This is my archive

bar

It’s about time

A month ago, I complained that people were dying because pharmacists were not allowed to prescribe Paxlovid: In my case, I got the prescription after about a 15 second consultation with a person I’d never met over a telemedicine zoom meeting.  Couldn’t a pharmacist do that?  Apparently not: Even if you qualify, someone will still have to prescribe the drug, which means the pharmacy you get tested at will need to have a clinic, like CVS’ MinuteClinic, where a professional can screen, diagnose and prescribe. Only 10% of CVS drugstores and even fewer Walgreens have clinicians on site. I understand that pharmacists might make a few more errors in their 15 seconds of questioning than the telemedicine operator I spoke with.  But 350 people are dying every day.  Is the FDA looking at this on a cost/benefit basis? Today, I read that the federal government has finally seen the light: Pharmacists can prescribe the leading COVID-19 pill directly to patients under a new U.S. policy announced Wednesday that’s intended to expand use of Pfizer’s drug Paxlovid. The Food and Drug Administration said pharmacists can begin screening patients to see if they are eligible for Paxlovid and then prescribe the medication, which has been shown to curb the worst effects of COVID-19. Previously only physicians could prescribe the antiviral drug. The announcement comes as COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations and deaths are rising again, though they remain near their lowest levels since the coronavirus outbreak began in 2020. Biden administration officials have expressed frustration that several hundred Americans continue to die of COVID-19 daily, despite the availability of vaccines and treatments. It’s important that we don’t blindly rely on experts, and instead hold their feet to the fire when they are not taking costs and benefits into account in policymaking.  Too often, bureaucrats follow rigid rules and do not pay sufficient attention to the broader welfare of society.  The US is still losing more than 300 people a day to Covid, many of them needlessly. When a free person makes a mistake, that person suffers.  When a bureaucrat makes a mistake, millions of people may suffer. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Gut Feelings

Couy Griffin, president of Cowboys for Trump, and one of the three commissioners of Otero County in New Mexico, voted against certifying the results of the 2022 elections (including party primaries). The Economist explains (“Trump Truthers Are Vying to Run America’s Local Elections,” June 28, 2022): This was not a contentious election. The county clerk insisted there was no evidence of fraud, and no candidate questioned the results. Mr Griffin himself admitted his intransigence was not based on any facts. Echoing a favourite conspiracy theory of Donald Trump, the commissioner said he just had a “gut feeling” that something was amiss with the Dominion voting machines. The County Commission was eventually ordered by the State Supreme Court to certify the results. On the same day that Mr. Griffin, contrary to the two other commissioners, defied the order, he was condemned to two weeks in jail following his previous trial for taking part in the 2021 Capitol riot. I wish to be on record for having nothing against cowboys nor against American traditions, with some exceptions. But any exception someone sees about something does not justify accepting a big lie because of one’s “gut feeling.” Basic respect and search for the truth is a minimum condition for any rational human endeavor, an idea that any education worth its salt should instill in each individual. Otherwise, we are begging for government of the guts, by the guts, for the guts. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Nonprofits and Economic Calculation

In a recent post at Longterm Liberalism, I discussed how the calculation problem applies to the nonprofit sector. While nonprofit organizations purchase factor inputs in markets, they do not sell the goods and services they produce. And as their name suggests, they do not receive profit-and-loss feedback. This lack of feedback means that decision-makers at nonprofits do not know whether they have created value for those they hope to benefit, especially if they hope to benefit people other than their donors and employees. I’m certainly not the first Austrian school economist to discuss this issue. Peter J. Boettke and David L. Prychitko discussed it in much more detail in an article in Conversations on Philanthropy. As they explain: “Voluntary nonprofit organizations and associations may, and surely do, purchase or lease inputs on the market, and are therefore guided by prices at that stage, but they don’t price their “product” or service (however they define it). They engage in unilateral transfers, providing a scarce service to others without the exchange of money (or any other commodity, for that matter) in return (Boulding 1981, ch. 1). They do have access to market processes (and, of course, political processes). Being “in” the commons does not imply they are divorced from other social institutions and processes. Yet, although nonprofits can undertake measurements, and, if encouraged, a rational assessment of their outcomes (using both quantitative and qualitative means), they have no way of calculating the realized results against the expected results. Nonprofit organizations and associations cannot, in other words, calculate the residual or monetary value-added of their endeavor, ex ante or ex post. In this sense, nonprofit is a better term for those that don’t price their service or product. There is no calculated monetary profit.” However, they argue that this inability to calculate need not mean that nonprofit organizations fail in some serious sense. They elaborate extensively on this: “Nonprofits are not isolated islands of human activity within the voluntary sector—the commons. Like another institution, the family, participants in nonprofits are themselves embedded in the institutional matrix of the market economy. Nonprofits have prices to guide them, particularly when purchasing or leasing inputs. In this way they can coordinate their resource demands with the supplies of resource providers, and they can and do participate in the knowledge-disseminating features of the market process. Although they cannot calculate the value added of their efforts, they can determine whether their specific goals and efforts are worthwhile. Nonprofits have to persuade prospective donors that their effort is worthwhile, of course. Rather than persuade them with the lure or calculated signal of monetary profit, however, they must turn to noncalculative but measurable or assessable means. The lack of economic calculation does not in itself create any impediment to coordination. Likewise, there can be no theoretically sustainable notion of “voluntary failure” such as that proposed by Salamon. The objection might be made, however, that application of a subjective theory of value as proposed here cannot help produce overall efficient allocation of philanthropic resources (or of tax-generated resources for welfare). Here, more broad accomplishment of plan fulfillment must suffice in the necessary absence of some more comprehensive yet undefinable and unattainable standard of social optimality. Even against the Pareto standard, there is little justification for criticizing nonprofit firms as failing in terms of efficiency. We suggest that the managers of nonprofits, “social entrepreneurs,” and their donors are able to make rational decisions about