This is my archive

bar

Private versus Government

In his textbook Public Finance, 7th edition, 2005, Princeton University emeritus professor of economics Harvey S. Rosen, discussing the idea that incentives to monitor are better in the private sector than in government, quotes Adam Smith’s statement to that effect in The Wealth of Nations. He also gives a famous modern example. Rosen writes: Anecdotal evidence for this viewpoint abounds. One celebrated case involved New York City, which spent $12 million attempting to rebuild the ice-skating rink in Central Park between 1980 and 1986. [DRH note: think about that–that’s 6 years.] The main problem was that the contractors were trying to use a new technology for making Iceland it did not work. In 1986, after spending $200,000 on a study to find out what went wrong, city officials learned they would have to start all over. In June 1986, real estate developer Donald J. Trump offered to take over the project and have it completed by December of that year for about $2.5 million. Trump finished the rink three weeks ahead of schedule and $750,000 under projected cost. I remembered this passage when I was preparing for a Zoom interview on Monday with a high school senior in Arizona. He asked good questions and I gave him this example and a number of others. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

The Mae West of energy sources

The New Yorker has a good article on nuclear power, which discusses the imminent shutdown of a nuclear power plant in California that produces 9% of their electricity, with zero carbon emissions: Today, the looming disruptions of climate change have altered the risk calculus around nuclear energy. James Hansen, the nasa scientist credited with first bringing global warming to public attention, in 1988, has long advocated a vast expansion of nuclear power to replace fossil fuels. Even some environmental groups that have reservations about nuclear energy, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Environmental Defense Fund, have recognized that abruptly closing existing reactors would lead to a spike in emissions. But U.S. plants are aging and grappling with a variety of challenges. In recent years, their economic viability has been threatened by cheap, fracked natural gas. Safety regulations introduced after the meltdowns at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, in 2011, have increased costs, and, in states such as California, legislation prioritizes renewables (the costs of which have also fallen steeply). Since 2013, eleven American reactors have been retired; the lost electricity has largely been replaced through the burning of fossil fuels. At least eight more closures, including Diablo Canyon’s, are planned. In a 2018 report, the Union of Concerned Scientists concluded that “closing the at-risk plants early could result in a cumulative 4 to 6 percent increase in US power sector carbon emissions by 2035.” I’ve always found it to be ironic that environmentalists are often the ones that protest against nuclear power, given how good it is for the environment.  It would almost be like community housing advocates opposing new housing construction.  (Oh wait . . . )  Or public health experts opposing first-dose-first. Some point to the risks of a catastrophic accident, such as occurred at Chernobyl.  In fact, while nuclear power is very good for the environment when working safely, it’s even better for the environment when there is a major disaster.  Chernobyl created a vast nature reserve in northern Ukraine, full of wild animals that have disappeared from much of Europe. This doesn’t necessarily mean that we should be building more nuclear power plants—there may be sound economic or safety reasons for not doing so.  But we should not move away from nuclear for “environmental” reasons, as this energy source is extremely good for the environment.  And it seems rather foolish to shut down clean energy power plants that have operated safely for decades, and where the high construction costs have already been incurred. PS.  The post title is a reference to one of the greatest actresses of Hollywood’s Golden Age: (1 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Boris Johnson’s reopening plan

On Twitter, Ryan Bourne links to a series of tweets by Ben Riley-Smith, the political editor of the Daily Telegraph, on Boris Johnson’s reopening plan. Ryan’s comment is: “Why are the UK guidance and laws so much more specific and prescriptive than anywhere else? Absurd level of micromanagement”. If you read Riley-Smith’s tweets (which, if I understand correctly, are based upon political rumor), you will indeed be left with a similar question. It is notable, and troubling, how much “planning” has been going on in these matters. This is the consequence of an approach of fighting the pandemic in which most governments renounced early on the idea of using rules, as general as possible in these difficult times, and choosing instead a discretionary approach. Discretion has two benefits: on the one hand, it allows for faster adaptation as the pandemic situation evolves. On the other hand, it makes it easier for people in power to claim credit for whatever advancement recorded in the struggle with the virus. But by using prohibitions and bans, rather than rules, and emphasizing the government’s power to impose and revise plans for the whole of society, we are wasting the opportunity to mobilize knowledge and creativity on a larger scale. Your grocer is not an epidemiologist, and his opinions on the virus’ variants, for example, are unlikely to be particularly well-founded. But if you tell him that he can have a certain number of people per hour / per square meter in his shop, or that he can stay open provided he copes with a certain degree of social distancing, he is likely to busy himself in contriving ways to keep open and complying with the rule at the same time. Since the virus is a collective problem, governments have all somehow assumed that there can be no bottom up solutions. But the “struggle against the virus”, by any practical purpose, is in fact a series of attempts and actions aiming at keeping our lives together and similar to what they were before, as much as possible despite the pandemic. These attempts and actions could benefit a great deal from bottom-up, trial-and-errors endeavor. Governments have chosen to do without them. This may increase the costs of non pharmacological interventions, but it also means that we won’t benefit from tinkering solutions. It is an old story: the government assumes its experts have superior knowledge. When it comes to the virus, it is likely to be true. When it comes to how to adapt our lives to the fact the virus exists, perhaps no. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Serbians’ Freedom to Choose

