home. Restaurants and other businesses should open. Arts, music, sport and other cultural activities should resume. People who are more at risk may participate if they wish, while society as a whole enjoys the protection conferred upon the vulnerable by those who have built up herd immunity. In most parts of the Western world, normal openings for restaurants, sporting events and workplaces are likely to lead to spiraling caseloads and overloaded hospitals, as is already a risk in some of the harder-hit parts of Europe. Reopenings, to the extent they work, rely on a government that so scares people that attendance remains low even with reopening. The middle paragraph is from the Great Barrington Declaration. The paragraphs that bookend it are from Cowen. I’m not familiar with Europe but Georgia (in the United States) opened without overloaded hospitals. As for spiraling caseloads, that’s part of how you reach herd immunity. And if you follow his link to a Bloomberg article, you’ll see that it says not a word about overloaded hospitals. Cowen is right that governments have reacted by scaring people. That’s one reason the Great Barrington Declaration is important. It seeks to tell people not to be so afraid unless they’re particularly vulnerable. Notice the statement in the Declaration that “Young low-risk adults should work normally, rather than from home.” The authors are not saying that they should be forced to; they’re saying they should. As I understand the Declaration, they’re trying to talk to young people as well as others and say, in effect, “Come in, the water’s fine.” Does Cowen object? If so, he doesn’t make clear and he doesn’t say why. Don’t get me wrong: The Great Barrington strategy is a tempting one. Coming out of a libertarian think tank, it tries to procure maximum liberty for commerce and daily life. It is a seductive idea. Yet consistency of message is not an unalloyed good, even when the subject is liberty. And when there is a pandemic, one of the government’s most vital roles is to secure public goods, such as vaccines. Notice how he jumps from the idea that the message is tempting and seductive (I agree) to government’s role in vaccines. Little problem: WE DON’T HAVE A VACCINE. The Great Barrington Declaration makes clear that it’s addressed to what to do while we’re waiting for a vaccine. Insert can opener joke. The declaration is disappointing because it is looking for an easy way out — first by taking the best alternatives for fighting Covid off the table, then by pretending a normal state of affairs is also an optimum state of affairs. Does he care to tell us what “the best alternatives for fighting Covid” are? It strikes me that he has two in mind: (1) vaccines, which haven’t yet been approved, in part thanks to the FDA, which Cowen has earlier said should not approve one from Russia, and (2) lockdowns, which Cowen says aren’t that important and, by the way, we should tighten them. My worldview is both more hopeful and more tragic. There is no normal here, but we can do better — with vigorous actions to combat Covid-19, including government actions. The conception of human nature evident in the Great Barrington Declaration is so passive, it raises the question of whether it even qualifies as a defense of natural liberty. I missed the hopeful part. OK, so what are the vigorous actions that include government actions? Blank out, as the aforementioned Ayn Rand loved to say. And how does he know that the authors of the Great Barrington Declaration would not favor those actions? Cowen is fixated on the idea that three non-libertarians produced a libertarian statement. As I mentioned in Part 1, that sends him down a rabbit hole from which he doesn’t emerge.         (3 COMMENTS)

When the pandemic first hit America, the states hardest hit were mostly “blue states” such as Washington, New York, New Jersey and Massachusetts. With the notable exception of Washington, they remain the hardest hit states in terms of cumulative deaths per capita. A Yahoo article points out that in recent months the “red states” have been getting hit harder than the blue states. But that could reflect many factors such as behavior, weather, or a lack of previous herd immunity. I also notice that both within the US and around the world it’s often the case that more densely populated areas have a higher rate of fatalities. This isn’t universally true (Germany has a low fatality rate) but it seems to be a strong tendency. Look at the states with the lowest rates of death per capita—most have relatively low populations: I’d like to throw out a hypothesis.  Perhaps both politics and density matter.  Perhaps the safest places are low-density states full of earnest do-gooders who follow public health rules.  So I’m going to look at recent Covid deaths in states with fewer than 1.1 million people.  Because I’m lazy I’ll take a few shortcuts, such as looking at total deaths, not per capita deaths, but that won’t affect my principle finding to any significant degree.  The differences in fatalities are vast, and all these states have between a 550,000 and 1.1 million people. I’ll first list Covid deaths since the beginning of June, and then deaths over the past two months.  