the effectiveness of their activities even though they cannot calculate the value added in a monetary sense—calculation being, again, a dollar measure of the total costs of their efforts and the total benefits of their efforts, the difference being monetary profit (or loss). We would add that they would have a greater incentive than government officials to assess effectiveness, because unlike Mises’s councilmen they cannot rely upon the power to tax. Instead, they must depend upon the voluntary contributions of their donors. This, of course, is problematic in our society, where many nonprofits often bypass the responsibility of persuasion and voluntary exchange and instead seek support from the state (not unlike many private business enterprises). In this regard, to accept Salamon’s advocacy of third-party government, which in effect seeks to legitimate nonprofit firms as arms of state action, would further weaken the effectiveness of nonprofit organizations by encouraging them to engage more in political rent-seeking than in marketplace persuasion.” Requiring nonprofits to persuade donors guards against the tendency towards rent-seeking and ensures that nonprofits will at least benefit their donors more than they cost them, nonprofits often claim to be pursuing more high-minded goals. They often purport to improve the lives of individuals who will never donate to the nonprofit organization, nor supply any factor input to it. To learn whether they are succeeding in such high-minded goals, they need some other way of assessing their actions. As Boettke and Prychitko acknowledge: “In an independent nonprofit sector, actors must rely on the signal of voluntary contributions and construct measures of output to show that desired results are, in fact, being achieved. This is an admittedly difficult project, not only for the real-world participants within this sector but also for theorists striving to explain the coordinating properties of the sector.” Boettke and Prychitko offer good reasons to reject Lester Salamon’s proposals for government intervention meant to prevent purported “failure” in the nonprofit sector. But the question of how nonprofit decision-makers can best learn and guide their efforts to improve the world is still an open and important one. The community of “effective altruists” engage in a variety of forms of analysis, contestation, empirical and theoretical work, and discussion to try to discover how to improve the world through philanthropy, research, and other voluntary action. But they’re certainly not the only people engaged in these kinds of projects. Some nonprofit organizations attempt to construct market-like mechanisms within their organizations to learn more about how to serve others. For example, in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Canice Prendergast explains how the nonprofit Feeding America “switched from a centralized queuing system, where food banks would wait their turn, to a market-based mechanism where they bid daily on truckloads of food using a ‘fake’ currency called shares.” Another example of the use of market logic to serve aid recipients more effectively can be seen in the work of GiveDirectly, which offers direct cash transfers to desperately poor recipients. This enables the recipients to buy whatever they value most with the cash, rather than simply receiving whatever decision-makers at a nonprofit think they might need. Of course, not all decisions made within nonprofits can use quasi-market mechanisms. And we should not pretend that we can design anything that will act as a proxy or replacement for economic calculation. But philanthropists and social entrepreneurs can engage in various forms of social learning as they seek to better help others. Nathan P. Goodman is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Economics at New York University. His research interests include defense and peace economics, self-governance, public choice, institutional analysis, and Austrian economics. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Intelligent Reply from the US Oil & Gas Association

On July 2, president Joe Biden tweeted one of the brilliant statements the last few US presidents have got the whole world used too: The US Oil & Gas Association tweeted a reply the same day. We might expect the usual empty PR of businessmen scared of government bullies and ignorant of the ways of the world. But this reply, or part of it, was rather intelligent: Ignore the first sentence. What exactly are private oil and gas producers working on? Figuring out what their marching orders are and how to obey, instead of charging as much as their competitors charge just as consumers will pay as little as they can? Making Biden believe that he is to American private oil suppliers what Nicolas Maduro is to state oil company PDVSA? But the second sentence is worth repeating as it seems to emphasize with humor the principles of economics in a free enterprise economy: In the meantime – have a Happy 4th and please make sure the WH intern who posted this tweet registers for Econ 101 for the fall semester… (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Ideas don’t stay discredited forever

A few weeks ago, I did a post pointing out that the quality of public policy was declining sharply during the 21st century. I see similar arguments all over the place. The Economist has a long article on trends in Latin America that points to a serious deterioration in the quality of governance.  Voters there are increasingly choosing really bad candidates on the far left and the far right over more sensible technocrats. Tyler Cowen has a piece in Bloomberg, suggesting that public attitudes are to blame: My fear, quite simply, is that we have entered an age in which the popular taste for good political outcomes, and fair political processes, is much weaker than it used to be. You might think that people would always want at least decent political outcomes, but that hypothesis has gotten increasingly hard to defend in the last 10 years, both in the US and globally. Attachment to democracy, for instance, seems significantly weaker, as does love for capitalism. People’s tastes are being pulled in different directions, whether it be the Proud Boys or the extremely woke.All of which is to say, a rather simple and unglorified possibility is becoming more likely: People have stopped wanting good things to happen. I suspect that is correct, but it begs for an explanation.  Tyler points out that there are no obvious answers: I realize this explanation is banal and does not hold much emotional appeal. Many people prefer conspiracy theories, or tightly structured theoretical hypotheses, or to pin the blame on some particular political faction, usually one they oppose. Or they focus on some very specific issue, such as climate change. I view all of those problems, real though they may be, as downstream from the more fundamental issue: Why haven’t our systems of government responded better to whatever particular dilemmas concern us most? One possibility is that good periods occur when the public learns “lessons” from previous mistakes.  When I look back on my life, I can recall certain lessons that grew out of historical events.  In school during the 1960s, the lessons of the first half of the 2oth century loomed large.  We were taught: 1. Authoritarian nationalism was a great evil, which had led to two world wars. 2. McCarthyism was also viewed as evil, resulting in a sort of “cancel culture”. As I got older, there were additional lessons: 3.  