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Immigrant Song

As many EconTalk listeners know, host Russ Roberts moved to Jerusalem last year as president of Shalem College. In this episode, jointly released with Conversations with Tyler, Cowen interviews Roberts about his experiences as a new immigrant in Israel. Tyler asks Russ “all the easy questions” about Israeli life, and as you might expect from two polymaths, the ensuing conversation is lively and rich. We wonder how many of you have stories to share about immigrating as an adult. Perhaps you’re willing to share some of your experiences below. Similarly, we wonder how many of you have experienced a core Great Books curriculum. We’d love to hear about that, too. Cowen asks Russ why there aren’t more universities like Shalem in mature economies (like Israel). We wonder why there aren’t more everywhere!     1- The conversation begins with Israel’s compulsory military service; Cowen asks Roberts if Adam Smith‘s concern regarding the decline of martial spirit in nations with advanced division of labor is justified. How does Roberts answer, and what role does he ascribe to the military as a socializing institution? What might fulfill that role absent military service? Given what you’ve heard, do you think Israel should have a voluntary military? A draft? Explain.   2- How has Shalem’s Great Books approach helped Roberts make sense of his immigration experience? What does Roberts cite as his favorite book, and why? [P.S. This page’s image gives you a hint!] What book has helped you make the most sense of your world, and why?   3- What has Roberts learned about Arabic culture since moving to Israel? How does Roberts suggest members of different world religions could get along better, and why does Cowen call Russ’ answer “a complicated regression?” With whom do you agree more, and why?   4- Cowen queries Russ about the recent deregulation of kosher certification. Why does Roberts think that this move might result in more and cheaper kosher food for Israelis? How does this example relate to Cowen’s later question about secular Israelis free-riding on their more religious fellows?   5- Why do you think Cowen asked Russ whether he’s become more utilitarian in his moral philosophy since moving? How does Roberts describe his view on Jeremy Bentham as part of his answer, and what does his answer suggest about the state of economics generally? How much Bentham have you read, and why does Cowen suggest you should read more?   (0 COMMENTS)

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Matthews Interviews Henderson on Price Controls

Last week health economist Merrill Matthews of the Institute for Policy Innovation (IPI), based in Dallas, read my Hoover article on price controls and, on that basis, interviewed me for about half an hour. Here’s the interview. A few highlights: 7:28: Prices aren’t arbitrary. 9:13: Can corporations charge whatever they want? 10:48: What about monopolies? 12:20: Lina Khan seems unaware of this. 16:20: The X factor during WWII. 17:10: Milton Friedman’s observation on Congressmen’s self-interest during World War II. 17:50: Is there a case for price controls during all-out war. My answer and my (possibly imperfect) memory of Keynes’s view during WWII. 19:40: Demsetz’s findings on ads for rent-controlled apartments in Chicago during WWII. 21:45: Effects of minimum wage. Why unions pushed for minimum wages in late 1930s. Hint: To price out black people. 24:00: I highlight Richard McKenzie’s work and Jacob Vigdor’s work on Seattle minimum wage age. 25:40: Is a tariff a type of price control? HINT: No. 26:30: The famous case of favoritism during price controls by a famous Texas congressman. 27:45: LBJ’s phone line. 28:15: If price controls are not a good option, what should we do instead?                 (0 COMMENTS)

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No, “the market” isn’t worried about “the Fed”

Falling stock prices have recently been in the news. You see headlines about stock investors being worried about “the Fed”. But when you read the actual articles there is often little or no discussion of how Fed policy might be depressing stock prices. More often, the claim is that markets are worried about rising interest rates.I have two problems with this sort of claim. First, there’s actually no reliable correlation between interest rates and stock prices. Interest rates generally fall sharply during recessions, and yet stocks often do poorly.More importantly, interest rates are not monetary policy. To suggest they are is to “reason from a price change.” There are occasions when a much tighter monetary policy will be associated with higher interest rates, but this doesn’t seem to be one of them. The 5-year TIPS spread has fallen a bit, but remains well above the Fed’s target. Money is certainly not tightening in any dramatic fashion.  Indeed, it should probably be even tighter. I have no idea why market interest rates have recently crept up a bit (albeit remaining at extremely low levels.)  Perhaps it is due to fear of an overheating economy.  But expectations of tighter money is not the primary factor. (0 COMMENTS)