States will be listed from most populous to least populous: Montana:  213/153 Delaware:  153/69 South Dakota:  245/154 North Dakota:   327/263 Alaska:  56/38 Vermont  3/0 Wyoming:  41/27 I use recent data because the initial outbreak caught many places unaware, so cultural/policy differences would have had less impact in March and April. Vermont really jumps out, and even in per capita terms it would be an extreme outlier.  This may be random, but it also might reflect the combination of really low density and “liberal” attitudes.  Most low-density areas in America are red states, and Vermont might be the only strongly blue state that’s mostly rural.  (Even Delaware is pretty urban by comparison.) If you want to be safe, rent a cabin in Vermont. This is not necessarily about politics in the normal American sense of the term.  New York is left wing, but isn’t full of earnest people who always follow rules.  Utah is right wing, but has a high level of civic cooperation.  Utah also has a lower than average fatality rate, even relative to states with similar populations. Germans and East Asians are known for following rules.  Latin Americans are not.  Notice a pattern? PS.  Let me apologize in advance for the Sumner curse, the tendency for patterns I notice to break down immediately after I post on them.  Sorry Vermonters. PPS.  I was originally going to draw the line at 1 million, but Montana seems like a low-density state, despite just over a million people.  On the other hand, while places like Nevada have large low-density areas, they also have major cities.   (6 COMMENTS)

What does “learning” mean to you? Where and when does it occur? What are its outcomes? How does it affect your status in the world, and do we accord status in the right way? These questions and more are at the heart of this provocative conversation. EconTalk host Russ Roberts welcomes Zena Hitz of St. John’s College to discuss her new book, Lost in Thought. Hitz is engaged in what Roberts calls a “quixotic quest” to restore a love of great books and contemplative and communal learning. A tutror- not a professor- at St John’s, Hitz is well-suited to make such an argument. But if the sort of learning Hitz recommends is indeed “hidden,” how can we power ourselves past the distractions of the modern world well enough to achieve it? We hope you’ll find the prompts below thought-provoking, and that you’ll let us know your response to them. We’d also love to know how you approach this sort of learning. What books do you love that you return to time and again. What books would you like to explore, but for whatever reason have yet to do so? As always, we love to hear from you.     1- What does Hitz mean by learning? What’s the point in teaching young people how to think about big ideas and read old books, as Roberts asks her? How does she expect her students to cultivate the resources for reflection, retreat, and contemplation? How might you cultivate the same sort of resources in your life?   2- Rather than turn to political activism in an effort to repair the brokenness of our world today, Hitz suggests a more inward approach. What would this like, and to what extent do you believe this approach to be effective?   3- How does your work/occupation identify you? What role has the sort of learning Hitz describes played in your work? Are you guilty of judging others on the basis of their occupation? As Roberts asks, “How we might humanize ourselves through learning to be more appreciative of people who are not like us, educationally?”   4- Hitz asserts, “…if you want to connect with someone from a different social class, you need a third topic to unite you. This is how human bonding, how human community works is: you unite around some third thing.” What sort of community organizations do you think might serve both to democratize learning and unite people of different social classes?   5- What’s the difference between spectacle and distraction, according to Hitz? Conversation and debate? How might a due consideration of these differences affect learning, both formally and informally?   (0 COMMENTS)

  In an article yesterday, “A Dangerous Libertarian Strategy for Herd Immunity,” Bloomberg, October 15, George Mason University economist Tyler Cowen criticizes the now-famous Great Barrington Declaration. This response is in two parts. Part 2 will follow tomorrow. I’ll consider Cowen’s arguments one by one. The highlighted sections are his and the non-highlighted sections are mine. But first I’ll point out two things. First, Cowen starts with a category error. He seems to think that when three non-libertarian medical professionals write a statement at a facility staff largely by libertarians, the result must be libertarian. It isn’t. Many libertarians will like it; some will not. But it’s not libertarian. In our book, Making Great Decisions in Business and Life, Charley Hooper and I point that in any project, the biggest mistakes are made the first day. That’s because everything follows from decisions made that day. Similarly, by misidentifying