The Chinese Cultural Revolution was seen as an example of egalitarianism run amok, as innocent people were shamed merely because they had wealthy ancestors. 4.  By the time I left graduate school, socialism was increasingly seen as being discredited (although the capitalist welfare state was still viewed positively.) When I see modern conservatives touting the advantages of authoritarian nationalism or trying to overturn democratic elections, I am shocked by what seems to me to be an ignorance of history.  I get the same reaction when I see progressives call for a sort of cancel culture, or price controls, or identity politics where some groups are shamed for being “privileged”.  Don’t these people know anything about history? We need to remember that not 1 person in 20 is serious about education.  Even many straight A students are just going through the motions to get good grades in order to get a good job.  We should not expect the public to understand what’s wrong with nationalism or socialism.  Why should they? In the decades after WWII, any American politician sounding like an authoritarian nationalist would have been rejected in the way an immunized body rejects a foreign virus.  Ditto for socialist ideas after the Soviet Union collapsed.  But immunization doesn’t last forever. In the past, we’ve had to go through some very painful historical events in order for the general public to learn its “lessons”.  Is there a less painful way to immunize the public against bad ideas?  PS.  Surely Putin’s recent actions constitute some sort of lesson for the public, albeit an extremely painful one for the Ukrainian people.  It triggered a rare piece of good news—the decision by Sweden and Finland to join NATO (and increasing support for NATO in the Pacific.) Happy 4th of July! (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Re-Imagining Medicine

Twice per year a group of medical students and I put on a “Mini Medical School” for high school students in our city’s public school system. About 50 students, nearly all from disadvantaged backgrounds, gather for a day at our medical school, attending a special class and learning a variety of medical skills in our simulation center. One year, one of the volunteer medical students putting on the program told the story of his own improbable path into medicine. A former kindergarten-through-12th-grade student in the same public school system, he shared how during his younger years, every time he told his teachers that he wanted to become a doctor, they would counsel him that he was being unrealistic, that his prospects for finding a path into medicine were vanishingly small, and that he should choose some more feasible educational path, such as learning a trade. He and his story captivated the high schoolers. What most impressed them was less what he said than his presence—there he stood, a fourth-year medical student who looked like them, but in a white coat, with a stethoscope draped around his neck, just one month from receiving his medical degree. Nothing could have more fired the students’ imagination about what was possible for them. In him and his story the students could see their own reflections. By the end, it felt as though every student in that room had grown two inches taller. Adam Smith recognizes that when we talk about the moral imagination, we often do so in connection with the sympathy we feel for the suffering of others. Yet Smith also recognizes that sympathy can act far beyond the bounds of misfortune. Just as we can imagine the pain or sorrow a person must be enduring as a result of an injury or illness, we can also imagine how it would feel to be told that something you happen to want very much is impossible for you. These high school students—many of whom came from single-parent families—qualified for free school lunches, and had no family members or neighbors who worked in health care, emerged from their encounter with their public-school predecessor suspecting, and in some cases convinced, that more might be possible for them than they had been led to believe, feeling more determined than ever to pursue it. Many of them, too, had been told by teachers or family members that, because of where they were coming from, such destinations in life were impossible for them to reach. Yet now, for the first time, they could see themselves as participants in the same larger story as the medical student, and their sense of the range of possibilities before them was both expanded and transformed. The key was less to give them more information than to nourish their imaginations, enabling them to see themselves in a role they had not considered realistic. Unfortunately, the stunting of imagination in medicine is not restricted to disadvantaged youth who never before dreamed of careers as physicians. It continues long after high school into college education and beyond into medical school and even the practice of medicine itself. Many physicians experience it throughout their careers. The fundamental problem is this—conformity. From their first days in school, most physicians are taught not to make mistakes. Consider the ubiquity of multiple-choice testing. When they take examinations, their mission is to select the “one best response” from a predetermined set of answer choices. Every question on every test has one right response, in comparison to which each of the other options is incorrect. The correct response has been designated by the teacher or the psychometrician who designed the question. Examinees are not asked to argue the relative merits of different available responses or to consider alternative conditions under which other options might be preferable, but simply to choose from a, b, c, d, or e. From the earliest years of schooling, this contributes to the presumption that what needs to be known is already known, and that to perform well, students simply need to commit it to memory. The central task of the student is to memorize, imitate, and above all, conform to expectations. The reasons that medical education relies so heavily on multiple-choice testing are not difficult to fathom. To begin with, it is both efficient and inexpensive. It might take hours for a faculty member or evaluator to assess a learner’s oral or essay responses, but multiple-choice responses can be graded almost instantaneously and in large numbers by a computer. Moreover, compared to oral and essay-based forms of evaluation, in which the judgment of an evaluator plays a prominent role, multiple-choice testing appears to be both fair and objective. Every student takes exactly the same examination, and every examination is graded exactly the same way, creating the impression of a subjectivity—and hence bias-free form of evaluation. Finally, the examination can be administered in more or less exactly the same way at many different geographic sites and times without adding substantially to costs. Of course, there are corresponding downsides, including the fact that evaluation is not tailored to the distinctive interests and abilities of each learner, capacities such as curiosity, creativity, and resilience go unassessed—any human element of assessment is lost—and learners often feel they are being treated as numbers rather than people. The lack of dialogue between learner and evaluator means that conformity rules, as all possibility of dialogue is completely forsaken. Another sign of medicine’s culture of conformity can be found in the contemporary state of medical records. Several decades ago, before such records were computerized, physicians wrote “notes” on their patients. Whether an inpatient or outpatient, every patient had a chart, and physicians would make notes