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Labor Econ Versus the World: Essays on the World’s Greatest Market

Big announcement: I’m publishing eight new books of my all-time best EconLog essays.  Today, the first volume – entitled Labor Econ Versus the World: Essays on the World’s Greatest Market, goes on sale on Amazon. I spent weeks reviewing the several thousand essays I’ve written since 2005, organizing them all by theme.  Labor Econ Versus the World collects my top pieces on the world of work, broken down into four categories.  “Laissez-Faire and Labor” analyzes the sorry effects of labor market regulation for workers and the rest of the economy.  “Open Borders” turns to the vast yet neglected gains of letting everyone on Earth work in whatever country they please.  “Education Without Romance” debunks the prevailing human capital model of education in favor of the signaling heresy.  “The Search for Success” shows how you can use the insights of labor economics to avoid poverty, advance your career, marry well, and optimize your parenting. Can’t you just read all of these essays for free online?  Absolutely.  But Labor Econ Versus the World curates your experience.  Instead of sifting through almost two decades of blog posts, you can read one top piece after another.  Editor Jack Pfeffercorn has beautifully typeset the entire book.  And the book is priced to sell: Just $12 for the paperback, and a mere $9.99 for the e-book.  If you enjoy this blog, I’m confident that you’ll get ample consumer surplus from the purchase. P.S. If you’re a journalist, influencer, or teacher considering course adoption, please email aachar3@gmu.edu for a review copy. P.P.S. I’m available for interviews and other media events for the book.  Just email me to set things up! (0 COMMENTS)

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Penny Lane on Loving and Loathing Kenny G

[ANNUAL LISTENER SURVEY: https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CQX28T6. Vote for your 2021 favorites!] Love it or hate it, but you’ve definitely heard it: the so-called “smooth jazz” of saxophonist Kenny G. Filmmaker Penny Lane talks about her documentary, Listening to Kenny G, with EconTalk host Russ Roberts. They discuss the pursuit of perfection, the power of vulnerability in art, […] The post Penny Lane on Loving and Loathing Kenny G appeared first on Econlib.

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A Simple Model of War and Peace

Rumors of war (think Ukraine) in a complicated world suggest that we look at a simple model of war and peace. Consider a world with two countries, Borduria and Syldavia. State propagandists as well as diplomats often say things like “Borduria has asked Syldavia to respond in writing to its demands.” In reality, it is the government of Borduria that asked something to the government of Syldavia. The government of each country is made of an assemblage of politicians, bureaucrats, and institutions; the latter may include voters or not, or include them to a variable extent. Economist Jack Hirshleifer’s article “The Dark Side of the Force” reviewed individual incentives in the use of violence in general. Here we are just doing the same for the individual as a participant in a collective decision about the use of violence. In each of our two countries, the incentives of the individuals manning the government and its institutions depend on each one’s self-interest and, crucially, on one’s influence in the process governmental decision-making. The “head of state” or prime minister has much influence and therefore strong incentives to push for war or peace depending on whether one or the other is in his own best interest. The individual voter’s influence is infinitesimal and generates little incentive for him to use resources to defend his self-interest through smart voting or just voting. Let’s define “the ruler” as the group of individuals who have decisive influence on the government’s decision. (The King of Prussia and his generals appear on the featured image of this post.) Borduria and Syldavia can be very different countries if power is distributed differently within them and if the incentives of individuals manning governing institutions consequently differ. In a country where widespread voters’ dissatisfaction—dissatisfaction strong enough to bring voters to follow the crowd at voting polls—has a chance to throw the rascals out, the ruler has comparatively more incentives to avoid war. Hence, the frequent observation that democratic governments go to war less often. Similarly and probably more importantly, the more a government is constrained on the use of its “human resources” (subjects or citizens), the lower the incentives of the ruler to wage war, ceteris paribus. Let’s assume that in both Borduria and Syldavia, the only constraint on government action is its need for popular support, either through formal elections or less formal means. At least in contemporary times, where a large number of people (it is hoped) understand that blowing up capital (factories, bridges, etc.) is not the road to prosperity, the ruler of Borduria, who wants to keep or increase his power, will normally want peace in order that his subjects be prosperous and happy, that is, content and quiet. It is the same in Syldavia. If his subjects are restless and currently threaten his power, the ruler of Borduria will have more incentives for war, ceteris paribus. War will distract and occupy the subjects and allow the ruler to increase his control over them, not counting his possible glory if he wins the war. War will also generate more identification of his subjects to “Borduria” and its flag: it’s “us Bordurians against them Syldavians.” Whether the incentives of the Bordurian ruler will go more toward war or peace will depend on where his personal expected net gain is the largest, or where the minimization of his expected net cost is the smallest. Again, the same incentives play in Syldavia. In this simple model, war happens when the ruler (as defined) calculates that it is in his best (probabilistic) interest give his social, political, and economic constraints. He may be pushed into war by mobbish nationalism but, most of the time, he or his predecessor is the one who has inflamed it. Assume that the government of Borduria declares war. What will be the position of a Bordurian classical liberal or libertarian in Borduria is quite obvious: he will oppose a war that responds to the ruler’s self-interest. It is not as obvious what will or should be the position of a Syldavian classical liberal or libertarian. There are many ways to bring this simple model closer to reality. Other countries than Borduria and Syldavia exist in the world, including “allied countries.” If the Bordurian government starts military operations, the Syldavian government may, as a substitute for war, impose economic sanctions on its own subjects in their dealings with Bordurian entities. Or perhaps the Bordurian or the Syldavian ruler is a Madisonian angel, morally detached from his personal self-interest? Another complication is whether we may consider a “country” as a protection club against foreign tyrants, as James Buchanan’s constitutional political economy and other classical-liberal theories would suggest (in certain circumstances). But which country today fits this model except (perhaps) for the strange case of Switzerland? (0 COMMENTS)