the strategy as libertarian, he goes down a rabbit hole from which he doesn’t emerge. (Note: I know that editors often assign titles and Cowen might not have chosen this one. If he disagrees with the title, then ignore this criticism.) Second, Cowen’s big-picture criticism of freedom is less like Strauss (one of his favorite words) and more like Schrodinger’s Cat. He claims, in the last few paragraphs of his article, that the declaration “tries to procure maximum liberty for commerce and daily life” and that its conception of human nature “raises the question of whether it even qualifies as a defense of natural liberty.” Which is it? Is it trying to procure maximum liberty, which, in this context, certainly seems like defending it, or is not a defense? I’m not asking whether it’s a good defense. I’m simply pointing out that Cowen seems to want to have it both ways. Now to the other specifics. Debate over the declaration has centered on the concept of “herd immunity,” but that discussion has become so emotional that it is better to focus first on the concrete. The declaration stresses the notion of protecting the vulnerable, such as the elderly, and giving everyone else maximum possible freedom. That sounds good, but the declaration fails to deliver on the details. True. It doesn’t deliver on details. I don’t think that was the intent. It’s 514 words long, only slightly longer than those short USA Today op/eds. Cowen’s piece, by contrast, is 1,399 words long, almost 3 times as long. And yet in some places, the Great Barrington Declaration gives more details than his. First and foremost, the declaration does not present the most important point right now, which is to say October 2020: By the middle of next year, and quite possibly sooner, the world will be in a much better position to combat Covid-19. Probably right, but it’s a guess. Moreover the middle of next year is 8 to 9 months from now. The arrival of some mix of vaccines and therapeutics will improve the situation, so it makes sense to shift cases and infection risks into the future while being somewhat protective now. The first clause is probably right, but the conclusion doesn’t follow. What is the cost of shifting cases into the future? Cowen doesn’t say. To allow large numbers of people today to die of Covid, in wealthy countries, is akin to charging the hill and taking casualties two days before the end of World War I. What does he mean by “allow?” Is he saying that people shouldn’t be allowed to take those risks? I don’t know. Notice also how he biases the discussion with “two days.” I would bet that the authors wouldn’t have bothered with the statement if they thought we would have a vaccine in 2 days, 4 days, or even 14 days. Not only does the declaration fail to make that point, but if anything the rhetoric conveys a sense of “letting things take their course” — after the most vulnerable are segregated from society, of course. It strikes exactly the wrong tone and stresses exactly the wrong points. Either he thinks this is self-evident or this is a lead-in to the next few paragraphs. If the former, he’s wrong; if the latter, let’s look at the next few paragraphs. The declaration also sets up a false dichotomy by comparing its policy proposals to lockdowns. The claim is this: “Current lockdown policies are producing devastating effects on short and long-term public health.” The health problems are very real, but in most of the U.S., the lockdowns are not severe. In my home state of Virginia, there are relatively few commercial activities I cannot partake in, were I so inclined. I even can go see a live bluegrass concert in a nightclub (I won’t, not yet). It’s not a false dichotomy. There are real lockdowns in place. And notice that he uses the word “commercial.” K-12 schools, even ones that charge tuition, are typically not lumped under “commercial.” This doesn’t affect Cowen. It does affect a number of my neighbors’ and friends’ kids, devastatingly so. And while Cowen can go to a bluegrass concert, I bet he can’t go to a gym. In most of California, we can’t yet go to gyms. My wife’s and my Pilates instructor is facing economic devastation. The problem is that most people don’t want to go out to such concerts, and indeed probably should not. It is this self-enforced isolation, not a government order, which screws us up, sometimes creating mental and other health problems. Why is it a problem if people don’t want to go out to such events? And if that’s the main reason they don’t, why are governments around the country, certainly in large states like California, New York, and Illinois, banning such events? He does get it right, though, about mental and other health problems. But some of these are due to lockdowns. Whatever you think of the stricter policies of last spring, they are now behind us, and the emphasis on “lockdowns” is not helpful. The more useful question is whether the list of prohibited activities should be expanded or contracted. In some cases, surely, it should be expanded. Indoor restaurant dining and drinking, for example, is probably not a good idea in most parts of the U.S. right now. Yes, many of