following each patient encounter, capturing such elements as past medical history, the story of the present illness, the findings of physical examination and laboratory testing, and plans for further diagnostic evaluation and care. This approach required the physician to think everything through and formulate a coherent plan. In a sense, every physician was a storyteller, and one of the signs of excellence was the ability to formulate a succinct but comprehensive and coherent account of the patient’s care. Today, by contrast, a great deal of the medical record is composed by selecting items from lists of available choices and drop-down menus. Medical students and physicians are not asked to formulate an account but to populate a template. And in most cases, the lists of options are constructed as much or more for coding and billing purposes—making sure the practice or hospital complies with regulations and gets paid—as they are to foster good patient care. Many patients can relate to the feeling that their physician is more focused on satisfying the requirements of the medical record system than listening to their story. Still another indicator of the ascendancy of compliance culture is medicine’s growing reliance on policies and procedures. Fewer and fewer physicians are engaged in solo and small-group practice, and more and more are going to work for large single- and multiple-specialty groups, hospitals, and health systems, not as independent professionals with an ownership interest in their practices but as employees. As a result, medicine is becoming increasingly bureaucratized. In a small group, everyone can know everyone else, and operations can be based to a large degree on personal acquaintance, respect, and trust. But as more and more physicians work in organizations with hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of employees, it becomes impossible to base practice on personal relationships, and, to an increasing extent, organizations rely on generic policies and procedures. As greater emphasis is placed on compliance, the distinctive excellences of each physician tend to be devalued. What matters most is not whether care was customized to the needs of each individual patient but whether the physician followed protocols meant to apply to all patients. As a result, the practice of medicine tends to undergo depersonalization, and physicians come to resemble functionaries in a production process, what some have called “assembly-line medicine.” The problem, of course, is that creating an imperative to conform to expectations prioritizes convention, the avoidance of deviation from standards, the earning of credentials, and the control of thought processes over innovation, risk taking, the pursuit of new knowledge, asking previously unformulated questions, and discovery. Physicians are molded into the kind of people who know what they are taught to know and do what they are taught to do and who fear making mistakes—deviating from standards and expectations—more than almost anything. In this model of premedical and medical education, the best students are not the ones who ask the best questions but the ones whose responses most often conform to the answer key. They know the textbooks of today forward and backwards, but they have become less and less well-equipped to write the textbooks of tomorrow. “To perform well as physicians, it is not enough to know the disease. It is necessary to know the patient, and to recall that we are not just treating diseases but also first and foremost caring for patients with diseases.” For a variety of reasons, this is a problem. For one thing, the riddle of human health and disease has not yet been solved, and we humans are still subject to a barrage of diseases for which cures are quite a long way off—among them cancers of various types, heart disease, and dementia. If we keep answering the same questions in the same way, these scourges will continue unabated. It is quite possible that in many cases, we have not been posing the right questions. Patients afflicted with these and many other diseases need physicians who can ask good questions, not just to arrive at a correct diagnosis and prescribe appropriate therapy, but also to understand the roots of disease in the lives of patients and to help patients coping with their conditions lead the best lives of which they are capable. To perform well as physicians, it is not enough to know the disease. It is necessary to know the patient, and to recall that we are not just treating diseases but also first and foremost caring for patients with diseases. The stunting of skepticism, creativity, and risk taking takes a toll on physicians, by preventing them from developing fully as professionals and persons. In the words of John Stuart Mill, “A state that dwarfs its people, even for beneficial purposes, will soon find that with small people no really great thing can be accomplished.” The medical profession needs to stop dwarfing its members. Consider an even richer story. Charlie Dotter and Bill Cook helped to usher in a revolution in medicine. Dotter was an academic physician in Oregon, now often referred to as the “father of interventional medicine.” Cook was an entrepreneur who built the world’s largest privately held medical device manufacturer out of a two-bedroom apartment in Bloomington, Indiana. Dotter and Cook first met one another at a medical trade show in Chicago in 1963. It soon became clear that Dotter was a rare physician, someone who loved to innovate and take risks. A radiologist, he was once asked to inject dye into the main artery of an elderly diabetic patient’s leg, to see whether the surgeon would need to amputate below or above the knee. She had developed infected foot ulcers that were not healing, and taking her leg seemed the only way to preserve her life. When Dotter saw the artery, however, he discovered a very short narrowing that he thought he could open up by passing progressively larger catheters through it. When he did so, circulation to the foot was restored, and over time, her ulcers healed. She ended up living an additional two years, eventually succumbing to pneumonia, but she died with two feet and all ten of her toes. Dotter was not conforming to standards. He was exploding them, opening up a radically new mode of therapy for narrowings and blockages throughout the body. Most of the culture of medical education could be likened to a spelling bee. In such a setting, the student who wins is the one who can spell words correctly. Dotter, by contrast, was inventing new words. He was not reciting from the textbooks of the past but helping to write the textbooks of the future. By all accounts, Dotter’s imagination was not dwarfed but developed to gigantic proportions. He was constantly coming up with new ideas. For one reason or another, many of these ideas were bad. Some offered too few benefits or carried too high a risk, and others simply would not work. But Dotter kept imagining and trying out, and from his fertile imagination sprang many ideas that have become standards in contemporary medicine. He did not allow his fear of making a mistake to prevent him from conjuring up and trying out something new. Instead, he imagined boldly and followed his ideas. In this respect, he represented a stark contrast to the habits inculcated by contemporary medical education, which tends to make avoiding mistakes the highest priority and implicitly encourages learners to attempt very little beyond memorizing what they are told. From Dotter’s point of view, perhaps the greatest sin against medicine is not to make a mistake