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Should Companies Be Deeply Obsessed with Helping Customers?

He also blamed PG&E for its “deep-rooted obsession for keeping power flowing,” which he said could be blamed for allowing its equipment to ignite wildfires despite forecasts for hazardous weather and, starting in 2019, a power shutoff strategy. This is from Julie Johnson, “Judge fires parting shots at PG&E as the utility’s probation comes to end,” San Francisco Chronicle, January 19, 2022. “He” in the above is U.S. District Judge William Alsup, pictured above. PG&E is Pacific Gas and Electric, which provides much of the natural gas and electricity between central California, where I live, and northern California. Alsup’s upset is about PG&E being obsessed with providing something that it has promised to provide its customers, something that we customers really value. I get that Alsup is upset that PG&E hasn’t cleared brush and trees as much as he would like. I don’t know if he knows that with all the state and local regulations, that’s often easier said than done. Years ago, when a branch on our tree was rubbing against our power line, I called PG&E and asked them to come out. The guy was very nice and cut a couple of small branches, telling me all the while that he might be breaking the law, and encouraging me to pay a couple of hundred dollars to the Pacific Grove city government for permission to cut the branches further myself. That was about 15 years ago. Maybe the regulations have been loosened since then, but I doubt it. Beyond that issue, though, I found Alsup’s comment stunning. I don’t know about him. Maybe he has solar panels that provide enough electricity for all his house uses. I don’t. And solar is not a sure thing. So I appreciate PG&E’s obsession “for keeping power flowing” just as I appreciate my local Safeway’s and Lucky’s obsession with stocking their shelves.     (0 COMMENTS)