Serbia has adopted an approval mechanism for vaccinations, giving citizens the option to choose which vaccine they want to get and in which location they want to get vaccinated. This makes Serbia the only country in the world where citizens can choose the vaccine type, between shots from Pfizer-BioNTech, China’s Sinopharm or Russia’s Sputnik. This is from Sara Mageit, “Serbia reaches one million vaccines with help of AI framework,” Healthcare IT News, February 23, 2021. There are 6.9 million people in Serbia, of whom over one million have received their first dose of vaccine. That’s 14.5 percent of Serbia’s population. Let’s compare that with the United States. 64 million doses have been distributed in the United States. 64 million is 19.4 percent of the U.S. population, which makes the U.S. look better than Serbia. But that would be if everyone who got a shot here got just one shot. Such a policy would be quite sensible. But it’s not the one that U.S. governments have chosen. 13.3 percent of the U.S. population have received at least one dose. 13.3 percent of 330 million is 43.9 million people. So 20.1 million people in the United States have received 2 doses and 23.8 million have received 1 dose. Since 2 doses isn’t much better than 1, a reasonable comparison would be between our 13.3 percent and Serbia’s 14.5 percent. In other words, almost a dead heat (because getting 2 doses is slightly better than 1 dose.) Interestingly, 14 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia have populations in which the percent having received at least one vaccination exceeds 15 percent. 3 states (Colorado, Iowa, and Wisconsin) have exceeded 14% but not 15%.   (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

L’Etat, C’est Ro

Louis XIV, pictured above, the king of France from 1643 to 1715, famously said, “L’Etat, C’est Moi.” Thus the title of this post. Ro Khanna, a Democratic member of the House of Representatives, was recently asked what his plan was for the small businesses that might be hurt by the Democrats’ (and some Republicans’) proposal to raise the minimum wage from its current $7.25 an hour to $15.00 an hour by 2025. The interviewer asked: I’m wondering what is your plan for smaller businesses? How does this, in your view, affect mom-and-pop businesses who are just struggling to keep their doors open, keep workers on the payroll right now? Khanna answered: Well they shouldn’t be doing it by paying people low wages. We don’t want low-wage businesses. What does Mr. Khanna mean by “we?” Many small businesses want to pay what he would regard as low wages. Many workers would like to work at those low wages if the alternative is higher wage rates but fewer hours, being worked harder, getting fewer benefits, or, in the limit getting zero hours. Many customers would like to buy goods and services produced by businesses paying wages less than $15 an hour. But none of these people count, in his view. His “we” means “he” or, more inclusively, people like him who are willing to ignore the desires of those three groups. Thus the title of this post. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