but to fail to attempt something that matters. Bill Cook was a nearly perfect complement to Dotter. He, too, had once attended medical school, but after a few days of classes, he realized that he had placed himself on a kind of assembly line. For years to come, he and his classmates would enroll in the same classes, sit through the same lectures, and take the same tests. Concerned that such an environment would be stifling for him, he spoke to the dean, asking how long he could continue to test the waters before it would be impossible for another student on the waiting list to take his place. The dean told him he had a week. At the end of that week, Cook returned and resigned his place in medical school. He did not want to be injected into the same mold as every other student. He wanted to play a role in refashioning the mold. So he started his own company, making his products in the second bedroom of his family’s small apartment. His company made the guidewires, catheters, and other devices that Dotter and physicians like him needed to create a new medical field of image-guided diagnosis and therapy. He and Dotter would make prototypes out of guitar strings, automobile speedometer cables, and vinyl insulation stripped from telecommunication cables. One of Cook’s first employees recalled that he loved to try out something new, and he was “willing to risk everything if he believed in what you were doing.” It did not take long for Dotter and Cook’s innovations to attract attention. A 1964 magazine article features photos of Dotter performing what was then one of the world’s first angioplasties, opening up an artery in a patient’s leg. Again, one of Cook’s first employees reports what it was like to see products they had made by hand in Cook’s two-bedroom apartment. “Holy cow,” he said, “we are really making a difference here.” Dotter’s thirst for innovation was so fierce that in some cases he made his colleagues uncomfortable. One time he was presenting at grand rounds at his hospital, talking about the advances in medicine that might be possible if a catheter could be placed in the heart and measurements taken of the pressure in different chambers. To the surprise and horror of his audience, Dotter then rolled up his sleeve and revealed that he had placed such a catheter in his own heart, which he then hooked up to a device and used to display his own pressures. Many feared that Dotter would drop dead on the spot, but he did not, and such pressure measurements have since become routine in the care of seriously ill patients. Cook was known for telling his employees to try something. Even if it didn’t work, it would get them involved in the problem, formulating, testing out, and refining their own ideas. Cook did not care about the educational pedigree or academic honors of his employees. For example, one of the most successful presidents of the company started out as a secretary, answering the phone, greeting people who came in the front door, and handling Cook’s correspondence. She did not have advanced academic credentials such as an MD or PhD, an MBA, or even a college degree. In fact, she had never attended college. But she was an eager learner, paid close attention to how the company operated, and understood most of the employees of the company, partly because she shared their background. Another Cook president had been a high school music teacher and band director, but Cook admired the way he dealt with people. What mattered most to Cook was not a transcript or a resume but whether a prospective employee was the kind of person who latched on to a job, took responsibility for making sure it was done right, and truly cared about the quality of work they did. As one early employee said, he did not look over people’s shoulders, because he knew they were the kind of people who cared about improving the quality of the work for its own sake. And Cook cared about his employees. He was often seen walking around the production floor, talking with people, and he and the company’s other leaders made it a point to have only one dining room, ensuring that everyone ate lunch together. Cook’s leaders operated not by sitting in a board room and formulating strategic plans or generating policies and procedures to which everyone must conform. Instead, they spent most of their time out in the field, meeting and talking with physicians. The goal of Cook’s field representatives was not to sell products—in fact, they were not allowed to take orders. Their goal was to listen to physicians, find out what problems they faced and how Cook might collaborate with them to design and produce solutions, and to make sure that their ideas for improving patient care had a chance to see the light of day. Cook was a company built not from the board room or the C-suite but from the front lines, the company’s relationships with physicians such as Dotter. This approach turned out to be highly conducive to innovation. Of course, many ideas did not pan out, but others did, and this helped to usher in a new era of image-guided, minimally invasive medical diagnosis and therapy. The goal was not to follow convention, avoid making mistakes, ensure that everyone held the appropriate credentials, control every word and action of every employee, or to confine people to a set of policies and procedures, but to foster creativity, collaboration, and risk taking that could enhance the care of patients. For more on these topics, see “Insights from Adam Smith on the Erosion of Sympathy in Medicine,” by Richard Gunderman. Adam Smith Works, June 23, 2021. Medical School: A Whistleblower’s Story, by Bryan Caplan. EconLog, Feb. 28 2018. “A Cure for Our Health Care Ills: The Supply Side,” by Charles L. Hooper and David R. Henderson. Econlib, Oct. 1, 2018. Such a culture is sorely needed in medicine today, when despite advances in knowledge and the expenditure of ever-greater amounts of money, the pace of biomedical innovation has slowed considerably since the period of 1950 to the 1980s. Numerous factors are responsible, but one of the most important is the growing culture of compliance that dominates the careers of physicians beginning during the earliest years of formal education and continuing right through to their final days of practice. We are not selecting for, nurturing, or rewarding imagination in medicine to the degree we should, and patients, physicians, and our society are paying the price for it. To reverse this trend, we need to recognize and explore more deeply both the costs of conformity and the rich bounty that can arise from fostering creativity. Just as disadvantaged high school students can discover new career paths in medicine, so medical students and practicing physicians can discover new pathways of innovation in medical education and practice, which will enable them to push the envelope of excellence in medicine. Physicians are bright people, and we sacrifice a great deal when we stunt the development of their imaginations. As we unfetter their creative faculty, we are likely to realize benefits not only in biomedical innovation but also in the fruits of moral imagination as manifested in relationships with patients. *Richard Gunderman is Chancellor’s Professor of Radiology, Pediatrics, Medical Education, Philosophy, Liberal Arts, Philanthropy, and Medical Humanities and Health Studies at Indiana University. He is also John A Campbell Professor of Radiology and in 2019-21 serves as Bicentennial Professor. He received his AB Summa Cum Laude from Wabash College; MD and PhD (Committee on Social Thought) with honors from the University of Chicago; and MPH from Indiana University. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Hollywood’s Monetary Policy

