Hayek and Buchanan on Institutions and Liberty


This conference explored Friedrich Hayek's and James Buchanan's understandings of economic and political ideas and institutions. The conference approached their writings from a comparative perspective in order to explore the differences and similarities in their thought in regard to liberty in society.


From Liberty Fund

Democracy in Deficit

by By James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner
Foreword by Robert D. Tollison

Democracy in Deficit is one of the early comprehensive attempts to apply the basic principles of public-choice analysis to macroeconomic theory and policy.

According to Robert D. Tollison in the foreword, “The central purpose of the book was to examine the simple precepts of Keynesian economics through the lens of…

/ Learn More

Additional Readings

Buchanan, James and Gordon Tullock. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1999.

Buchanan, James M. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 7, The Limits of Liberty––Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000.

Buchanan, James M. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2000.

Hayek, F. A. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Hayek, F. A. Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, 1980.

Hayek, Friedrich A. “James Buchanan interviews Friedrich A. Hayek (Part 1).” By James Buchanan. The Hayek Interviews (October 28, 1978). (accessed ).

Hayek, Friedrich A. Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 3: The Political Order of a Free People. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979.