the Covid cases spread by such activity would be among the lower-risk young, rather than the higher-risk elderly. Still, practically speaking, given America’s current response capabilities, those cases will further paralyze schools and workplaces and entertainment venues. It just doesn’t seem worth it. The first sentence of the second paragraph is key. Finally, he’s getting to details. He doesn’t make a case, though, that those cases will further paralyze schools and workplaces. What’s his evidence? Emily Oster at Brown University differs with Cowen on this. And unlike Cowen, she actually has evidence. Moreover, to whom does it not seem worth it? Not to the people who want to do it. Cowen seems to be substituting his own values for those of others. Even if you disagree with that judgment, the critics who emphasize lockdowns are setting up a straw man. What they’re trying to do is talk us into something more dangerous than what we ought to accept. The truth is that lockdowns are extremely unpopular, and while they may have to be reimposed in extreme circumstances, they are not the main alternative on the table in the U.S. right now. Wait a minute. We have lockdowns. Some of them are severe. Cowen has just told us that he wants to make them more severe. But arguing against lockdowns is arguing against a straw man? Huh? The declaration also notes the value of reopening schools. It is an inarguable point, and Sweden seems to have made it work. But schools cannot and should not be reopened unconditionally. Amid high levels of Covid-19, a successful reopening very often will require social distancing, masks and a good system for testing and tracing. It would be better to focus on what needs to be done to make school reopenings work. Reopened schools in Israel, for instance, seem to have contributed to a significant second wave of Covid-19. Actually, I think every point is arguable. What he really means is that he comes down on the side of reopening schools. Good. On that we agree. But for someone who thinks we should look at data, Cowen really should look at Oster’s data. And notice how close Cowen comes to the Great Barrington view on this. I don’t know what the three authors would say about what needs to be done to make school reopenings work. Neither does Cowen. A broader worry about the declaration is that, for all the talk of science, it fails to emphasize data. The declaration is a series of static recommendations, yet the situation on the ground is evolving all the time. The best policies today are not the same as the best policies two months ago, and won’t necessarily be the best policies two months from now. This reader is also struck by the document’s frequent use of the passive voice — as if there is no choice but to let a series of inevitable events slowly unfold, albeit in a minimally painless way, and to allow the pandemic to finish its work. Cowen accuses the authors of failing to emphasize data? That’s rich. He has hardly any data. Here’s a statement from the Declaration: We know that vulnerability to death from COVID-19 is more than a thousand-fold higher in the old and infirm than the young. That’s data, and pretty relevant data. Cowen points out correctly that the best policies of today are [probably] not the best policies two months from now. But the big advantage of the focus the Declaration proposes is that it allows for that. What about the passive voice? I think Cowen needs to consult a grammar textbook. There’s not a whole lot of passive voice in the Declaration. It’s mainly active. And letting people do things has nothing to do with the passive voice. Part 2 will be tomorrow. Stay tuned.     (2 COMMENTS)

When I was young, we were all taught that people should not be convicted and sent to prison unless they were “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”. Unfortunately, Americans love sending people to prison, and they violate this maxim every single day. I’m not one of those people who romanticize prisoners. America does have a lot of crime, and people should go to prison for serious offenses such as rape, robbery, burglary, arson and murder. But they certainly should not be imprisoned for doing things that might not even be serious crimes. In the US, activities that are illegal in one state might be perfectly legal in another. That’s OK. Federalism makes a lot of sense. It’s not 100% clear whether marijuana should be legal or illegal. It’s not 100% clear whether the age of consent should be 16 or 18. Different states have reached different conclusions, and that’s fine. What’s not OK is sending people to prison for activities that would be perfectly legal in many other states. Remember, I’m not talking about entirely different cultures such as New Guinea or Turkmenistan, where people have vastly different values. I’m talking about moving from Chicago to Milwaukee, two industrial cities fronting Lake Michigan that are 90 miles apart. Selling pot is legal in Chicago, whereas you could be sent to prison for selling pot in Milwaukee. In most states the age of consent is 16. But some states have 17 or 18. I have no idea who’s right, but it’s obvious