A Book Review of The Lords of Easy Money: How the Federal Reserve Broke the American Economy, by Christopher Leonard.1 Many great movies are “based on a true story”—meaning some parts are true, but the details, even entire plotlines, are embellished with what is sometimes called “poetic license.” Though it’s not on the big screen (yet), Christopher Leonard’s The Lords of Easy Money: How the Federal Reserve Broke the American Economy is the Hollywood version of monetary policy. Leonard explains the Federal Reserve’s activities with an engaging narrative that exposes many difficulties of setting monetary policy as well as the dangerous consequences when those policies are wrong. To do that, however, the author shoehorns complex economic issues into a simple storyline that gives many false impressions about the monetary and financial system. Thomas Hoenig plays the hero in this story. During his time at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in the 1970s and1980s, Hoenig witnessed banks expand their risky lending based on inflated prices and overly optimistic projections. By 1991, he rose to become the president of the regional reserve bank and served on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which decides the Fed’s monetary policy. Hoeing was later named vice chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) where he championed stricter regulations for United States banks. Current Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, who began his career as a corporate attorney and investment banker before moving into private equity with the prestigious Carlyle Group, is cast as the villain. Leonard focuses on Powel’s work with the corporation Rexnord, which, in Leonard’s telling, was pushed to repeatedly increase leverage and cut costs until it was forced to lay off part of its United States workforce and move operations to a plant in Mexico. Leonard also documents Powell’s transition from a Fed Governor and an early critic of the first quantitative easing (QE) program to becoming the main advocate of such policies in his role as Fed chair since 2018. The main focus of Lords of Easy Money is the Fed’s role in directing—or misdirecting—credit. As an independent central bank, the Fed’s objective is, or at least should be, to support the needs of trade and the financial system rather than influencing where funds are channeled and invested. Leonard explains in detail how excessively expansionary policy—particularly the massive monetary injections under QE—can seep into overleveraged financial markets, driving asset price inflation, reach for yield, and excessive risk taking. The core of the book is dedicated to exposing the repeated cycle of the Fed driving financial risk through easy credit conditions and the buildup of risks across the entire financial system until the economy crashes into recession. Leonard blames Fed policy for a variety of economic and social ills, including an increasingly fragile financial system, heightened income inequality, even the off-shoring of manufacturing—an ongoing trend since the 1970s. “While we should surely be wary of Fed-induced risk taking and credit misallocation, I’m skeptical that this was a major problem in the QE period.” What is fact versus fiction in this story? While we should surely be wary of Fed-induced risk taking and credit misallocation, I’m skeptical that this was a major problem in the QE period. Yes, the Fed created unprecedented trillions in new base money from 2008 to 2014. But the book barely touches on the most significant change ever in the Fed’s monetary policy: its transition from a corridor system of monetary policy to a floor system when it began paying interest on the excess reserves (IOER) that banks held at the Fed. Because the Fed was paying banks interest to hold reserves, the vast majority of money created by QE was left sitting on bank balance sheets rather than being lent out into the economy. While this topic remains divisive among economists, my recent paper in the Journal of Macroeconomics2 finds that the Fed’s payment of IOER caused banks to reduce their lending, likely stunting the effects of QE. Rather than driving risk-taking in the financial system, the banks held onto the newly-created, ultra-safe base money because the Fed was paying them to do so. Could the new money added by QE have led to asset price inflation in the broader financial system? Perhaps, but this seems unlikely. Consumer price inflation repeatedly undershot the Fed’s two percent target for almost an entire decade. The Fed could have done more QE, but it probably could have achieved its target by doing less QE if it had lowered the rate of IOER, which was set higher than short-term market interest rates for most of the period. Leonard doesn’t say how to identify asset price inflation, but the combination of below-target consumer price inflation, reduced lending, and higher-than-market rates of IOER seems to indicate that money was—if anything—too tight in this period, so it was probably not driving a major price bubble in financial assets. This criticism is especially true of the Great Recession of 2007-2009. As Scott Sumner has thoroughly exposed, the major contraction in 2008 resulted from excessively tight, not loose, monetary policy. Hoenig and a few other FOMC members vocally opposed monetary expansion. They even proposed raising interest rates during this period. This opposition inhibited the Fed’s monetary expansion, which almost certainly increased the severity of the recession. So while excessively loose monetary policy can indeed be a problem, it doesn’t appear to have been an issue in 2008 or the decade that followed. Of course, an enlarged Fed balance sheet can also lead to credit misallocation, as George Selgin has dubbed “Fiscal QE,” just not in the way described in the book. The dangers of resource misallocation and heightened financial risk seem more plausible in the recent QE period starting in 2020. High inflation has made appropriate risk analysis more difficult. The Fed kept interest rates near zero despite the highest inflation in 40 years and nearly the lowest unemployment rates since World War II. Fed officials failed to act to curtail its monetary stimulus and ignored the warning signs of high inflation. Only time will tell if Fed policy has, in fact, created the negative effects discussed by Leonard such as excessive leverage and increased financial fragility. Aside from monetary policy, the book discusses how Fed officials came under great political pressure during the coronavirus pandemic. The Fed coordinated with the Treasury on its monetary policy and lending programs, which, in conjunction with the Coronavirus Aid, Recover, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, allowed it to go far beyond its normal emergency lending role. The Fed provided funds to nonbank companies and state and local governments, things former Fed Chairs Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen said the Fed should never do. In contrast, Chair Powell promised the Fed would do “whatever it takes” to support the economy. Fed officials have bowed to political pressure to pursue climate and social goals that are clearly outside its legal mandate.3 Another thing the book gets right is Hoenig’s criticism of the complexity of Unite bank capital regulations. Like a complex tax code, complex regulations allow banks to evade the burden or regulation. Because regulators cannot perfectly identify the riskiness of every asset, complexity can