What the Success Sequence Means

[continued from yesterday] …This is a strange state of affairs.  Everyone – even the original researchers – insists that the success sequence sheds little or no light on who to blame for poverty.  And since I’m writing a book called Poverty: Who To Blame, I beg to differ. Consider this hypothetical.  Suppose the success sequence discovered that people could only reliably avoid poverty by finishing a Ph.D. in engineering, working 80 hours a week, and practicing lifelong celibacy.  What would be the right reaction?  Something along the lines of, “Then we shouldn’t blame people for their own poverty, because self-help is just too damn hard.” The underlying moral principle: You shouldn’t blame people for problems they have no reasonable way to avoid.  You shouldn’t blame them if avoiding the problem is literally impossible; nor should you blame them if they can only avoid the problem by enduring years of abject misery. The flip side, though, is that you should blame people for problems they do have a reasonable way to avoid.  And the steps of the success sequence are eminently reasonable.  This is especially clear in the U.S.  American high schools have low standards, so almost any student who puts in a little effort will graduate.  Outside of severe recessions, American labor markets offer ample opportunities for full-time work.  And since cheap, effective contraception is available, people can easily avoid having children before they are ready to support them. These realizations are probably the main reason why talking about the success sequence so agitates the critics.  The success sequence isn’t merely a powerful recipe for avoiding poverty.  It is a recipe easy enough for almost any adult to understand and follow. But can’t we still blame society for failing to foster the bourgeois values necessary to actually adhere to the success sequence?  Despite the popularity of this rhetorical question, my answer is an unequivocal no.  In ordinary moral reasoning, virtually no one buys such attempts to shift blame for individual misdeeds to “society.” Suppose, for example, that your spouse cheats on you.  When caught, he objects, “I come from a broken home, so I didn’t have a good role model for fidelity, so you shouldn’t blame me.”  Not very morally convincing, is it? Similarly, suppose you hire a worker, and he steals from you.  When you catch him, he protests, “Don’t blame me.  Blame racism.”  How do you react?  Poorly, I bet. Or imagine that you brother drinks his way into homelessness.  When you tell him he has to reform if he wants your help, he denounces your “bloodless moralism.”  Are you still obliged to help him?  Really? Finally, imagine you’re a juror on a war crimes trial.  A soldier accused of murdering a dozen children says, “It was war, I’m a product of my violent circumstances.”  Could you in good conscience exonerate him? So what?  We should place much greater confidence in our concrete moral judgments than in grand moral theories.  This is moral reasoning 101.  And virtually all of our concrete moral judgments say that we should blame individuals – not “society” – for their own bad behavior.  When wrong-doers point to broad social forces that influenced their behavior, the right response is, “Social forces influence us all, but that’s no excuse.  You can and should have done the right thing despite your upbringing, racism, love of drink, or violent circumstances.” To be clear, I’m not saying that we should pretend that individuals are morally responsible for their own actions to give better incentives.  What I’m saying, rather, is that individuals really are morally responsible for their actions.  Better incentives are just icing on the cake. This is not my eccentric opinion.  As long as we stick to concrete cases, virtually everyone agrees with me.  Each of my little moral vignettes is a forceful counter-example to the grand moral theory that invokes “broad social forces” to excuse wrong-doing.  And retaining a grand moral theory in the face of multitudinous counter-examples is practically the definition of bad philosophy. Does empirical research on the success sequence really show that the poor are entirely to blame for their own poverty?  Of course not!  In rich countries, following the success sequence is normally easy for able-bodied adults, but not for children or the severely handicapped.  In poor countries, even able-bodied adults often find that the success sequence falls short (though this would be far less true under open borders).  Haitians who follow the success sequence usually remain quite poor because economic conditions in Haiti are grim.  Though even there, we can properly blame Haitians who stray from the success sequence for making a bad situation worse. Research on the success sequence clearly makes people nervous.  Few modern thinkers, left or right, want to declare: “Despite numerous bad economic policies, responsible behavior is virtually a sufficient condition for avoiding poverty in the First World.  And we have every right to blame individuals for the predictable consequences of their own irresponsible behavior.”  Yet if you combine the rather obvious empirics of the success sequence with common-sense morality, this is exactly what you will end up believing. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Terence Kealey on the British ARPA

Terence Kealey has an excellent piece in CapX on the influence of Mariana Mazzucato’s work on the British “conservative” government. Boris Johnson has announced a new Advanced Research & Invention Agency (ARIA), a brainchild of his controversial advisor Dominic Cummings. It is an ambitious effort, as the government itself describes it as a “new research agency to support high risk, high reward science”. Here you can see the reaction of a few scientists who welcomed the news. Terence begs to differ, and he does so by writing a short history of ARPA in the US, which he considers more a case of government failure than one of successful, “mission-oriented” public spending. At the very end of his piece, Terence reminds that some of Johnson’s voters, and Brexit fans, may have hoped to see the government shrinking once they regained “independence” from the EU. Sadly, they are going to be disappointed: Some Brexiteers had hoped that leaving the EU would be a chance to shrink the state. Sadly for them, Boris Johnson knows he’s Prime Minister only because of the votes of the ‘left behind’, and such folk are none too keen on the bracing winds of competition: they are keen on high public spending, subsidies, and a corporate state within which they can find shelter. And boy, is Johnson delivering for them, starting with an industrial policy based on vast corporate welfare – starting with research. I am not so sure what the “left behind” would make of the building of a “British ARPA”. Is that helping in any way the left-behinds? I suppose the Johnsons of this world would make the case that the new agency is indirectly strengthening British business, keeping it at the frontier of technology and thus “saving jobs” from globalization and international trade. It is sort of variation of the old argument for infant industry protection. But I also suppose that the left-behinds do care about improvements in their lives- here and now- and it is harder to make the case that a British ARPA would play any role in providing them with better job opportunities, or strengthening their purchasing power, or safeguarding their savings. It may please them as a symbol: the British flag waving over science- be proud of your government because it invests in science. We tend to overestimate the role of interests in real-life politics, but my takeaway from the last few years of ramping populism is that most of the time, people do not vote thinking of their immediate interests. They are mesmerized by symbols, and happy to be fed with them. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment and Unemployment