that there is “reasonable doubt” as to where to draw the line; unless you think the US contains many states where lawmakers make obviously wrong decisions. But if you have that little faith in lawmakers, should we really be sending 2 million people to prison? There’s no getting around the fact that if lots of states view an activity as perfectly legal, then there is reasonable doubt as to whether people deserve to be sent to prison for engaging in that activity, in any state. It’s not enough that juries find a person to have done some activity “beyond a reasonable doubt”, it’s also essential that juries conclude that the thing they did is a serious crime beyond a reasonable doubt. So does that mean we must end federalism? Not at all. Rather it means that when there is doubt as to whether an activity is a crime, it should be punishable with a fine. We already do that for speeding, and many other activities where states disagree as to exactly where to draw the line. People often make the argument that switching from prison to fines would favor the rich. Rich people could easily pay the fine for smoking pot, while the poor would struggle to do so. (Note that many people who make this argument also favor high taxes on cigarettes, which completely contradicts their argument.) This is a bad argument for two reasons. First, in our system the rich have an easier time purchasing yachts, BMWs, vacations in St. Bart, and fancy French dinners, which is as it should be. They have an easier time paying parking tickets and speeding tickets, which is as it should be. We use fines for all sorts of offenses that are not serious enough to justify prison. Fines should reflect both the damage done by the offense, and the probability of being caught.  That’s a feature, not a bug. Second, prison is nowhere near as egalitarian as it seems. While in theory a rich and poor drug user are equally likely to go to prison, the system has intentionally been set up to make it vastly more likely that a poor drug user will go to prison. In some cases this bias is so obvious as to be embarrassing, as back when the punishment for crack cocaine (used by the poor) was much higher than for powder cocaine. I believe that issue was recently fixed, but that was never the primary inequity. Low-income people are much more likely to sell a small amount of drugs on the side, to get some money to support their habit. Rich people don’t need to do this. When lawmakers discovered this difference, they made the penalty for selling drugs vastly higher than the penalty for consuming drugs. This was to ensure that the upper middle class and rich people were not accidentally ensnared in a drug war aimed at the poor.  No prison for “Karen”. From a logical perspective, the penalty for use should be higher than for selling drugs. Obviously the drug industry cannot exist without both buyers and sellers, so in that sense the two activities are equally culpable. But sellers are arguably more blameless as they are motivated by money, whereas buyers are motivated by consumption. And the typical person is more addicted to money than to drugs. That’s why professionals often give up drugs as they get older. If it’s a choice between giving up cocaine and losing a cushy Wall Street job, most people will choose to go straight.  The lure of drugs is strong for some; the lure of money is even stronger for almost everyone. If I drive by a pot store in Orange County it all looks so “normal”.  But I always force myself to think about people locked up in some prison in Mississippi for doing the exact same thing—selling pot.  Maybe a young single mom that was pressured by her boyfriend to sell some pot, or to help with a delivery.  Can we say beyond a reasonable doubt that she is deserving of spending years in prison? PS. Some people argue that the people in jail for drug offenses would do other bad things if drugs were legalized.  If so, it’s odd that the murder rate in America doubled after Prohibition was enacted and then fell in half after Prohibition was repealed. (0 COMMENTS)

A reader of a recent post of mine blamed me for using the R word: “redneck.” (His comment was not published because he was a new commenter and we could not confirm his email address.) What I call “redneck” is close to Merriam-Webster’s definition, minus the pejorative connotation: 1. sometimes disparaging: a white member of the Southern rural laboring class 2. often disparaging: a person whose behavior and opinions are similar to those attributed to rednecks I use “redneckitude” as a much-needed neologism for the typical redneck’s behavior, opinions, character, and preferences (to use an economic term). Jim Bovard tells me that the neologism “might be tolerable” until a better one is found. On the model of “wokeness,” perhaps “redneckess” would be better? The featured image of this post represents how redneckitude is seen by the intellectual establishment and part of popular and political culture. Jim Goad’s The Redneck Manifesto: How Hillbillies, Hicks, and White Trash Became America’s Scapegoats (Simon & Schuster, 1997) helps understand how the redneck concept now extends