encourage banks to take more risk than they normally would. These rules incentivized banks to increase their holdings of highly rated MBSs and credit default obligations (CDOs) leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. Studies by researchers from the Bank of England, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and even the Federal Reserve Bank of New York have all found that complex regulations are not better predictors of bank risk than simple measures such as the equity capital ratio. Complex regulations have large costs and small (possibly negative) benefits.4 There are important lessons to be learned, and even readers who are already skeptical of the Fed will appreciate the thoroughness of Leonard’s explanations. Unfortunately, many “facts” and economic explanations in the book are either inadequately explained or just plain wrong. There are many minor errors and misrepresentations. Leonard’s critiques often are politically one-sided. He regularly calls for government intervention, but he generally fails to recognize government as the source of such problems or that private entrepreneurs might provide superior solutions. For more on these topics, see Thomas Hoenig on Inflation and the Federal Reserve. Great Antidote Podcast. The 2008 Financial Crisis, by Arnold Kling. Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Scott Sumner on Monetary Policy. EconTalk. It’s possible that Leonard is right about the extent of asset price inflation. Alas, the high number of factual errors in the book make it difficult to evaluate his claims. He provides little evidence that monetary policy has caused higher income inequality, lower economic productivity, or changes in manufacturing technology—all of which seem to be mostly caused by nonmonetary factors. Lords of Easy Money provides a gripping introduction to the dangers of faulty monetary policy, but readers should be skeptical of the Hollywood version. Should we be critical of Fed policy? Yes. Should we worry about resource misallocation and excessive financial risk? Absolutely. Should we blame every economic problem (real and imagined) on the Fed? As Tom Hoenig would say, “Respectfully, no.” Footnotes [1] Christopher Leonard, The Lords of Easy Money: How the Federal Reserve Broke the American Economy. Simon and Schuster, 2022. [2] Thomas Hogan, “Bank lending and interest on excess reserves: An empirical investigation,” Journal of Macroeconomics. Volume 69, September 2021. [3] Thomas Hogan, “The Renewed Politicization of the Federal Reserve,” American Institute for Economic Research, May 5, 2022. [4] Thomas Hogan, A Review of the Regulatory Impact Analysis of Risk-Based Capital and Related Liquidity Rules,” Journal of Risk and Financial Management. Volume 14(1), September 2020. *Thomas L. Hogan is a senior research faculty member at the American Institute for Economic Research. He was formerly the chief economist for the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. As an Amazon Associate, Econlib earns from qualifying purchases. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

Economic Thought Experiments

Perhaps the oddest thing of our soon-to-be present is that while the Americans revel in their petty, internal squabbles, they will barely notice that elsewhere !!! Lights will flicker and go dark. Famine’s leathery claws will dig deep and hold tight. Access to the inputs—financial and material and labor—that define the modern world will cease existing in sufficient quantity to make modernity possible… the last seventy-five years will be remembered as a golden age, and one that didn’t last nearly long enough at that. Peter Zeihan, The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization. (6)1 Peter Zeihan foresees globalization going into reverse. He may turn out to be correct. Just as he was finishing his book, The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization, the de-globalization process received a jump-start from the Russia-Ukraine War, along with the West’s participation via economic sanctions. But I hope instead that globalization is robust, and that The End turns out to be just a thought-experiment. Students of economics could benefit greatly by reading through this thought-experiment. Basic economic concepts like opportunity cost and the gains from trade are rarely made concrete. Instead, they are usually taught using simple paper exercises. In contrast, The End describes economic activity as it actually takes place, in all its modern complexity. “With less than ten percent of Americans working as factory production workers or agricultural laborers, the rest of us have little appreciation of how our basic needs get met.” With less than ten percent of Americans working as factory production workers or agricultural laborers, the rest of us have little appreciation of how our basic needs get met. This was brought home to me during the early weeks of the pandemic, when friends who are members of the laptop class complained about the fact that other people were out and about rather than staying home. I had to remind them that the people they were deriding as stupid and heedless of public health were making it possible for the rest of us to eat. Zeihan focuses on the basics: demographics, transportation, energy, industrial materials, manufacturing, and food production. He explains how these factors operated in pre-industrial societies, during the industrial revolution, and in the “golden age” of the last 75 years. And he describes what could happen if (when?) the foundation for prosperity erodes. He is pessimistic that world trade routes will remain peaceful and that countries will be able to adapt to rapidly declining birth rates. Economically, this will produce a vicious cycle. … reduced interaction means reduced access means reduced income means fewer economies of scale means less labor specialization means reduced interaction… Everyone becomes less efficient. Less productive. And that means less of everything: not just electronics but electricity, not just automobiles but gasoline, not just fertilizer but food… Electricity shortages gut manufacturing. Food shortages gut the population. Fewer people means less chance of keeping anything that requires specialized labor working. Say, things like road construction or the electrical grid or food production. That is what “decivilization” means: a cascade of reinforcing breakdowns that do not simply damage, but destroy, the bedrock of what makes the modern world function. (66) Global transportation costs have come down in recent years. Some of this comes from inventions, such as the container ship. Some of it comes from low energy costs, as we have discovered more oil and more ways to extract oil. And much of it comes from America’s perceived need to protect the non-Communist world and ensure freedom of the seas. Zeihan sees the fall of Communism as reducing America’s motivation to be the world’s policeman. With no policeman, he predicts trade will be more often disrupted by war and piracy. Violence will impose a large tax on transportation. Anything that raises the marginal cost of transport increases friction throughout the system. Simply a 1 percent increase in the cost of a subsidiary part largely obliterates the economics of an existing supply chain. Most locations will count themselves fortunate if their transport costs increase by only one hundred percent (387) In his book, Zeihan dives into the specifics of how the world produces and trades food, energy, and manufactured goods. He clearly explains the feedback loops involved. Perhaps the most interesting chapters concern