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Kevin Erdmann was right

Back in 2009-10, I did a number of posts criticizing the theory that rising house prices in the early 2000s represented a “bubble”.  In one post, I pointed to an article in The Economist that criticized Eugene Fama, and bragged that they had presciently foreseen the housing bubble.  In fact, the specific predictions they cited (from an 2003 advertisement for The Economist, since deleted) turned out to be almost entirely wrong, indeed wildly off base. The Economist did not take kindly to my post: Mr Sumner disagrees. He seems to think it’s funny that The Economists pent much of the last decade warning that, globally, home prices were rising in a troubling manner. Contrarianism is fun and all, but this strikes me as an odd way to process the experiences that led us to this point. I responded:  I would note that Free Exchange seemed to enjoy making fun of Fama’s views. Now The Economist has seen the light: Perhaps it is just a matter of time before the house of cards collapses. But as a recent paper by Gabriel Chodorow-Reich of Harvard University and colleagues explains, what might appear to be a housing bubble may in fact be the product of fundamental economic shifts. The paper shows that the monumental house-price increases in America in the early to mid-2000s were largely a consequence of factors such as urban revitalisation, growing preferences for city living and rising wage premia for educated workers in cities. By 2019 American real house prices had pretty much regained their pre-financial-crisis peak, further evidence that the mania of the mid-2000s was perhaps not quite so mad after all. Fundamental forces may once again explain why house prices today are so high—and why they may endure. Three of them stand out: robust household balance-sheets; people’s greater willingness to spend more on their living arrangements; and the severity of supply constraints. I’d add permanently low real interest rates. I would like to take credit here, but I was just shooting from the hip when I questioned the housing bubble view that was so popular after 2006.  Credit should go to Kevin Erdmann, who produced a mountain of evidence against the bubble hypothesis in two very impressive books on housing.  His view, which was once highly contrarian, has now been completely vindicated.  Indeed, I don’t see how any fair-minded person reading his books could still believe in the housing bubble theory.  Unfortunately, he’ll probably be ignored.  The media tends to focus on academic research from top schools like Harvard, not unaccredited individuals working on their own.  Better to be famous than to be right. (0 COMMENTS)

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Regenerative Agriculture and the Denial of Comparative Advantage: Part 3