In a comment on my blog post about the proposed $15 federal minimum wage, frequent (and careful) commenter KevinDC quotes my statement: Here’s what they found. The vast majority of studies, 79.3 percent, found that a higher minimum wage led to less employment. He then comments: I like the precise wording here by using the term “less employment.” One thing I’ve tried explaining to people is that is possible for increases in the minimum wage to decrease employment without increasing unemployment, because economists are bad at naming things in a way that make intuitive sense to people outside the field. (“Public goods? Obviously that means goods provided by the public sector, right?” “Market failure? That’s whenever I personally don’t like a market outcome, isn’t it?”) So, even in the case where  particular study doesn’t find increased unemployment after a minimum wage hike, that doesn’t actually mean that the increase in the minimum wage didn’t decrease employment. Well said, Kevin. I want to add that the CBO study I cited makes this distinction also. Here’s a key paragraph: Taking those factors into account, CBO projects that, on net, the Raise the Wage Act of 2021 would reduce employment by increasing amounts over the 2021–2025 period. In 2025, when the minimum wage reached $15 per hour, employment would be reduced by 1.4 million workers (or 0.9 percent), according to CBO’s average estimate. In 2021, most workers who would not have a job because of the higher minimum wage would still be looking for work and hence be categorized as unemployed; by 2025, however, half of the 1.4 million people who would be jobless because of the bill would have dropped out of the labor force, CBO estimates. Young, less educated people would account for a disproportionate share of those reductions in employment.     (1 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Correlation and causation

Bryan Caplan has a new post where he claims that people can avoid poverty with three simple steps: If you live in the First World, there is a simple and highly effective formula for avoiding poverty: 1. Finish high school. 2. Get a full-time job once you finish school. 3. Get married before you have children. This made me wonder if Bryan was confusing correlation with causation.  He denies this: A more agnostic criticism doubts causation.  Sure, poverty correlates with failure to follow the success sequence.  How, though, do we know that the so-called success sequence actually causes success?  It’s not like we run experiments where we randomly assign lifestyles to people.  The best answer to this challenge, frankly, is that causation is obvious.  “Dropping out of school, idleness, and single parenthood make you poor” is on par with “burning money makes you poor.”  The demand for further proof of the obvious is a thinly-veiled veto of unpalatable truths. I am not at all convinced by this argument.  Indeed I don’t see any real argument being made here.  It seems equally plausible to me that the sort of person who doesn’t finish high school is different, on average, from those who do.  The dropout may (on average) be less smart, less interested in classes, less motivated, and/or perhaps a bit anti-social.  None of those traits are normally associated with financial success.  If you put a gun to their heads and forced this cohort to finish high school, would that by itself change those personal characteristics?  Maybe slightly, but how much?  Would this group then become identical to other high school grads?  I doubt it. As for marriage, the Nordic countries tend to have a much higher share of births out of wedlock, and yet typically have relatively low rates of poverty: You might argue that their culture is different, and that in Scandinavia even unmarried men often take an interest in raising their children.  I accept that, but again it just makes me wonder if it’s marriage that is the key, or if the deciding factor is the personal characteristics of those who fall into poverty. I certainly agree that working hard and being responsible are useful traits, and that some people are poor due to unfortunate life choices.  I would push back, however, against any suggestion that there are simple public policy fixes, such as policies that discourage people from dropping out of high school or encouraging marriage.  Those policies might work, but simple correlations don’t prove that.  (BTW, I lean toward policies that make work more attractive, such as low wage subsidies and housing deregulation, as opposed to basic income programs that might discourage work.) Also keep in mind that definitions of poverty are based on “households”, where the poverty line increases only modestly each time a person is added to a household.  Thus if two single people making $10,000 each decide to double up and live in the same apartment, that pushes them above the poverty line.  It’s not obvious their situation improved (otherwise no one would ever chose to live alone), but the US government treats the decision to share an apartment as an improvement of living standards.  This biases the statistics toward the conclusion that marriage improves one’s economic well being. Thus you might just as well argue that poverty could be almost eliminated if everyone lived like Chinese college students in the 1980s, with eight people per apartment. Even with minimum wage jobs, a household of eight will earn far more than $47,650.  But would those “households” be better off, or would people get on each other’s nerves?  (My wife shared a room with 7 other college students in the 1980s, in Beijing.) Finally, most women have a strong preference to have children.  Finding a suitable husband is not always a “simple” process. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

What Does the Success Sequence Mean?