energy. Although Zeihan is a believer in the dangers of climate change, his analysis shows that “green energy” fails, even on its own terms. In order to generate, transmit, and store solar and wind power, we need to build solar panels, wind farms, batteries, and new transmission systems. The cost of doing so, including the carbon dioxide that will be released in that atmosphere in the process, is daunting. Zeihan starts with the limited availability of reliable solar and wind power. Zones for which today’s greentech makes both environmental and economic sense comprise less than one-fifth of the land area of the populated continents, most of which is far removed from our major population centers. Think Patagonia for wind, or the Outback for solar. The unfortunate fact is that greentech in its current form simply isn’t useful for most people in most places—either to reduce carbon emissions or to provide a substitute for energy inputs. (265) Zeihan notes the energy density of fossil fuels. Fossil fuels are so concentrated that they are literally “energy” in physical form. In contrast, all greentechs require space. Solar is the worst of the bunch: it is roughly one thousand times less dense than systems powered by conventional means… … All [cities] are by definition densely populated, while greentech by definition is dense. Squaring that circle even in sunny and windy locations will require massive infrastructure to bridge the gap between dense population patterns and far more dispersed greentech electricity-generating systems. Such infrastructure would be on a scale and of a scope that humanity has not yet attempted. The alternative is to empty the cities and unwind six thousand years of history. (268) For more on these topics, see Opportunity Cost, by David R. Henderson. Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. “Free Trade and Globalization: More than ‘Just Stuff’,” by Donald J. Boudreaux. Econlib, Nov. 1, 2010. “Order and the Wealth of Nations,” by Arnold Kling. Econlib, May 4, 2020. I hope that people read and come away with a better appreciation of what makes our modern world possible. We are highly specialized. We are very interdependent. Our energy production and distribution system is remarkably efficient. Those who would like to stifle global trade and/or fossil fuels should understand just how primitive we might live if their ideologies prevail. Footnotes [1] The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization, by Peter Zeihan *Arnold Kling has a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of several books, including Crisis of Abundance: Rethinking How We Pay for Health Care; Invisible Wealth: The Hidden Story of How Markets Work; Unchecked and Unbalanced: How the Discrepancy Between Knowledge and Power Caused the Financial Crisis and Threatens Democracy; and Specialization and Trade: A Re-introduction to Economics. He contributed to EconLog from January 2003 through August 2012. Read more of what Arnold Kling’s been reading. For more book reviews and articles by Arnold Kling, see the Archive. As an Amazon Associate, Econlib earns from qualifying purchases. (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More

The Positive Externalities of the American Revolution

I used to line up an article every month for Econlib, from 2008 to 2019. My favorite was one by Jeff Hummel in 2018. It’s titled “Benefits of the American Revolution: An Exploration of Positive Externalities.” Here are the opening two paragraphs: It has become de rigueur, even among libertarians and classical liberals, to denigrate the benefits of the American Revolution. Thus, libertarian Bryan Caplan writes:  “Can anyone tell me why American independence was worth fighting for?… [W]hen you ask about specific libertarian policy changes that came about because of the Revolution, it’s hard to get a decent answer. In fact, with 20/20 hindsight, independence had two massive anti-libertarian consequences: It removed the last real check on American aggression against the Indians, and allowed American slavery to avoid earlier—and peaceful—abolition.”1 One can also find such challenges reflected in recent mainstream writing, both popular and scholarly. In fact, the American Revolution, despite all its obvious costs and excesses, brought about enormous net benefits not just for citizens of the newly independent United States but also, over the long run, for people across the globe. Speculations that, without the American Revolution, the treatment of the indigenous population would have been more just or that slavery would have been abolished earlier display extreme historical naivety. Indeed, a far stronger case can be made that without the American Revolution, the condition of Native Americans would have been no better, the emancipation of slaves in the British West Indies would have been significantly delayed, and the condition of European colonists throughout the British empire, not just those in what became the United States, would have been worse than otherwise. Another excerpt: [Historian Gordon] Wood concludes that “Americans had become, almost overnight, the most liberal, the most democratic, the most commercially minded, and the most modern people in the world…. The Revolution not only radically changed the personal and social relations of people… but also destroyed aristocracy as it had been understood in the Western world for at least two millennia. The Revolution brought respectability and even dominance to ordinary people long held in contempt and gave dignity to their menial labor in a manner unprecedented in history and to a degree not equaled elsewhere in the world. The Revolution did not just eliminate monarchy and create republics; it actually reconstituted what Americans meant by public or state power.” Here’s a comment Jeff made in 2018 in response to some commenters: Even after military conflict broke out in April 1775, a majority of the Continental Congress did not favor independence until February 1776, and it was a slim majority. The first colony to actually instruct its delegates to vote for independence was North Carolina the following April. Thus we have nearly a year of hard fighting during which a majority of Patriots favored and expected to achieve reconciliation within the British Empire. It was Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, published in January 1776, that ultimately tipped the scales in favor of secession. Also the difference between the French and American Revolutions can be overdrawn. The American Revolution admittedly had no reign of terror, but the treatment of Loyalists could be quite appalling, with disturbing instances of brutality and killing. Given that many Loyalists fought for the British, some historians have started referring to the Revolution as a civil war, a term neither of you [the two people he’s responding to] consider. At the end of the War for Independence, an estimated 50,000 Loyalists left the United States, out of total population of 2.5 million. The French Revolution generated as many as 130,000 émigrés and deportees, out of a total population of 25 million. Thus the American Revolution produced refugees at almost four times the rate of the French Revolution. And while many émigrés eventually returned to France, very few Loyalists returned to the U.S. I still maintain that the American Revolution brought momentous benefits, but let us not overlook its costs and excesses. The picture above is of me with my Betsy Ross flag in front our house. I will be carrying it in the July 4 parade in Monterey later today. Happy, happy July 4.     (0 COMMENTS)

/ Learn More