Agricultural Productivity and Standards of Living There was a time not too long ago when most people understood that comparative advantage, trade, the division of labor and specialization delivered greater agricultural productivity and standards of living. Perhaps because they or members of their extended family weren’t all that removed from quasi-subsistence farming, they saw the virtues of specializing in the production of “cash crops” for which there were lucrative and often distant urban markets. By participating in a larger division of labor in which they concentrated on what their land was best suited for, commercial farmers achieved a much higher standard of living for themselves and others. A well-documented historical case in the transition from subsistence to exchange is ancient Athens and its back country of Attica. Although a large plain in the context of Greece’s overall topography, like much of the Greek mainland Attica has relatively poor soils and highly variable annual rainfalls. Before the explosive growth of Athens over two and a half millennia ago, local farmers grew mostly a variety of grains and some vegetables with the help of hand tools, although in the better areas larger fields were worked with ass or ox-drawn ploughs. Low and erratic precipitations resulted in a rather high probability of crop failures, perhaps as much as one year out of four for wheat and one out of twenty for barley. Despite these odds, grain cultivation was typically the most sensible option because of its nutritional value and ease of production and storage. Fortunately, Athenians had ready access to sea travel. As they progressively integrated into regional trading networks, they finished clearing up marginal lands in their backcountry to obtain trees for firewood and to build and manufacture houses, ships and other implements and items of commerce. Meanwhile, in various locations around the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, Greek colonists and local populations developed large-scale productions of cereal grains (especially the more lucrative soft bread wheat) and other foodstuffs for the specific purpose of supplying Athens and other urban markets. In time, non-local producers supplied at least half of Athens requirements, especially as its residents became fond of wheaten bread. To distant suppliers, Athens was a prime market because it was the largest, wealthiest and most stable Greek city at the time. It offered foreign traders good port facilities, safe passage, a valuable return cargo (from manufactured goods to silver) and at some point in time special courts devoted to maritime commerce. In light of the abundance and affordability of foreign wheat shipments, Attica producers focused their efforts on growing barley and replanted some lands formerly devoted to grain production with vineyards and olive and fig orchards. There is, however, some controversy as to how much intensive local farming that included crop rotations with legumes and the raising of livestock took place. Be that as it may, Athenians might have become net food importers as early as the sixth century BC and were certainly regular and substantial grain importers in the following centuries. Needless to say, food markets during this time period were never completely free. To summarize, the exportation of local grain from Athens was prohibited at all time and punishable by death. Officially sanctioned grain buyers were authorized to raise public subscriptions and use private money to secure foreign supplies. Commanders of Athenian ships leaving a foreign port were compelled to carry grain as ballast and to leave two-thirds of their grain cargo in Athens (the rest could be sold or re-exported at their discretion). Despite these bureaucratic impediments and the somewhat primitive nature of the transportation and preservation technologies of the time, Athens’ food supply proved generally sufficient, except in times of war. There is also no question it was more diversified and affordable than in previous centuries or would have been in the absence of long-distance trade. As could be expected, much evidence suggests that throughout history urban dwellers everywhere acquired as much cheaper or more exotic foodstuff produced in more distant locations as was practical and politically feasible. For instance, The Thousand and One Nights list some of the items available to wealthy Baghdad consumers, from wine, olives, dry fruits and meats of all kinds to Syrian apples, Othmanee quinces, peaches of Oman, cucumbers of the Nile, Egyptian limes and Sultanee citron. In his A tour thro’ the Whole Island of Great Britain published in the mid-1720s, Daniel Defoe observed that “this whole kingdom, as well as the people, as the land, and even the sea, in every part of it, are employed to furnish something… to supply the city of London with provisions.” As a result, his country was the most “flourishing and opulent” in the world. In most parts of the world, however, bad inland transportation infrastructure meant that significant local self-sufficiency was more the rule than the exception. Reflecting on his early nineteenth century youth in northeastern Ohio, the San Francisco Chronicle agricultural writer, editor and ardent anti-socialist Edward Francis Adams described a world where “transportation was slow and expensive, and the products of each district mostly consumed therein.” It was inhabited by “thrifty 100-acre farm” families made up mostly of “jacks of all trades” who exchanged surplus meat and butter with neighbors and nearby villagers. They brought their grain to the local mill and the leather of the cow killed for family consumption to the local tanner. They sold their extra eggs and maple syrup to the local store where they bought their few good pieces of clothing. The local boys “got their spending money by picking up nuts in the woods and from the sale of the fur of an occasional mink or muskrat.” The area specialists (millers, tanners, doctors, ministers and others) purchased a combination of locally produced and imported items at the local store while “the small surplus” of extra grain and barrels of pork which had been “accumulated painfully” by local farmers found “its way to the seaboard” in exchange for things locals couldn’t produce. In this context, the hard working local farmer “received very little money, and kept it almost no time at all.” There as elsewhere, trade was never entirely absent, but when it was insignificant, farmers had no capacity to accumulate savings and to invest in equipment and inputs. Fortunately, the advent of the coal-powered steamship and railroad soon made long-distance trade and regional specialization more viable. Writing in the pages of The Popular Science Monthly in 1890, J. J. Menzies observed that “[e]xperience keeps constantly adding to our knowledge of the special advantages of each locality, and every free movement of trade and industry increases the sum of their usefulness to the human race. Scarcity of food can no longer exist among nations that have kept abreast of this economical revolution.” Menzies added that “[t]hose who doubt the advantages of this universal, world-wide intercourse and exchange are bound in consistency to advocate the reversion of society not merely to any earlier stage in its development, but to that state of things which preceded its initiation – that is, to pure and simple cannibalism; for an argument that is good against one step in this march of progress is equally good against another.” In his high school textbook, economic geographer Charles Morris wrote in 1910 that “some parts of the earth are fitted to produce certain special thins and some to produce other things. None of us can produce all the things we need, unless our wants are very simple indeed.” For instance, the “cattle and sheep-raisers of the western plains must buy wheat for their bread from farmers. These, in turn, need to buy ploughs and harvesting machines from the manufacturers. The latter have to buy iron and wood from the miners and foresters. These need to buy meat from the cattle-raisers. Thus the circle of trade is complete.” Regional specialization at home was mirrored between countries. For instance, the varieties of American corn available at the time “will not ripen in the British Islands or Northern Europe, and much is sent there for cattle-food.” Much American wheat was also exported to Europe at the time, while, on the other hand, America got “great part of its sugar, and all of its coffee, tea and spices, from foreign lands.” At about the same time the social reformer Frederic Clemson Howe could observe that the “desires of the city direct the life of the shepherds on the mountain-side, the fishermen in Alaska, the pearl-divers of India, the plantations of the tropics, the wheat-fields of America and Russia… the sheep and cattle ranges of Australia and Argentina [and] the wine-growers of France.” A decade ago agricultural economists Jayson Lusk and F. Bailey Norwood felt compelled to restate these arguments on this website in light of the increased popularity of the local food movement. They argued that “local food is generally more expensive than non-local food of the same quality. If that were not so, there would be no need to exhort people to ‘buy local.’” But what about keeping the money in the local community instead of sending it to distant corporate headquarters? The economists pointed out that paying more for a comparable local item means that there is less money left in the pockets of consumers to purchase other things – “the very definition of wealth destruction.” But what about all the greenhouse gas emissions of long-distance transportation? Not so fast, for the “truth is that the energy expended transporting food is relatively unimportant” when you look at the whole life-cycle. Growing pineapples in energy guzzling greenhouses in North Dakota is possible, but importing them from locations where nature gives you the heat free of charge is preferable for both your wallet and the planet. In the end, as one analyst put it, subsistence farming and regional quasi self-sufficiency always and everywhere delivered “low yields, low productivity and paltry incomes.” In other words, “stagnation – just enough to survive on, but never enough to improve one’s lot.” Alternative food system activists who believe the time to make excuses for agri-business is over and that we must radically change the way we do things should perhaps ponder a bit longer why countless people worked so long and so hard to develop our globalized food supply chain.     (0 COMMENTS)