to any lower-class, white, gun-toting, God-loving but sin-committing, flag-waving but often non-voting, rural individual. Rednecks exist in Vermont and Maine too. The redneck is also self-reliant, although this may have changed in the mounting socialist culture. He is certainly not a standard-bearer for the 18th-century Enlightenment. The major point of the economics of redneckitude is that, as a social scientist, the economist is not morally judgmental. Rednecks have preferences and make choices according to these preferences. These choices have social consequences (including “economic” consequences in the narrow sense) that are of scientific interest for the understanding of society. And note that, like in other sciences, words used in economics are just labels that may carry historical meaning but are mainly useful for analytical purposes. This methodological approach explains the historical tolerance of economists for eccentric preferences and lifestyles. For this reason, I don’t consider the R word as pejorative. I even share some preferences with rednecks. I might have titled the present post “In Defense of Redneckitude.” In New York Times article (“A Profession With an Egalitarian Core”, March 16, 2013), Tyler Cowen pointed out many historical instances of the economists’ tolerance, including: In 1829, all 15 economists who held seats in the British Parliament voted to allow Roman Catholics as members. In 1858, the 13 economists in Parliament voted unanimously to extend full civil rights to Jews. (While both measures were approved, they were controversial among many non-economist members.) For many years leading up to the various abolitions of slavery, economists were generally critics of slavery and advocates of people’s natural equality. … Professors Levy and Peart coined the phrase “analytical egalitarianism” to describe the underpinnings of this tradition. For example, Adam Smith cited birth and fortune, as opposed to intrinsically different capabilities, as the primary reasons for differences in social rank. And the classical economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill promoted equal legal and institutional rights for women long before such views were fashionable. This tolerance has limits that, in the classical-liberal or libertarian perspective, correspond to the point where some individuals coercively ban the preferences of other individuals. In this perspective, all forms of apartheid or government discrimination are beyond the pale of tolerance. There is a significant difference between harboring esthetic or lifestyle beliefs on the one hand and, on the other hand, wanting to impose those on others. For example, many rednecks may have had or perhaps still have racist personal preferences, which would be as acceptable (although not commendable) as the contemporary wokes’ anti-white opinions are (although not commendable); but the desire to impose such preferences through the coercive power of the state is antithetical to tolerance and thus unacceptable. No surprise that economists have generally been opposed to slavery and, as shown by David Levy and Sandra Peart, this opposition earned economics the pejorative label of “dismal science” by conservative Thomas Carlyle (see Levy and Peart’s “The Secret History of the Dismal Science. Part 1. Economics, Religion and Race in the 19th Century,” Econlib, January 22, 2001). Another sort of limit to most economist’s tolerance relates to the development of children. Considering children as future sovereign individuals who should not be robbed of their future choices and opportunities may suggest more complex classical-liberal values (James Buchanan’s, for example) but such reflections would take us too far from this short post. (0 COMMENTS)

Economist Paul Romer tweeted today: Doesn’t sound like China is going to sign up for the “Great Barrington” plan for surrendering to the virus. Wouldn’t it be refreshing to live in a country where everybody understands that it is the government’s job to do whatever it takes to protect public health? He was referencing the following Associated Press item: ASIA TODAY: Chinese health authorities will test all 9 million people in the eastern city of Qingdao for the coronavirus this week after nine cases linked to a hospital were found, the government announces. I think Paul is correct to say that an authoritarian government such as China’s is unlikely to show as much tolerance for people’s freedom as the authors of the Great Barrington Declaration advocate. It is disturbing, though, to see Romer write that it is government’s job to do whatever it takes to protect public health. His authoritarianism lives loudly within him. In an email discussion, George Mason University Jon Murphy made a further relevant point: Paul Romer is missing the far more obvious question: Why can China test 9 million people on a whim but the United States does not? What’s been missing from this whole nonsense is randomized testing so that we can determine the actual spread of the disease (and subsequently how it spreads, how deadly it is, etc). We don’t even know the N in this pandemic because there isn’t the testing going on. I have an answer to the question (I think).  It has nothing to do with state capacity or political will or anything like that. Simple expert failure (Roger Koppl) and dynamics of interventionism (Sanford Ikeda). Trump invoked the Defense Production Act with testing kits.  The predictable shortages of testing resulted in more being allocated to higher-valued uses: testing the people who are sick in the hospital.  Thus, we didn’t have enough to do the lower-valued uses: randomly testing the population. Isn’t it interesting how doing “whatever it takes to protect public health” can sometimes hurt public health. Unintended consequences anyone? (1 COMMENTS)