If you live in the First World, there is a simple and highly effective formula for avoiding poverty: 1. Finish high school. 2. Get a full-time job once you finish school. 3. Get married before you have children. Researchers call this formula the “success sequence.”  Ron Haskins and Isabel Sawhill got the ball rolling with their book Creating an  Opportunity Society, calling for a change in social norms to “bring back the success sequence as the expected path for young Americans.”  The highest-quality research on this success sequence probably comes from Wendy Wang and Brad Wilcox.  In their Millennial Success Sequence, they observe: 97% of Millennials who follow what has been called the “success sequence”—that is, who get at least a high school degree, work, and then marry before having any children, in that order—are not poor by the time they reach their prime young adult years (ages 28-34). One common criticism is that full-time work does almost all the work of the success sequence.  Even if you drop out of high school and have five kids with five different partners, you’ll probably avoid poverty as long as you work full-time.  Wilcox and Wang disagree: …This analysis is especially relevant since some critics of the success sequence have argued that marriage does not matter once education and work status are controlled. The regression results indicate that after controlling for a range of background factors, the order of marriage and parenthood in Millennials’ lives is significantly associated with their financial well-being in the prime of young adulthood. Simply put, compared with the path of having a baby first, marrying before children more than doubles young adults’ odds of being in the middle or top income. Meanwhile, putting marriage first reduces the odds of young adults being in poverty by 60% (vs. having a baby first). But even if the “work does all the work” criticism were statistically true, it is misses the point: Single parenthood makes it very hard to work full-time. A more agnostic criticism doubts causation.  Sure, poverty correlates with failure to follow the success sequence.  How, though, do we know that the so-called success sequence actually causes success?  It’s not like we run experiments where we randomly assign lifestyles to people.  The best answer to this challenge, frankly, is that causation is obvious.  “Dropping out of school, idleness, and single parenthood make you poor” is on par with “burning money makes you poor.”  The demand for further proof of the obvious is a thinly-veiled veto of unpalatable truths. A very different criticism, however, challenges the perceived moral premise behind the success sequence.  What is this alleged moral premise?  Something along the lines of: “Since people can reliably escape poverty with moderately responsible behavior, the poor are largely to blame for their own poverty, and society is not obliged to help them.”  Or perhaps simply, “The success sequence shifts much of the moral blame for poverty from broad social forces to individual behavior.”  While hardly anyone explicitly uses the success sequence to argue that we underrate the blameworthiness of the poor for their own troubles, critics still hear this argument loud and clear – and vociferously object. Thus, Eve Tushnet writes: To me, the success sequence is an example of what Helen Andrews dubbed “bloodless moralism”… All bloodless moralisms conflate material success and virtue, presenting present successful people as moral exemplars. And this, like “it’s better to have a diploma than a GED,” is something virtually every poor American already believes: that escaping poverty proves your virtue and remaining poor is shameful. Brian Alexander similarly remarks: The appeal of the success sequence, then, appears to be about more than whether it’s a good idea. In a society where so much of one’s prospects are determined by birth, it makes sense that narratives pushing individual responsibility—narratives that convince the well-off that they deserve what they have—take hold. Cato’s Michael Tanner says much the same: The success sequence also ignores the circumstances in which the poor make choices. Our choices result from a complex process that is influenced at each step by a variety of outside factors. We are not perfectly rational actors, carefully weighing the likely outcomes for each choice. In particular, progressives are correct to point to the impact of racism, gender-based discrimination, and economic dislocation on the decisions that the poor make in their lives. Focusing on the choices and not the underlying conditions is akin to a doctor treating only the visible symptoms without dealing with the underlying disease. Strikingly,  the leading researchers of the success sequence seem to agree with the critics!  Wang and Wilcox: We do not take the view that the success sequence is simply a “pull yourselves up by your own bootstraps” strategy that individuals adopt on their own. Rather, for many, the “success sequence” does not exist in a cultural vacuum; it’s inculcated by an interlocking cultural array of ideals, norms, expectations, and knowledge.* This is a strange state of affairs.  Everyone – even the original researchers – insists that the success sequence sheds little or no light on who to blame for poverty.  And since I’m writing a book called Poverty: Who To Blame, I beg to differ… * To be fair, Wang and Wilcox also tell us: “But it’s not just about natural endowments, social structure, and culture; agency also matters. Most men and women have the  capacity to make choices, to embrace virtues or avoid vices, and to otherwise take steps that increase or decrease their odds of doing well in school, finding and keeping a job, or deciding when to marry and have children.” [to be continued] (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More