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The Case Against Price Controls

“This is a great suppressed topic. It was absolutely mainstream from the start of World War II until the Reagan administration.” This is a quote from “Price Controls Set Off Heated Debate as History Gets a Second Look,” a January 13 New York Times article by Ben Casselman and Jeanne Smialek. The speaker quoted is James (Jamie) K. Galbraith, a left-wing economist at the University of Texas. The “this” in the quote refers price controls, which Galbraith appears to favor. He comes by it honestly. His father, the late John Kenneth Galbraith, was a high-level official in the Office of Price Administration during World War II, and he sometimes reflected fondly on the power that he exerted over the US economy. I disagree with Galbraith that the topic has been suppressed. We opponents of price controls have been quite willing to discuss why they’re a bad idea. If he were to be more accurate, Galbraith would have to say that the idea has been rejected. Indeed, the heartening point of the Times article is that the vast majority of economists, including left-wing economists such as Paul Krugman, reject the idea of comprehensive government controls on prices. But sometimes it’s hard for people who are losing a debate to admit that they’ve lost, not because the topic has been suppressed but because their idea has been analytically crushed. It’s worthwhile, therefore, to say why they are such a bad idea. Price controls cause shortages, waste people’s time in line, sometimes lead to favoritism by suppliers, and, as in the case of oil and gasoline in the 1970s, can lead to harmful regulation that lasts for decades. This is from David R. Henderson, “Price Controls: Still a Bad Idea,” Defining Ideas, January 20, 2022. The problem with the “smashed thermometer” analogy: When University of Chicago economist Harold Demsetz gave a talk in the winter of 1970 at the University of Winnipeg, where I was an undergrad, he used an analogy that many critics of price controls still use. Demsetz told his audience that using price controls to reduce inflation is like responding to cold weather in Winnipeg by breaking the thermometer. His point was that just as thermometers respond to temperature, prices are an indicator of underlying economic phenomena, namely supply and demand. Breaking a thermometer doesn’t cause the temperature to rise; controlling prices doesn’t cause inflation to fall. But it’s worse than that. When you break the thermometer, you don’t make the weather worse. But when a government controls prices, it makes the economy worse by causing shortages. “Greed” What’s wrong with attributing price increases to “corporate greed”? The problem with that explanation is not that corporations aren’t greedy. If we take “greed” to mean “wanting to make as high a profit as possible,” then yes, most corporations are greedy. But those same corporations often cut prices. Have you noticed that the prices of wide-screen televisions have fallen regularly over the past fifteen years? Does that mean that the corporations producing those TVs have steadily become less greedy? Unlikely. So greed is not a good explainer of price increases. A good rule for thinking, as Charles L. Hooper and I pointed out in our book, Making Great Decisions in Business and Life, is that to explain a change in one variable, you need to point to a change in another variable. Because greed (however defined) is relatively constant, it’s not a good way to explain a change. Read the whole thing. (2 COMMENTS)

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