  Last night on his show on Fox News Channel, host Tucker Carlson interviewed Colorado Congressman Ken Buck. Buck was critical of high-tech companies, as is Carlson, and was pushing for new antitrust legislation. But that’s not what this post is about. Twice in a 3.5 minute interview, Buck claimed that high-tech companies cheat and steal. (At the 1:00 point and again at the 2:28 point.) Buck didn’t specify how. A journalist worth his salt would have asked how. But Tucker didn’t. Here’s my question to commenters. Do any of you know how big tech cheats and steals? Please give details. (2 COMMENTS)

Friends of freedom routinely defend the right to do wrong.  “If you’re only free to do good things, what freedom do you really have?”  Yet on reflection, this sorely underrates the value of freedom.  Yes, the freedom to do bad things is important.  Much more important, though, is the freedom to do good things that sound bad. Why is this so important?  Because Social Desirability Bias is ubiquitous; that’s why.   Long psych story short: When the truth sounds bad, human beings deceive and self-deceive.  This deceit in turn routinely rationalizes bad policies.  Example: Convenience and fun are often better than health and safety.  That’s what your actions declare whenever you drive to a restaurant instead of hunkering down in your home.  But almost no one wants to give a public speech where they say, “Convenience and fun are often better than health and safety.”  Policymakers, in turn, largely ignore the value of convenience and fun.  Abandoning your dysfunctional country is often better than “staying to fix it.” But no one wants to openly declare, “I decided my country was a lost cause, so I got out of Dodge.”  Policymakers, in turn, vigorously spurn mere “economic migrants.”  Breaking inconvenient laws is often the best move, but few scofflaws will ever call a press conference to defend their behavior.  Policymakers, in turn, enforce phonebooks’ worth of inane rules.  Working hard to get rich yields wonderful social benefits, but hardly anyone on Earth will even admit to being rich.  Policymakers, in turn, treat the rich as cattle or leeches. The rhetoric of “freedom” is a great way to neutralize this poison of Social Desirability Bias.  Indeed, there is probably no better antidote in the universe.  When busybodies try to use government to force everyone to sacrifice tons of convenience and fun for vestigial doses of health and safety, shouting, “I spurn safety for convenience” will get you nowhere.  But shouting, “Freedom!” like you’re in Braveheart just might foil the busybodies’ nefarious efforts.  People won’t welcome an immigrant who says he hated his country of birth.  But they will smile upon an immigrant who earnestly avows that he came for “freedom.“ If you’re caught breaking a stupid law, you won’t escape a guilty verdict by conclusively showing that the law is stupid.  You might, though, if you stand up for your “freedom.” A rich man who wants to keep what he’s earned won’t win much sympathy by lecturing the world about economics.  His better bet, rather, is to raise the banner of “Freedom!” None of this means that appeals to freedom are – or should be – insincere.  Pursuit of convenience and fun, fleeing your hellhole of birth, breaking stupid laws, and working your way to wealth are all bona fide expressions of freedom.  My point, rather, is about marketing.  Directly defying Social Desirability Bias is ever-tempting, but usually fruitless.  If you want to defend good things that sound bad, your best bet is to reframe the debate.  Want to stand up for business and the rich?  Your best bet is to change the subject.  What were we talking about again?  Oh, that’s right: Freedom! Isn’t this precisely what critics accuse libertarians of doing all the time?  Pretty much.  What I’m saying is that their accusations are unfair, but we should strive to make them true.  Mainstream political thinkers are too wrapped up in their own irrational demagoguery to even acknowledge the existence of Social Desirability Bias.  Once you fully absorb the distinction between what sounds good and what is good, however, the implied political danger will weigh upon your mind.  What can rational human beings do in the face of such mindless emotionalism?  Wave the flag of freedom.  Wave it habitually.  Wave it proudly.  Even then, you’ll probably lose the war of words, but at least you’ll have a fighting chance. (0 COMMENTS)